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This dissertation studies patterns of strategic communication in cases, in which the involved parties
disagree in their preferences or opinions.
In Chapter 1, I study a model of strategic communication in networks, in which the players
diverge in their preferences and information can be communicated either through a costly verifi-
able information (hard) channel or through a low-cost cheap talk (soft) channel. I find that the
availability of hard links allows each agent to get a weakly greater number of truthful messages
compared to the pure cheap talk setting. If only one party bears the cost of a hard link, then
introducing hard links increases the total expected welfare. In contrast, if the cost of a hard link is
shared by both parties, then allowing for verifiable communication can decrease the total welfare.
In Chapter 2, I consider a model of strategic cheap talk communication in networks, in which the
players can disagree in their preferences or their opinions. I find that the information transmission
pattern crucially depends on the nature of the disagreement. If the agents diverge in their pref-
erences, then information transmission exhibits a negative externality effect : greater information
obtained by some agent discourages further information accumulation by harming the credibility
of other agents. In contrast, information transmission displays a positive externality effect when
the agents have divergent opinions: greater information obtained by some agent encourages further
information accumulation by improving the credibility of other agents.
Chapter 3 studies a benevolent authority’s decision to constrain or inform a population of
individuals. It demonstrates that the authority’s decision to regulate an activity depends on whether
she deems it a matter of preference or opinion. In the former case, the benevolent authority is
libertarian: she gives truthful advice and safeguards liberty. In the latter case, the benevolent
authority is paternalistic: believing that she acts in the individuals’ best interest, the authority
forces another action than the individuals would choose for themselves.
In Chapter 4, I consider communication between an informed Sender and an uninformed Re-
ceiver. The Sender has a preference bias and is guilt averse to letting down the Receiver’s payoff
expectations. I show that no separating equilibrium exists; rather, in case of uniform state of the
world and quadratic utilities, I demonstrate that there exist partition equilibria (as in Crawford
and Sobel (1982)). An increase in the guilt aversion intensity is akin a decrease in the preference
divergence: higher guilt aversion intensity allows for more intervals in the equilibrium partition;
and holding the number of elements in the partition fixed, greater guilt aversion intensity results
in more balanced intervals.
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1Summary
In many economic situations, people need to make judgements about the uncertain environ-
ment and choose the most appropriate actions that influence other agents as well. Oftentimes,
these decisions are based not only on the private information of the individuals, but also on the
information collected from other agents during preliminary discussions. When people differ in their
opinions or in their preferences, these features give rise to strategic communication. The goal of
this dissertation is to characterize the patterns of information transmission.
The basic framework of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 is the following. There are n players, each
player i receives a private signal si about the uncertain state of the world θ ∈ [0, 1]. Conditional
on θ, the signals are independent and identically distributed, with each si taking a value of 1 with
probability θ and 0 with complementary probability 1 − θ. Agents can simultaneously transmit
their private signals to each other according to the communication network. Finally, players pick
actions that influence all other agents.
Chapter 1. In Chapter 1, I study the communication in networks, where individuals can choose
between soft and hard information transmission. Soft links are very cheap to sustain, and corre-
spond to cheap talk communication (e.g., writing an email with a short summary). Hard links are
costly, and correspond to non-strategic direct revelation of the signal (e.g., personal meeting where
the receiving party is presented with all supporting evidence that allows to decode the underlying
signal). Individuals agree in their beliefs about the uncertain environment, but differ in their pref-
erences, so that player i’s payoff is −∑nj=1(yj − θ− bi)2. That is, player i with the preference bias
bi prefers that his action, as well as the actions of other players, are close to player i’s ideal action,
θ + bi.
While both parties always desire the truthful revelation of a signal from the ex-ante perspective,
there is a credibility issue in strategic communication via a soft link at the interim stage. Similar to
[Galeotti et al., 2011], I find a congestion effect in cheap talk communication. Namely, player i is
credible in reporting to player j as long as the number of truthful messages player j gets (called the
in-degree of player j and denoted by kj) is not that large compared to the preference divergence,
|bi − bj |.1 At the same time, the incentive to communicate through a hard link does not depend
1Intuitively, the magnitude of the effect from an additional signal on j’s action decreases with the informativeness
2on the preference divergence: a hard link from player i to player j is created whenever the ex-ante
benefits of revealing an additional signal (which depend only on player j’s in-degree, kj) outweigh
the costs.
The first—intuitive—result of the chapter describes the effect of introducing the possibility of
forming hard links on the scope of information transmission. More precisely, start from the pure
cheap talk setting, i.e., verifiable information transmission is prohibitively costly. Then introduce
feasible hard links, i.e., lower the cost of hard links such that they can emerge in the equilibrium
truthful network. As a result, there is a new equilibrium that generates more intensive information
transmission, i.e., weakly larger in-degrees for all players.
The second—and main—result concerns the welfare aspect of introducing the feasible verifiable
information transmission channel. The welfare outcome is composed of two effects: the positive
effect of an information improvement and the negative effect of crowding out cheap talk communi-
cation with costly verifiable information transmission. The crowding out effect is at the heart of
the chapter. As hard links become available, some agents who could not truthfully communicate
via cheap talk can find it beneficial to pay the cost and transfer the private information through
hard links. The appearance of hard links increases players’ in-degrees which, given the congestion
result, can render truth-telling through some soft links no longer incentive compatible. Those soft
links must be replaced by hard links for the players to remain credible. Thus, even though players
get more truthful messages, the number of soft links might decrease, implying that the cheap talk
communication is crowded out by the costly verifiable information transmission.
I find that the final welfare outcome of the two forces depends on the cost structure. If only
one party bears the cost of a hard link, then there always exists an equilibrium with feasible hard
links that generates greater total welfare than in the pure cheap talk case. Interestingly, the welfare
can decrease if the cost of a hard link is shared between the players. Indeed, each player does not
account for the full cost of a hard link, hence, too many hard links are created. As a result, the
negative crowding out effect can dominate the positive informational effect.
Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, I consider patterns of cheap talk communication, where individuals
disagree on the proper actions, either because they have conflicting preferences or because they
of agent j. Thus, for sufficiently high kj , the expected effect might become so small that i would prefer to lie in order
to shift j’s action closer towards i’s preferred one.
3have conflicting opinions. The framework differs from the setting of Chapter 1 in that the state of
the world relevant to the decision-making process is redefined to be the sum S of private signals si.
Under conflicting preferences, the individuals agree on the fundamentals of the uncertain economic
environment but simply like different courses of action. Under conflicting opinions, the individuals
would prefer the same actions had they known the exact state of the world; however, under incom-
plete information, they diverge in their opinions about the uncertain environment and, thus, deem
different actions optimal. As in Chapter 1, I formalize the interdependence of individuals’ payoffs
by assuming that each agent faces a loss when his action and the actions of other agents differ from
his own ideal action.
Under either type of disagreement between the agents, the two parties, i and j, would ex-ante
prefer truthful revelation of si to agent j. However, the credibility of communication and the
way it is influenced by j’s in-degree kj crucially depends on the nature of disagreement between
the individuals. When the two parties diverge in their preferences, I find a negative externality
effect of information transmission: greater information available to player j—higher kj—harms the
credibility of player i. This corresponds to the congestion effect of Chapter 1 and shares the same
intuition.
In contrast, when the parties disagree in their opinions, the communication pattern exhibits
positive externality effect : greater number of aspects obtained by agent j—higher kj—improves
the credibility of agent i. Intuitively, as kj increases, two things happen. First, agent i expects the
ex-post belief of agent j to become more congruent. Indeed, agent i deems other signals revealed to
player j distributed according to i’s belief, hence, he expects player j to be persuaded and adjust
his ex-post belief in the “right” direction (from i’s point of view). Second, the magnitude of the
effect of an additional signal on j’s action decreases with kj . However, the additive nature of the
state S insures that the rate of decrease is sufficiently low, so that the effect of i’s message on j’s
action remains significant enough to prevent player i from misreporting to player j (given that i
expects j to become more congruent).
Chapter 3 (joint with Petra Persson). In Chapter 3, we study how a benevolent authority
decides whether to constrain or inform a population of agents (continuum of individuals i). We start
by considering an advisor who can issue recommendations, but not enact mandates. She privately
4obtains an imprecise piece of information s about an unknown state of the world θ ∈ {0, 1}, and
sends a public message, before each individual i chooses action ai. Lying entails a cost; modulo
this cost, talk is cheap. The advisor’s material payoff is maximized by each individual choosing
ai = θ, and individual i’s ideal action is ai = θ+ bi. The advisor’s opinion (prior belief) about θ is
piA = Pr(θ = 1); each individual’s opinion is pii. Under preference disagreement, the population’s
preferences are characterized by a distribution f(b), but their opinions concur with that of the
advisor, pii = piA ∀i. Under opinion disagreement, the population’s opinions are characterized by
a distribution g(pi), but their preferences concur with those of the advisor, bi = 0 ∀i. For each
type of disagreement, we analyze how the ability to sustain truthful communication depends on the
advisor’s benevolence, or altruism, modeled as the share of the individuals’ material payoffs that
she internalizes, ϕ ≥ 0.
Under preference disagreement, altruism improves communication. As the advisor’s altruism
becomes stronger, the action that the advisor wants each individual to choose approaches the
individual’s own preferred action. Higher altruism is thus akin to smaller preference disagreement;
as disagreement lessens, truthful communication becomes attainable. By contrast, under conflicting
priors, altruism can destroy communication. In this case, the advisor is convinced that her preferred
action, given the signal s, maximizes both her own and each individual’s expected welfare. Each
individual, however, would interpret a truthfully revealed signal in light of his own prior, and choose
a different action. Even though the advisor represents the median opinion in the population, she
may believe that, on average, the individuals’ are better off with the action choices they take when
she lies. Lying then protects them from misinterpreting a truthful report. When ϕ increases, the
advisor internalizes more of the disutility that she expects each individual to suffer from his (in her
view) suboptimal choice of action. Paradoxically, a sufficiently altruistic advisor may therefore lie.
We then consider an authority who, after observing the signal s, either can send a public
message, or incur some cost q ≥ 0 to mandate one action for all individuals. Under preference
disagreement, enacting a mandate is unattractive to a benevolent authority, for two reasons: First,
truthful communication can be sustained. Second, if the authority lets each individual i choose his
action, then i implements an action that is close to the action that the highly altruistic authority
would want him to choose. Consequently, while a self-interested authority may enact a mandate,
a benevolent authority instead communicates truthfully, and gives each individual the liberty to
5choose. By contrast, under opinion disagreement, mandating an action is attractive to the altru-
istic authority for two reasons: First, she may not be credible; if she would allow the individuals
to choose their actions, they would thus base their choices on less information than she would do.
Second, when the authority is sufficiently altruistic, she would enact a mandate even if truthful
communication were possible, because she knows that the actions that the individuals would take
differ from the action that she deems optimal for them. Consequently, while a self-interested au-
thority may communicate truthfully, a benevolent authority instead mandates an action, believing
that she acts in the population’s interest.
Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, I study strategic communication setting of [Crawford and Sobel, 1982]
with guilt averse Sender, who suffers from letting down the Receiver’s payoff expectation. That is,
the Sender faces the cost k ·c(x, e) (where k is the cost intensity parameter), if the Receiver’s actual
payoff x after the message m appears to be lower than the Receiver’s expected payoff e (conditional
on the message m). It is straightforward to see, that the psychological cost of lying arising from
guilt aversion is not a specific case of the literal cost approach, in which the lying cost depends
only on the state of the world and the message sent ([Kartik, 2009], [Kartik et al., 2007]). Indeed,
in the guilt aversion case, the Sender suffers from the cost when the Receiver gets a lower payoff
than the Receiver expected. Hence, the level of the cost depends on how the Receiver interprets
the message and forms his payoff expectation, and not on the literal difference between the actual
and the reported states.
Recall, that the outcome of the classic [Crawford and Sobel, 1982] model is a partition equilib-
rium, in which the Sender indicates only the interval where the state of the world lies. Introducing
literal cost of lying ([Kartik, 2009]) results in the ability of the lower type senders to separate
themselves through an inflated language. On the contrary, I show that introducing quilt aversion
cost of lying precludes the existence of equilibria with separating intervals of types. Instead, under
the assumptions of uniform state distribution and quadratic payoff functions, there exist partition
equilibria like in [Crawford and Sobel, 1982].
Assume that the Sender has a persistent positive preference bias, i.e., the Sender wants a higher
action than the Receiver, given any state of the world. I demonstrate that as in [Crawford and
Sobel, 1982] model, in any partition equilibrium, the higher type senders transmit less information
6than the lower type senders: the intervals in the equilibrium partition expand as the Sender’s
type increases. Increasing the level of guilt aversion (or decreasing the preference divergence),
while holding the number of partition elements fixed, does not change this pattern, but makes the
intervals more balanced. Further, an increase in the cost intensity (or a decrease in the preference
bias) allows for a greater number of intervals in the equilibrium partition.
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Chapter 1
Strategic communication in networks:
The choice between soft and hard
information transmission
Uliana Loginova
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Abstract
I study a model in which every agent needs to take an action that matches his preferences given
the state of the world and that action affects the payoffs of all other agents. Before deciding
upon the action, agents can choose to whom and how to reveal their private information about
the state. There are two ways in which the information can be communicated: either through a
costly verifiable information (hard) channel or through a low-cost cheap talk (soft) channel. The
information transmission pattern is characterized by a strategic communication network whose
links represent truthful information transmission via either channel. I characterize and compare
the pure cheap talk setting with the setting in which verifiable information transmission is feasible.
I find that the availability of hard links allows each agent to get a weakly greater number of truthful
messages compared to the pure cheap talk setting. If only one party bears the cost of a hard link,
then introducing hard links increases the total expected welfare. In contrast, if the cost of a hard
link is shared by both parties, then allowing for verifiable communication can decrease the total
welfare.
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1.1 Introduction
In many economic situations, people are required to make judgements about the uncertain state
of the world and pick the most appropriate actions that influence other participants as well. Of-
tentimes, these decisions are based not only on the private information of the individuals, but also
on the information collected from other agents during preliminary discussions. Clearly, the stage
of information transmission plays an important role in such settings. The literature that studies
possible communication patterns can generally be classified by the type of information transmis-
sion technology into two categories. One approach follows [Grossman, 1981] and [Milgrom, 1981]
in assuming a verifiable (or hard) type of information, i.e., information that can be withheld by
the agent but not lied about (hard talk). The second approach complies with [Crawford and Sobel,
1982] and [Green and Stokey, 2007] in considering an unverifiable (or soft) type of information,
i.e., information that can be arbitrarily misreported by the agent at no cost (cheap talk). The
overwhelming majority of theoretical studies share the assumption that communication mode, ei-
ther cheap talk or hard talk, is a feature of the environment, and hence is a fixed characteristic of
communication stage.1
While a predetermined communication mode might be natural in many cases, there are other
situations in which the participants not only choose with whom to communicate, but also get to
determine the way in which the information is transferred. Indeed, in reality communication of
the same piece of private information can take different forms, from sending one-sentence emails
to prolonged discussions. With the extreme options, it is natural to assume that the email com-
munication is cheap and the discussion is costly, because sending a one-sentence email requires
considerably less time and effort than participating in long discussions. Moreover, one would ex-
pect that a one-sentence email gives a decision-relevant summary of the sending party’s private
information without providing supplementary materials and explanations that will allow the re-
1One exception is [Eso˝ and Galambos, 2008] who extend the model of [Crawford and Sobel, 1982] to allow for
costly provision of hard evidence, and show that contrary to the pure cheap talk case, a greater preference bias can
lead to more informative communication. Other exceptions are [Kartik et al., 2007] and [Kartik, 2009] who consider
the case when it is costly to misreport the information and show that the equilibrium outcome involves separation
with inflated language. [Dessein and Santos, 2006] assume that the information transmission takes the form of a
noisy hard talk and allow the organization to choose the level of communication precision. [Dewatripont and Tirole,
2005], [Calvo´-Armengol et al., 2011] and [Persson, 2011] depart from the predetermination of communication mode
by considering the setting where the trustworthiness of information transmission is endogenously defined by the
communication efforts of the parties.
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ceiving party to verify the message. Such limitation leaves the composition of the message entirely
up to the sender’s discretion. At the same time, prolonged discussions can give an opportunity for
the reporting party to present the supporting data and provide the necessary justifications, so that
the receiving agent is able to uncover the decision-relevant piece of information himself. From this
point of view, sending a one-sentence email is closer to cheap talk communication, while prolonged
meetings resemble verifiable information transmission; and often it is up to the participants which
type of communication to engage in. Clearly, in such cases, the assumption about a predetermined
communication mode might be substantially limiting.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze communication patterns that arise when agents are allowed
to choose the way they communicate, soft or hard, and to evaluate the effect of providing the
individuals with such a choice compared to the predetermined cheap talk communication mode
setting. The framework I study builds on [Galeotti et al., 2011] with the possibility to form not
only soft links, but also hard links. In the model, there are n players characterized by preference
biases b1, ..., bn. Each player i receives a private signal si about the unknown state of the world θ,
which has a common prior of Beta distribution with parameters (α, β). The signals are independent
and identically distributed, with each si taking a value of 1 with probability θ and a value of 0 with
probability 1−θ. Players can simultaneously transmit their private signals to each other according to
the communication network, which is set prior to the signals’ realization. The network is described
by a directed graph of hard and soft links. Player i can send messages to other player that he has
links to in compliance with the link type: if the link is soft, then reporting takes the form of cheap
talk, while if the link is hard, then communication is a non-strategic direct revelation of the signal
si to the other party.
While soft links are very cheap to sustain, hard links are costly. The way the cost of a hard
link is split between the involved parties is defined by a specific cost structure that is the same for
all pairs of agents. That is, the costs of outgoing and incoming hard links are fixed across agents.
While considering a general cost structure where the cost is split arbitrarily between the parties, I
distinguish between the following two cases. The first case is one in which only one party, either the
sender or the receiver, bears the cost of a hard link. The structure with only the sender paying the
cost naturally arises when it takes considerable effort to to develop argumentation and to report the
findings of the analysis, while it is very easy for the receiver to uncover the underlying signal after
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being presented with the collected materials. Similarly, the cost structure where only the receiver
incurs the cost corresponds to a situation in which it is much easier to formulate the message and
provide the material, than it is to decode the underlying signal. The second case is one in which
both parties bear strictly positive costs of a hard link and represents situations in which both the
sender and the receiver are required to put in considerable effort to transmit and understand the
information ([Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005] and [Persson, 2011]).
After the communication stage, players simultaneously choose actions {y1, ..., yn} that influence
each other’s payoffs, such that every player i obtains −∑nj=1(yj−θ−bi)2. That is, player i’s payoff
depends on how close his action, as well as the actions of other players, are to player i’s ideal action,
θ + bi.
As an example of this setting, consider a group of managers of an international corporation,
who have to decide on the strategies for their respective divisions. Managers are located in differ-
ent countries, each being responsible for the corporation’s performance in the manager’s respective
location. The effect of chosen strategies on the firm’s well-being depends on the economic envi-
ronment, which is uncertain. However, each manager holds some private information about the
characteristics of the economic environment. Corporation divisions might be endowed with differ-
ent goals and interests depending on the location, which implies preference divergence among the
managers. Nevertheless, different divisions are parts of one corporation, meaning that the strategy
chosen by some manager has an effect on other divisions’ payoffs. Before making their decisions,
managers can communicate their private information to each other. Communication can take one
of the two forms: a short email or a personal meeting. An email is easy to compose and send,
but its content can not be verified by the receiver. At the same time, personal meetings require
traveling and spending extra time and effort on preparation, but necessarily reveal the underlying
private information. The burden of personal meetings—the cost and the way it is divided between
the parties—depends on the corporate policy. In particular, the corporation can either encourage
personal discussions by appropriate financing and making traveling a pleasant experience, or can
discourage managers from meeting with each other by providing limited traveling assistance.
To study the model, I define an equilibrium to be an extension of pure strategies Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE). Namely, communication and action strategies form the usual pure strategies
PBE, holding the communication network fixed. At the same time, the communication network
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must be such that no player prefers to delete a link, and no two players prefer to form a hard link
in the absence of truthful communication, given rationally updated communication and decision
making strategies. The resulting communication pattern is described by a directed truthful network,
in which every link corresponds to truthful communication through a soft or hard link.
While both parties always desire the truthful revelation of a signal from the ex-ante perspective,
there is a credibility issue in strategic communication via a soft link at the interim stage. Similar
to [Galeotti et al., 2011], I find that a decreasing marginal effect of an additional truthful message
leads to a congestion effect in cheap talk communication: the willingness of player i to report
truthfully to player j decreases with the number of truthful messages player j gets, called the
in-degree of player j and denoted by kj . Moreover, the incentive to misreport increases with the
preference divergence between the players. In contrast, the incentive to communicate through the
hard link does not depend on the preference divergence. The benefit of forming a hard link ij from
player i to player j depends only on the number of truthful messages that j gets, kj , and is strictly
decreasing in kj . This implies that hard links are directed towards only those players who have a
sufficiently low number of incoming truthful soft links.
The first—intuitive—result of the chapter describes the effect of introducing the possibility of
forming hard links on the scope of information transmission. More precisely, start from the pure
cheap talk setting, i.e., verifiable information transmission is prohibitively costly and all commu-
nication is performed through soft links. Then introduce feasible hard links, i.e., lower the cost
of hard links such that they can emerge in the equilibrium truthful network. As a result, there is
a new equilibrium that generates more intensive information transmission. Using the introduced
notation, it means that a new equilibrium with hard links generates a truthful network with weakly
larger in-degrees for all players.
The second—and main—result concerns the welfare aspect of introducing the feasible verifiable
information transmission channel. The fact that there are almost always multiple equilibria presents
some difficulties in comparing the welfare across different settings. I resolve the multiplicity issue
by introducing the notion of pairwise stability—a natural equilibrium refinement. This notion is
an analogue to the pairwise stability condition commonly used in network theory, but adapted to
the defined equilibrium concept. More precisely, an equilibrium is called pairwise stable, if no two
players can find an incentive compatible way to improve interaction between them by communicat-
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ing truthfully through a soft link instead of a costly hard link or instead of not communicating at
all, holding other communication and decision making strategies fixed.
The welfare outcome of introducing feasible hard links in the initial pure cheap talk setting
is composed of two effects: the positive effect of an information improvement and the negative
effect of crowding out cheap talk communication with costly verifiable information transmission.
The information improvement effect is the substance of the informational result described above:
availability of verifiable information transmission leads to greater and more evenly distributed in-
degrees. The crowding out effect is at the heart of the chapter. As hard links become available,
some agents who could not truthfully communicate via cheap talk can find it beneficial to pay
the cost and transfer the private information through hard links. The appearance of hard links
increases players’ in-degrees which, given the congestion result, can render truth-telling through
some soft links no longer incentive compatible.2 Those soft links should be replaced by hard links
for the players to remain credible. Thus, even though players get more truthful messages, the
number of soft links might decrease, implying that the cheap talk communication is crowded out
by the costly verifiable information transmission.
I find that the final welfare outcome of the two forces depends on the cost structure. In the
case where only one party bears the cost of a hard link, there always exists a pairwise stable
equilibrium with feasible hard links that generates greater total welfare than in the pure cheap talk
case. Interestingly, the positive welfare result no longer holds when the cost of a hard link is shared
between the players. In particular, I follow [Galeotti et al., 2011] in analyzing communication
between two communities composed of players with the same preferences. In this setting, I find
that introducing feasible hard links does not alter soft intra-group communication—people with
the same preferences can always be credible to each other through a cheap talk. At the same time,
newly created hard links can make cross-group cheap talk communication no longer credible, wipe
out all cross-group soft links, and replace them with costly hard links. As a result, the total welfare
can decrease relative to the pure cheap talk case.3 As another extreme, I consider the case of a
2Clearly, the vulnerability of a soft link increases with the divergence in preferences.
3The observation that communication between the individuals with different characteristics tends to be more
substantial and proof-oriented than between “similar” individuals, adds to a new perspective to the study of homophily
presented in [Galeotti et al., 2011], i.e., “the tendency of individuals to associate and exchange information with others
who are similar to themselves.” Also on this topic see, for example, [Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954], [McPherson et
al., 2001], [Moody, 2001], [Currarini et al., 2009].
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diverse group of people who have equidistant preference biases, and show that adding the possibility
of forming hard links can decrease the total welfare only when the number of players is 3.
Finally, I study two natural extensions of the model. In the first extension, I allow the players to
negotiate how to split the cost of a hard link between them. Surprisingly, I find that endogenizing
of the cost shares does not imply aggregate efficiency and introducing hard links can still lead to
lower total welfare—which reinforces the main result of the chapter.
In the second extension, I allow the costs of hard links differ across the pairs of players. This
might happen for various reasons, e.g., people working at the same location might face a lower cost
of verifiable information transmission that takes the form of personal meetings, than people from
different locations. I illustrate that when the difference in costs is substantial, introducing hard
links likely results in localization of communication—pairs of players with a low cost communicate
with each other via hard links. At the same time, the amount of information accumulated by every
player can remain the same. This implies a decrease in the total welfare compared to the pure
cheap talk case, even when only one party bears the cost.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model and discusses the solution
concept. Section 1.3 provides the incentive for truthful reporting via a soft link, the benefit of
forming a hard link, and their implications for the equilibrium communication networks. The
informational result of introducing verifiable information transmission is presented in Section 1.4,
and the welfare results are analyzed in Section 1.5. The extensions of the model with endogenous
cost shares and heterogeneous hard links costs are considered in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes
the chapter. Finally, Appendix 1.8 provides some additional details on characterization of the
pairwise stable equilibria, and Appendix 1.9 contains all the proofs omitted in the main text.
1.1.1 Related literature
This chapter contributes to the literature that considers settings with a fixed communication mode:
cheap talk or verifiable information transmission. While this literature is very rich, in this section I
mention only the few of most related studies. The most closely related work is [Galeotti et al., 2011],
and as already discussed, the current chapter departs from their framework mainly by incorporating
additional means of verifiable communication. Another closely related paper is [Hagenbach and
Koessler, 2010], who study strategic cheap talk communication in networks. Their model differs
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in two important ways. First, in their model the underlying state of the world is determined as a
sum of signals sampled from known distributions, which implies a constant marginal value of every
additional signal. As a result, there is no congestion effect in their model. Second, they consider
a different type of coordination, i.e., each player not only wants others’ actions to be closer to his
action (as is the case in my model), but also also wants to match his action with the actions of
others.
Other related papers with cheap talk communication include settings with multiple senders
(e.g. [Morgan and Stocken, 2008]) and multiple receivers (e.g. [Caillaud and Tirole, 2007]). While
in this chapter I focus on private communication, there are studies that compare private with
public information transmission, e.g. [Farrell and Gibbons, 1989], [Goltsman and Pavlov, 2011]
and [Galeotti et al., 2011].
Results on how the structure of a hard link cost influences communication patterns contribute
to the literature on organizational design with cheap talk (e.g. [Alonso et al., 2008], [Rantakari,
2008]), verifiable information (e.g. [Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994], [Radner, 1992], [Radner, 1993],
[Sah and Stiglitz, 1986], [Van Zandt and Radner, 2001]) and noisy hard talk, where the information
is transmitted perfectly with some probability less than 1 (e.g. [Dessein and Santos, 2006]). A find-
ing that allowing for verifiable communication can lead to a welfare decreasing excessive hard link
formation is related to [Dessein, 2007]. In his model, a committee of privately informed members
needs to make a decision and the communication process combines soft and hard information. Des-
sein shows that authoritative decision-making can outperform majority decision-making, because
it avoids costly rent-seeking discussions and reduces lobbying for mediocre alternatives.
Also related are studies that focus on questions of coordination and adaptation with verifi-
able information transmission in communication networks. In particular, [Chwe, 2000] studies a
collective action problem with preliminary communication regarding participation activity in a de-
terministic exogenous network. [Calvo´-Armengol and de Mart´ı, 2007] and [Calvo´-Armengol and
de Mart´ı, 2009] analyze how the communication pattern affects individual behavior and aggregate
welfare in a setting in which the agents not only want to coordinate their actions, but also adapt to
an unknown state of the world. Instead, [Calvo´-Armengol et al., 2011] consider local uncertainty
regarding the state and study information transmission patterns that arise when the agents are
allowed to alter the communication precision.
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Finally, the analysis of the communication patterns arising in equilibria contributes to the
literature of strategic network formation, which includes [Bala and Goyal, 2000], [Goyal, 2007],
[Jackson, 2008], [Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996].
1.2 Model
Let the set of players be N = {1, ..., n} with n ≥ 2. Each player i has preference bias bi; the
preference profile {b1, ..., bn} is common knowledge. The state of the world θ is unknown and has





Each player i receives a private signal si ∈ {0, 1} about θ, where si = 1 with probability θ and
si = 0 with complementary probability 1 − θ. Private signals are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed.
The communication network is set prior to the signals’ realization and is described by a directed
graph g ∈ {0, s, h}n×n, where gij = s if and only if a soft link ij is present, meaning that i reports
to j via a cheap talk channel; gij = h if and only if a hard link ij is present, meaning that i
communicates his signal to j via a verifiable information channel; gij = 0 if and only if there is
no link from player i to player j.5 It is assumed that hard links are costly and the way the cost
of a hard link C ≥ 0 is split between the players depends on the specific cost structure. Once the
specific cost structure is fixed, it is the same for all players. For the main part of the chapter, I
assume cost C of a hard link to be the same for all pairs of players; the case in which cost can vary
with the players’ identities is considered in the Extensions section. At the same time, soft links are
cheap to sustain: each involved party bears just an infinitesimal cost ε > 0.
While the players are aware of each other’s existence and preference biases, the communication
4Considering a general Beta distribution is a generalization of the [Galeotti et al., 2011] model, where they use a
uniform on [0, 1] prior, which is a particular case of Beta distribution with parameters (1, 1).
5The assumption that the communication network is defined before the realization of the signals, for instance, can
be justified by the necessity of forming the communication schedule beforehand. Another case where this assumption
is appropriate corresponds to repeated interactions, where each period there is a new draw of the state θ, then signals
arrive and decisions are made, while the communication stage is a part of the routine schedule that stays constant
across periods.
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network g is not common knowledge. Rather, each player i knows only the structure of his respective
neighborhood. That is, player i observes the set of players to whom he has soft links, denoted as
N si (g) = {j ∈ N : gij = s}; and the set of players to whom he has hard links, denoted as
Nhi (g) = {j ∈ N : gij = h}. Similarly, player i observes the set of players who have soft links
directed to him, N−1,si (g) = {j ∈ N : gji = s}; and the set of players who have hard links directed
to him, N−1,hi (g) = {j ∈ N : gji = h}.6
Cost structure. If there is a hard link ij from player i (the sender) to player j (the receiver),
then player i bears a share α ∈ [0, 1] and player j bears a share 1 − α of the total link cost C. I
distinguish between two cost structures:
(i) Only one party bears the cost of a hard link, C. α = 1 corresponds to a case in which the
sender has to exert some effort to create and deliver a message, which then allows the receiver
to easily extract the signal. On the other hand, α = 0 represents a case in which it is costless
for the sender to elaborate the message, but then the receiver has to make a costly effort in
order to understand it and reveal the underlying signal.
(ii) The sender and the receiver share the cost of a hard link, C, with the weights α ∈ (0, 1) and
(1 − α), respectively. This happens when player i, as a sender, needs to exert some effort
to elaborate and deliver the message about the signal, while player j, as a receiver, needs to
make an effort in order to understand the message and learn what the underlying signal is.
Communication. Each player i sends private messages to the players that he has links to ac-
cording to the respective links’ nature in the communication network g: if a link ij is hard, then
the message sent to player j truthfully reveals the signal, mgij = si; if a link ij is soft, then any
message mgij ∈ {0, 1} can be sent. It is assumed that the messages are sent simultaneously and are
observed only by the sending and the receiving parties. Note, that communication via hard links is
non-strategic—the message perfectly reveals the signal.7 In contrast, communication through soft
6The assumption that the players observe only the structure of their respective neighborhoods, while being more
realistic, is not without loss of generality. If instead the network were commonly observed, then the players could
condition their strategies on the whole network structure and more communication patterns—including very unlikely
ones—could have be induced.
7Note that, due to the unraveling argument, the perfect revelation of the underlying signal is also the outcome in
the usual verifiable information setting with the option to withhold information. Indeed, assume that the message
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links is in the form of cheap talk, and hence is strategic. A communication strategy of player i with








where {µgij(si)}j∈Nsi (g) ∈ {0, 1}|N
s
i (g)| and µgij(si) = si for every j ∈ Nhi (g). A communication
strategy profile is denoted by µg = {µg1, . . . , µgn}. The messages actually sent by player i are
denoted by vector m̂gi , while the profile of all sent messages is m̂
g = {m̂g1, . . . , m̂gn}. The superscript
g signifies the dependence of the communication strategies on the network structure. I use the
same superscript g for strategies of different players to simplify the notation, however, one needs
to keep in mind that every player i conditions his communication strategy only on the available
information about the communication network—the structure of player i’s neighborhood.
Decision making. After the communication stage, each player i chooses an action ygi ∈ R.
Denote the set of all players who have a link to i as N−1i (g) = {j ∈ N : gji = s or gji = h}.




, the action strategy of player i is a function ygi : {0, 1} × {0, 1}|N
−1
i (g)| → R. Let
yg = {yg1 , ..., ygn} denote the action strategy profile.8 Conditional on the state of the world θ, if the





(yˆgj − θ − bi)2.
Player i’s payoff depends on how close his own action and the actions of other players are to player
i’s ideal action, θ + bi.
9
Time notation. For further analysis, it is useful to introduce the following time notation to
distinguish among periods with different scopes of information available to the agents: “ex-ante”
space is {0, 1, {0, 1}}. If player i reports to player j with the bias bj > bi via a hard link, then player i would always
choose to reveal the signal 0. This, in turn, leads to the unique full revelation outcome.
8Superscript g emphasizes the dependence of the action strategies on the communication network: each player i
knows the structure and the type of links in his neighborhood.
9The chosen functional form of the payoff simplifies the technical analysis; all the main results can be extended
to more general settings as well.
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to denote the stage prior to when the signals are realized (such that the only information about the
state of the world each player has is the common prior), “interim” to refer to the time period after
the signals’ realization but prior to communication (such that each player knows the common prior
and his private signal), and finally, “ex-post” - for the period after communication has occurred
but before the actions are taken (such that each player knows the common prior, his private signal,
and reported messages).
Solution concept. I solve the model using the concept of pure strategies Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE). The restriction to pure strategies simplifies the analysis and implies that cheap
talk communication can take two forms: truthful, where the message reflects the signal perfectly,
or uninformative, where, for any signal si, player i sends the same message, either 0 or 1. In
the latter case, I assume that when a player gets a message which is off the equilibrium path, he
ignores it and does not update his belief. Because of this simplification, equilibrium beliefs are
defined in a straightforward way: any message received through a hard link or in truthful com-
munication through a soft link induces perfect knowledge about the underlying signal, while any
message received in uninformative communication through a soft link leaves the prior belief about
the underlying signal unchanged.
Holding the communication network g fixed, it is natural to determine the communication and
action strategy profile (µg, yg) = ({µgi }i∈N , {ygi }i∈N ) by using the standard PBE solution concept.
However, conditional on a particular choice of g and equilibrium (µg, yg), some soft and costly hard
links in g might be ex-ante undesired by at least one party involved in the link (i.e., a sender or a
receiver with respect to this link). In particular, all soft links with uninformative communication
are ex-ante unprofitable to both parties.10 On the other hand, it might as well be the case that
the two players, i and j, would prefer to have a costly hard link ij in order to be able to directly
transmit the signal si to j, rather than having no link or having a soft link with uninformative
communication, while holding all other strategies fixed. One of the underlying ideas for the model
is that people can to some extent manage the links themselves and might object to existence of
soft links with uninformative communication and to some hard links. To account for this, I define
10Note, that no player will object to a cheap soft link with truthful communication. Indeed, as it is shown in
Lemma 2, destroying the soft link with truthful communication will strictly harm the ex-ante expected payoffs of
both parties involved in the link (provided that the cost ε is infinitesimal).
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an equilibrium as a communication network g coupled with a strategy profile (µg, yg) such that (i)
the pair (µg, yg) forms a PBE given g, (ii) no player would strictly prefer to break some incoming
or outgoing link from an ex-ante perspective, and (iii) no two players, i and j, would strictly prefer
to form a costly hard link gij = h from an ex-ante perspective, holding other communication and
action strategies fixed.11
To formally state the equilibrium definition, it is useful to denote by Eul (g, µg, yg) the ex-ante
expected utility of agent l, where (µg, yg) are communication and strategy profiles given some
communication network g.12 Let g(gij = 0) be the communication network with the same set of
links as in g, except that there is no link from i to j; let µg(gij=0) be the profile of communication
strategies which coincides with µg everywhere, except that now there is no communication from
i to j; and let yg(gij=0) be the same action profile as yg for all players but j, while player j’s
action is now optimally defined conditional on the lower number of truthful messages. Similarly, let
g(gij = h) denote the communication network with the same set of links as in g, except that there
is a hard link from i to j. Then µg(gij=h) is the profile of communication strategies which coincides
with µg for all links but gij , through which the communication is truthful. Finally, y
g(gij=h) is the
same action profile as yg for all players but j, while player j’s action is now optimally defined given
the new information structure. Using this notation, below is the formal equilibrium definition:
Definition. Equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} consists of a communication network g and a strategy profile
(µg, yg) = ({µgi }i∈N , {ygi }i∈N ), such that the following properties hold:
(i) The pair (µg, yg) forms a PBE given the communication network g.
(ii) For any i and j such that gij = h or gij = s:
Eul (g, µg, yg) ≥ Eul
(
g(gij = 0), µ
g(gij=0), yg(gij=0)
)
, for l = i, j.
11So far I don’t consider a similar desire to form a soft link, because communication through a soft link is strategic,
and the mere existence of a soft link does not guarantee informativeness of the communication pattern. Adding a
soft link with truthful communication requires more coordination at the communication stage, otherwise the commu-
nication might be completely uninformative. The possibility of adding a soft link and coordinating on the respective
communication pattern is considered later in the context of pairwise stability.
12Note that the ex-ante expected utility Eul (g, µg, yg) takes into account all link costs that accrue to agent l.
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(iii) For any i and j such that gij = 0 or gij = s:
Eul (g, µg, yg) ≥ Eul
(
g(gij = h), µ
g(gij=h), yg(gij=h)
)
, for either l = i or l = j.
Remark. In any equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)}, communication network g is truthful, i.e., all links of g




I start the analysis by deriving the optimal action choice holding fixed the communication network
g. Given that agent i got the private signal si and received messages m̂
g
N−1i (g),i
, he chooses an
action ygi (si, m̂
g
N−1i (g),i




(ygj − θ − bi)2 si, m̂gN−1i (g),i
 ,
which means that the agent chooses
ygi (si, m̂N−1i (g),i





−(ygi − θ − bi)2 si, m̂gN−1i (g),i
)}





Given that the cheap talk communication is assumed to be either truthful or completely unre-






, can be equivalently represented as the set
of revealed signals. In particular, assume that player i gets to know k signals, l of which are 1. The
conditional probability that l signals out of k are 1 given θ is
f(l|θ, k) = k!
l!(k − l)!θ
l(1− θ)k−l.
The posterior of θ, f(θ|l, k), is proportional to the product of the prior and the conditional proba-
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bility, f(θ)f(l|θ, k). Hence, the posterior has Beta distribution with parameters (α+ l, β + k − l):
f(θ|l, k) = 1
B(α+ l, β + k − l)θ
α+l−1(1− θ)β+k−l−1,
and the expected value of θ then is E(θ|l, k) = α+lα+β+k .
1.3.2 Equilibrium networks
Assume that the strategy profile (µg, yg) is such that the communication network g is truthful:
communication through each link of g, either soft or hard, leads to a signal revelation. Define kj(g)
to be the number of other players who report truthfully to j via either channel, and refer to it as
the in-degree of player j.
Benefits of signal revelation. For the analysis of equilibrium networks, it is useful to study the
ex-ante expected additional benefit that accrues to some player i ∈ N from an extra signal revealed
to player j. In order to do this, assume that kj players report truthfully to player j. This means
that, together with his own private signal, player j gets to know a set of kj + 1 signals, summarized
by a vector sR. Based on the information sR, j chooses action ysR = bj + E(θ|sR). The ex-ante






(ysR − θ − bi)2f(θ, sR)dθ.
The following lemma shows that this input consists of the two components: the expected residual
variance of the state θ and the square of the preference divergence.
Lemma 1. Fix a truthful network g and consider player j with the in-degree of kj = kj(g). Let
sR be the set of signals that player j gets to know and ysR be the corresponding action chosen by j.






(ysR − θ − bi)2f(θ, sR)dθ = −h(kj)− (bj − bi)2,
where h(kj) = E [Var(θ|sR)] = αβ(α+β+1+kj)(α+β+1)(α+β) .
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Proof. See Appendix 1.9.
Assume now that an extra signal is revealed to player j by some player l ∈ N . Then j bases
his decision on kj + 2 signals (sR, sl). By Lemma 1, the ex-ante expected input from j into i’s
utility becomes E [Var(θ|sR, sl)] − (bj − bi)2. As a result, the ex-ante expected additional benefit
that accrues to player i from an additional truthful link directed to j is a change in the expected
residual variance of the state:
h(kj)− h(kj + 1) = E [Var(θ|sR)]− E [Var(θ|sR, sl)] . (1.2)
Note first, that the extra benefit is positive for all values of kj , because every additional signal
improves the information available to player j, and hence reduces the expected residual variance
of θ. Second, the additional benefit of player i given by (1.2) doesn’t depend on the preference
divergence, bi − bj . Intuitively, player j chooses an action equal to the expected state θ plus
his preference bias bj , and the only way in which extra signal impacts this action is through the
precision of the expected value of θ. Thus, each player i ∈ N , including player j himself, enjoys the
same ex-ante expected extra benefit of (1.2) from player j having an extra truthful link directed
to him.13 Finally, because h(kj) is a decreasing and convex function of kj , the additional benefit
(1.2) is a decreasing function of the number of signals that player j already gets, kj . Intuitively,
the better the information of player j is, the lower is the marginal impact of an additional signal
in improving the residual variance, implying a lower ex-ante expected gain in the payoff.
These results are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Fix a truthful network g, and consider player j with the in-degree of kj = kj(g). The
ex-ante expected benefit of any player i ∈ N from j receiving an additional signal is h(kj)−h(kj+1).
It does not depend on the preference divergence, is strictly positive for any kj, and is decreasing in
kj.
Communication through soft links. While Lemma 2 ensures that the truthful communication
via a soft link is always desirable from the ex-ante perspective, there is a credibility issue at the
13Clearly, the result that player j obtains the same extra benefit as other players is due to the specific form of
the utility function, namely, that the terms corresponding to different agents’ actions enter the sum with the same
coefficients.
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interim stage. To study the incentive of truthful reporting via a soft link, consider the case in which
agent i has a soft link to agent j. Suppose that j gets to know kj signals: 1 signal player j gets
himself and (kj − 1) signals he infers from other players’ messages, excluding i. Denote a vector of
these kj signals as sR. Assume that player j believes i’s message, i.e., j puts probability 1 on that
si = mij . Let ysR,si be j’s action if he has information sR and i sends him the true signal mij = si;
and ysR,1−si be j’s action if he has information sR and i lies by reporting mij = 1− si. Agent i will











(ysR,1−si − θ − bi)2f(θ, sR|si)dθ.
As is shown in the proof of Theorem 1, this incentive compatibility constraint of truth-telling can
be rewritten as
|bj − bi| ≤ 1
2(α+ β + kj + 1)
, (1.3)
which means that player i can report truthfully to player j via a soft link as long as player j
doesn’t get to know too many signals, given their preference divergence. The incentive compatibility
constraint (1.3) is exactly the congestion effect of [Galeotti et al., 2011] extended to the case of a
more general prior of Beta distribution.
To see the intuition behind this, assume that bj > bi meaning that the ideal action for player j
is greater than the ideal action for player i. The effect of an additional signal on j’s action decreases
with the number of signals that j gets to know, kj . Thus, for sufficiently high kj , the effect of i’s
message on j’s action is so small that i would prefer to lie when si = 1 and report mij = 0 in order
to shift j’s action closer towards i’s preferred one. On the other hand, when j’s in-degree is quite
low, the effect of an additional signal on j’s action is quite large, in which case misreporting when
si = 1 may shift j’s action downward too much, making it undesirable.
Incentives to form/delete hard links. Unlike soft-link communication, information transmis-
sion via a costly hard link is not affected by credibility concerns. The decisions regarding the
existence of particular hard links are made before the private signals are realized. Thus, in order
to study the incentives to form (maintain/not destroy) a hard link ij, I consider the net expected
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value of ij from the ex-ante perspective using the prior distribution of θ. Fix a truthful network g
and assume that kj other players apart from i report truthfully to player j, i.e., kj = |N−1j (g))/{i}|.
By Lemma 2, the ex-ante expected additional benefit that accrues to player i and player j from
having a hard link ij is solely in reducing the residual uncertainty regarding the state of the world,
h(kj)− h(kj + 1).
Consider a general case of the cost structure, where C is distributed between the sender and
the receiver with the shares α ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − α, respectively. Both players, i and j, would like a
hard link ij to be a part of the communication network if and only if the cost paid by each of them
is lower than the expected benefit from having the hard link:
max{α, 1− α}C ≤ h(kj)− h(kj + 1). (1.4)
Given the properties of the additional benefit outlined in Lemma 2, a few things can be noted.
First, while the willingness to truthfully communicate the signal via a soft link decreases with
the preference divergence, the incentive to form (or maintain) a hard link is independent of the
preference biases. Second, similar to the condition of credible soft-link communication, the incentive
to form a hard link represents a congestion effect. Indeed, because the benefit of the hard link
decreases with kj , the players will be reluctant to form a hard link when kj is sufficiently high.
Finally, the incentive condition to form (or maintain) a hard link to player j (1.4) is the same
across every two settings characterized by (C1, α1) and (C2, α2) such that max{α1, 1 − α1}C1 =
max{α2, 1 − α2}C2. This also means that the two settings share the same set of equilibria. In
particular, the equilibria are the same across the following 3 cases: (i) only the sender bears the
cost of the hard link C, (ii) only the receiver bears the cost C, and (iii) the cost of the hard link
2C is split equally between the sender and the receiver.
Equilibrium characterization. To fix ideas, I assume that whenever a player is indifferent, the
choice is made in favor of forming (or maintaining) a hard link. This assumption along with the
incentive conditions (1.3) and (1.4) lead to the following equilibrium characterization:
Theorem 1. Consider a triple {g, (µg, yg)} and assume that each element of yg satisfies the opti-
mality condition (1.1). Then {g, (µg, yg)} constitutes an equilibrium if and only if the communica-
tion network g is truthful and satisfies the following conditions: for any player j with an in-degree
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kj = kj(g) and any player i,
gij = s only if |bj − bi| ≤ 1
2(α+ β + kj + 1)
,
gij = h only if max{α, 1− α}C ≤ h(kj − 1)− h(kj),
gij = 0 only if max{α, 1− α}C > h(kj)− h(kj + 1).
Proof. See Appendix 1.9.
Intuitively, for player j with an in-degree kj to get truthful messages through the soft links
from players N−1,sj (g) = {i ∈ N : gij = s} in equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraint
(1.3) must be satisfied for every i ∈ N−1,sj (g). Further, players N−1,hj (g) = {i ∈ N : gij = h} reveal
their signals to j in a verifiable way whenever no player objects to any existing hard link, i.e., the
incentive condition (1.4) is satisfied. Finally, for players N−1,0j (g) = {i ∈ N : gij = 0} not to report
truthfully to j, it must be the case that there is no player i ∈ N−1,0j (g), such that i and j prefer to
create a new hard link ij.
More can be noted about the equilibrium networks for extreme levels of the cost C. On the
one hand, a sufficiently high cost C precludes the existence of verifiable information transmission
in equilibrium. To find the threshold value of C, above which no hard links can be sustained, recall
that the benefit from a hard link is a decreasing function of the player’s in-degree. Consequently,
the expected additional benefit can not exceed h(0)−h(1). This means, that no equilibrium network
can have hard links whenever the cost C > (h(0) − h(1))/max{α, 1 − α}.14 On the other hand,
if the cost C is sufficiently small, then any equilibrium network is necessarily complete. Indeed, if
C ≤ h(n − 2) − h(n − 1), then for any two players, i and j, a hard link ij is preferred to no link
independently of kj ≤ n − 2. Hence, in any equilibrium communication network, the in-degree of
each player must be n− 1, i.e., every individual obtains all the information.
1.4 Informational result
In this section I start with the case in which only soft communication is available and show how
the introduction of a verifiable communication technology expands the information accumulated
14Clearly, if C > 2(h(0)− h(1)) then no equilibrium network can have hard links, independently of α.
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by each individual—the first (and the intuitive) result of the chapter.
The setting with only cheap communication can be viewed as a previously considered setup with
a prohibitively high hard link cost. In particular, assume that C = C0 > (h(0)−h(1))/max{α, 1−
α} and consider some equilibrium {g(C0), (µg(C0), yg(C0))}. Let the in-degrees of players in the
equilibrium network be k1 = k1(g(C0)), ..., kn = kn(g(C0)). I will refer to such equilibria with only
cheap communication as the pure cheap talk or the pure soft-link equilibria.
Now suppose that the cost of a hard link is decreased, so that hard links can be a part of
some equilibrium network. If for every player j ∈ N , C1 ≥ h(kj)−h(kj+1)max{α,1−α} , then the considered pure
cheap talk equilibrium still remains an equilibrium. If, however, C1 <
h(kj)−h(kj+1)
max{α,1−α} for some j,
then, by Theorem 1, g(C0) fails to be an equilibrium network. The question of interest is whether





, such that the information accumulated
by each player is improved, i.e., the in-degrees k′1 = k1(g(C1)), ..., k′n = kn(g(C1)) exceed the in-
degrees k1, ..., kn, respectively. The following theorem provides a positive answer: indeed, when
communication via hard links becomes feasible, there exists an equilibrium with hard links that is
weakly information superior to the pure soft-link equilibrium.






. Let the in-degrees in the equilibrium network g(C0) be






in which the players have weakly greater in-degrees:
k′j = kj(g(C1)) ≥ kj for any i ∈ N.
Proof. See Appendix 1.9.
While the complete proof is presented in Appendix 1.9, here I illustrate the intuition for the
result with a particular C1. Consider a pure soft-link equilibrium that corresponds to the cost C0
and renumber the players such that their in-degrees in the equilibrium network g(C0) are increasing
in their respective number: k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ... ≤ kn. Assume now, that the cost is set to the level of
C1 such that max{α, 1− α}C1 ∈ (h(kj + 1)− h(kj + 2), h(kj)− h(kj + 1)] for some j ∈ N , where
kj < kj+1. By Theorem 1, the in-degree of every player must be at least kj + 1, because otherwise,
there exists a pair of players who would prefer to form a new hard link. In particular, set g(C1)
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such that each player i = 1, ..., j has exactly kj + 1 incoming hard links and no incoming soft links.
For other players j + 1, ..., n, suppose that the only links directed towards them in g(C1) are the
soft links from the pure cheap talk equilibrium network g(C0). Clearly, truthful communication
through these soft links is still incentive compatible because the in-degrees of the players are the
same as in the pure cheap talk equilibrium. Further, no player would like to destroy a hard link
directed towards player i = 1, ..., j, because max{α, 1 − α}C1 ≤ h(kj) − h(kj + 1). Also, no two
players would want to deviate and create hard links directed towards players j + 1, ..., n, because
max{α, 1− α}C1 > h(kj + 1)− h(kj + 2) ≥ h(ki + 1)− h(ki + 2) for any i = j + 1, ..., n. Thus, the
construction results in an equilibrium network g(C1) with the in-degrees
k′1 = ... = k
′
j = kj + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hard-link communication
, k′j+1 = kj+1, ... , k
′
n = kn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Soft-link communication
,
that are greater than or equal to the corresponding in-degrees in g(C0).
1.5 Welfare result
Throughout the section I consider a non-trivial case of a strictly positive hard link cost : C > 0.15
Because there might be multiple equilibria, I focus on those that satisfy the natural refinement of
pairwise stability—no two players can profitably deviate by changing the communication pattern
between them. As Section 1.4 shows, availability of hard links leads to greater in-degrees which, by
Lemma 1, positively affects the total welfare. However, in what follows, I demonstrate that, apart
from the positive informational effect, there is a negative crowding out effect: the appearance of
costly hard links crowds out costless soft communication which, in turn, harms the total welfare.
This section presents the second (and the main) result of the chapter, namely, introducing feasible
hard links can be either beneficial and detrimental to the total welfare, depending on the setting
and the cost structure.
To gain a better understanding of the welfare implications, I first illustrate the interaction of
the two effects in an example with three players. Afterwards, I move to a more general setting and
demonstrate that if only one party bears the cost of a hard link, then introducing hard links is
15Case C = 0 is trivial because each equilibrium network is necessarily complete, and players face zero costs of
sustaining it. This implies the highest possible levels of individual and total welfare.
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welfare beneficial. Later on, I consider the case in which the cost of a hard link is shared between
the parties and derive conditions for the welfare decrease in natural settings of the two communities
and the diverse group of people.
1.5.1 Pairwise stable equilibria
There may exist multiple equilibria, and as a natural refinement, I adapt the common notion of
pairwise stability from the networks literature (e.g., [Bala and Goyal, 2000], [Goyal, 2007], [Jackson,
2008], [Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996]). In particular, call an equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} pairwise stable,
if no pair of players can change the communication pattern between them to improve their ex-ante
expected utilities, while satisfying the interim incentive compatibility constraints of truth-telling,
holding other strategies fixed. More formally:
Definition. An equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} is pairwise stable if
(i) For any i, j ∈ {1, .., n}, gij = 0 only if, holding other strategies fixed, i cannot credibly report
to j via a soft link, assuming that j believes i’s message, and communication via a hard link
is not desired by at least one party.
(ii) For any i, j ∈ {1, .., n}, gij = h only if, holding other strategies fixed, i cannot credibly report
to j via a soft link, assuming that j believes i’s message.
Characterization of pairwise stable equilibria. In order to prove the existence and study
the properties of pairwise stable equilibria, I first define the notion of a maximal equilibrium as an
equilibrium that generates the maximal vector of in-degrees among all equilibria:
Definition. Equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} with the in-degrees k1 = k1(g), ..., kn = kn(g) is maximal if
for any other equilibrium with the in-degrees k′1, ..., k′n:
ki ≥ k′i, i = 1, ..., n.
In turn, the in-degrees k1, ..., kn are called maximal in-degrees.
The following lemma states that the set of pairwise stable equilibria is non-empty and is a
subset of maximal equilibria.
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Lemma 3. There exist a maximal and a pairwise stable equilibrium. Any pairwise stable equilibrium
is maximal.
Proof. See Appendix 1.9.
Let the individual welfare denote the ex-ante expected individual payoff and the total welfare
stand for the sum of all ex-ante expected individual payoffs. Because the pairwise stability incor-
porates efficient communication in terms of its cost and informativeness, there exists a pairwise
stable equilibrium whose total welfare is (weakly) higher than in any other equilibrium.16 For
example, such a pairwise stable equilibrium can be constructed in the following way (I refer to this
construction further in the text as well). For each i ∈ N perform the following procedure: order
other players j ∈ N/{i} in the increasing absolute values of their preference divergence from i,
|bj − bi|; let this order be i1, ..., in−1. Consider the maximal in-degree of player i, ki. If ki = 0,
then nobody can report truthfully to i in equilibrium. If ki > 0, then take the closest player i1:
if truth-telling through a soft link i1i is incentive compatible for i1, given that i gets ki − 1 other
truthful messages, then let i1 report truthfully to i via a soft link. Otherwise, set gi1i = h. Repeat
this procedure for other ki − 1 closest to i players to set the links of particular type with truthful
communication through them. In the proof of Lemma 3, I show that this construction leads to a
pairwise stable equilibrium, in which each player gets truthful messages through the soft links from
the players sufficiently close in their preferences, truthful messages through the hard links from the
less close players, and no messages from the more distinct players. This equilibrium generates the
greatest total welfare, because, first, the equilibrium construction guarantees the minimal possible
number of the costly hard links across all equilibria. And second, the equilibrium network provides
the maximal level of individual informativeness which positively influences welfare, because, by
Lemma 1, the ex-ante expected individual payoffs increase with the in-degree of each player.
An additional comment regarding the welfare can be made in the pure cheap talk setting: all
maximal equilibria generate the same ex-ante expected individual payoffs (and, as a consequence,
the same total welfare) that are the greatest across all equilibria.17 Indeed, provided that the cost
16This statement cannot be extended to a per-individual basis because costly hard links can be distributed differ-
ently in various maximal and pairwise stable equilibria.
17Given this welfare property, the communication network of any maximal equilibrium corresponds to the utility-
maximizing equilibrium network studied in [Galeotti et al., 2011].
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of a soft link ε is infinitesimal, the ex-ante expected payoff of each individual depends only on
the vector of in-degrees; hence, the expected individual payoffs are the same across all maximal
equilibria. These results are presented in the lemma below.
Lemma 4. There exists a pairwise stable equilibrium that generates the greatest total welfare across
all equilibria. In the pure cheap talk setting, all maximal equilibria generate the same ex-ante
expected individual payoffs that are the greatest across all equilibria.
Interested readers are referred to Appendix 1.8 for an additional discussion of pairwise stable
equilibria.
1.5.2 Example with three players
Let the prior distribution of θ be uniform on the interval [0, 1] and consider three players with
the preference biases b1 = 0, b2 = b, b3 = 2b, where
1
10 < b ≤ 18 . Such preference structure
implies that truth-telling through a soft link ij is incentive compatible for player i if and only
if |bi − bj | = b and nobody else reports to j truthfully. If hard links are prohibitively costly,
max{α, 1 − α}C > h(0) − h(1), then there are two pairwise stable pure cheap talk equilibria that
generate the following truthful networks (see Figure 1.1, where dashed lines depict soft links):
(i) g21 = g23 = g12 = s, g13 = g31 = g32 = 0,
(ii) g21 = g23 = g32 = s, g13 = g31 = g12 = 0.
Note, that players have the same in-degrees of 1 and the same ex-ante expected payoffs across the
pairwise stable equilibria. Consider the equilibrium corresponding to the soft-link truthful network
(i), denoted by gs. Using Lemma 1 and ignoring the infinitesimal costs of the soft links, the ex-ante




[h(1) + (bj − bi)2] = −3h(1)−Bi, i = 1, 2, 3,
where Bi depends only on divergence in preferences, Bi =
∑3
j=1(bj − bi)2.
Suppose that the cost of a hard link satisfies max{α, 1− α}C ∈ (h(1)− h(2), h(0)− h(1)], i.e.,
players i and j prefer to form a hard link ij if the in-degree of player j is 0. Clearly, in this case,
the set of the pairwise stable equilibria is the same as in the pure cheap talk setting above.
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Figure 1.1: Communication networks of pairwise stable pure cheap talk equilibria.
Now assume that the cost is decreased further: max{α, 1− α}C ∈ (0, h(1)− h(2)], i.e., i and j
prefer to introduce a hard link ij if the in-degree of player j is kj ≤ 1. Consequently, the in-degree
of any player in any equilibrium network must be 2. Because player i cannot be credible in cheap
talk communication to player j with kj = 2, no soft links can be a part of an equilibrium network.
As a result, the only equilibrium (which is also pairwise stable) has a complete communication
network consisting of hard links, which I denote by gh (see Figure 1.2, where solid lines depict hard
links).
This analysis shows how soft links are substituted with costly hard links, as the cost decreases.18
Regarding the welfare effect, there are two forces. On the one hand, crowding out of cheap com-
munication by costly verifiable communication is welfare decreasing. On the other hand, players
accumulate more information, which is welfare increasing. Below I show how the resulting impact
depends on the cost structure and the cost level.
In the communication network gh, each person has the in-degree of 2 and supports 4 hard
links—2 incoming and 2 outgoing—which implies that each player faces the cost of 2C (see Figure
2). The ex-ante expected payoff of agent i then is
Eui(gh, C) = −3h(2)− 2C −Bi, i = 1, 2, 3.
18Consider, for example, the effect of introducing a hard link 31 in the soft-link network gs. Once the hard link 31
is formed, then player 2 is no longer credible in reporting to player 1 via a soft link. This forces player 2 and player
1 to substitute a soft link 21 with a costly hard link.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium network when max{α, 1− α}C ∈ (0, h(1)− h(2)].
Only one party bears the cost of a hard link. If only one party faces the cost of a hard link,
then the difference in the ex-ante expected payoffs corresponding to gh and gs is






> 0, i = 1, 2, 3,
because C ≤ h(1)−h(2). This means, that the positive informational effect dominates the negative
crowding-out effect, and the pairwise stable equilibrium with the hard links generates higher ex-ante
expected individual payoffs (as well as higher total welfare) than the pure cheap talk pairwise stable
equilibrium. Clearly, the ex-ante expected individual payoffs (and the total welfare) in a pairwise
stable equilibrium weakly increase as C decreases: they are flat when C > h(1) − h(2) (the pure
cheap talk equilibrium) and strictly increase when C ≤ h(1)− h(2) (the hard-link equilibrium).
The sender and the receiver share the cost of a hard link. When the cost of a hard
link is divided between the parties, introducing costly hard links might harm the ex-ante expected
individual payoffs. In particular, if α ∈ (13 , 23), the difference Eui(gh, C) − Eui(gs) is strictly neg-







. In this case, the crowding-out effect dominates the
information improvement effect, and the unique hard-link equilibrium generates strictly lower ex-
ante expected individual payoffs compared to the pairwise stable soft-link equilibrium. Intuitively,
compared to the previous case in which one party internalizes the entire cost of a hard link, the
parties now share the cost of a hard link while enjoying the same benefit. This leads to the for-
mation of too many hard links relative to the cost C.19 If, however, the cost is sufficiently low,
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, then the hard-link equilibrium generates greater individual ex-ante expected
payoffs than any pairwise stable soft-link equilibrium. As a result, the ex-ante expected individual
payoffs (and the total welfare) are non-monotonic in the cost C: Figure 1.3 depicts Eui in a pairwise
stable equilibrium when the cost C is divided equally between the parties, α = 12 .
1.5.3 One party bears the cost of a hard link
Consider the setting in which the cost of a hard link C accrues to only one party, either the one
sending the message or receiving it. The following theorem states that allowing for an additional
means of communication via hard links can only improve the total welfare in a pairwise stable
equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Take any cost C0 > h(0) − h(1) and consider some pure cheap talk pairwise stable
equilibrium with the communication network g(C0) and the total welfare W (g(C0)). Then for any
cost C1 ≤ h(0) − h(1), there exists a pairwise stable equilibrium with the communication network
g(C1) such that the total welfare W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(C0)).20
Proof. See Appendix 1.9.
To understand what drives the result, renumber the players such that their in-degrees in g(C0)
20Notational comment: the cost enters only the welfare W (g(C1), C1) and is omitted from W (g(C0)) to signify
that, under the cost of C0, a pairwise stable equilibrium has no hard links.
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are increasing, k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ... ≤ kn, and consider a particular case of the cost C1 ∈ (h(k + 1) −
h(k + 2), h(k) − h(k + 1)] for some k, k1 ≤ k < kn. Clearly, there exists player j such that
kj < k + 1 ≤ kj+1. This means that under the cost of C1, there are incentives to form hard links
towards the first j players, whose in-degrees are less than k+ 1, until their in-degrees become equal
to k + 1. Thus, the set of new maximal in-degrees is:
k′1 = ... = k
′
j = k + 1, k
′
j+1 = kj+1, ... , k
′
n = kn.
Note that because of the congestion effect, the new hard links towards players 1, ..., j might crowd
out some soft links. In the worst case, all soft links directed to players 1, ..., j are substituted by the
hard links. This corresponds to a maximal equilibrium with the communication network g(C1), in
which all links directed towards players 1, ..., j are hard, while all links directed to players j+1, ..., n
are soft and the same as in g(C0). To compare the total welfare in g(C0) and g(C1), consider the
total cost of the newly introduced hard links and the additional ex-ante expected payoff arising
from information improvement. The total cost of the hard links amounts to
j(k + 1)C1 ≤ j(k + 1)(h(k)− h(k + 1)).




(h(ki)− h(k + 1)) ≥ n · j(h(k)− h(k + 1)).
The lower bound for the welfare gain strictly exceeds the upper bound for the cost, because n−1 ≥
kn > k. Intuitively, while k + 1 hard links are used to increase the in-degree of player l ∈ {1, ..., j}
by at least 1, all n players enjoy the additional benefit arising from a greater accuracy of l’s action.
Hence, for this maximal equilibrium, W (g(C1), C1) > W (g(C0)). Next, Lemma 4 insures that there
exists a pairwise stable equilibrium that achieves the total welfare of at least W (g(C1), C1), which
implies the result.
From this example, it becomes apparent that while the total welfare in a pairwise stable equilib-
rium goes up, individual welfare might go down. In particular, assume that the receiver bears the
cost of a hard link and the maximal equilibrium considered above with the communication network
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g(C1) is actually pairwise stable.
21 Then it might be the case that player j would prefer the pure
cheap talk equilibrium with the communication network g(C0) to the pairwise stable equilibrium
with g(C1) because the expected gain in his payoff is dominated by the high cost of maintaining
k + 1 links. This point is emphasized in the following remark.
Remark. The positive welfare result of Theorem 3 does not extend to a per-individual basis.
Specifically, a pairwise stable equilibrium with hard links might generate a lower welfare for some
player compared to the cheap talk case, if he ends up sustaining too many costly hard links relative
to the individual gains from the information improvement.
1.5.4 Two parties bear the cost of a hard link
Assume that the cost of a hard link C is distributed between the sender and the receiver with
the shares α and 1 − α, respectively. A previously considered example with 3 players revealed
that the welfare might go down when the cost C is decreased, so that hard links appear in a
pairwise stable equilibrium. In this section, I follow [Galeotti et al., 2011] and [Hagenbach and
Koessler, 2010] in considering the natural cases of the two communities and a diverse group of
people, and describe conditions under which the total welfare decreases (or increases) when verifiable
information transmission becomes feasible.
The welfare outcome depends on which effect—the positive information improvement or the
negative crowding out—dominates. Clearly, if no crowding out of cheap communication occurs,
then the total welfare necessarily goes up, because the benefit of an extra hard link enters the
payoffs of more than 2 players, which strictly outweighs the total cost of the link, C. A more
general version of this intuitive result, which is useful for further analysis, is presented in the
following lemma:
Lemma 5. Consider two cost levels, C0 ≥ C1. For each Ci, fix some equilibrium and consider the
corresponding communication network g(Ci) = g
s(Ci)∪ gh(Ci), where gs(Ci) is the set of soft links
of g(Ci) and g
h(Ci) is the set of hard links of g(Ci). If g
s(C0) ⊆ gs(C1) and gh(C0) ⊆ gh(C1),
then W (g(C1), C1) ≥ W (g(C0), C0), where W (g(Ci), Ci) is the total welfare corresponding to the
21The examples of such pairwise stable equilibria are presented in the two communities setting (with n1 = 1) of
the next subsection.
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equilibrium network g(Ci) and the cost Ci. Moreover, the same welfare implications hold on a
per-individual basis.
Proof. See Appendix 1.9.
Excessive formation of hard links. The result that the total welfare can decrease when ver-
ifiable information transmission becomes feasible hinges on the excessive formation of hard links
(and hence, extensive crowding out of soft links) if both parties bear the cost. When α ∈ (0, 1), the
individuals fail to account for the total cost of the hard link, which results in stronger incentives to
form hard links than in the case in which one party faces the full cost.22 For instance, assume that
the cost C is such that hard links don’t appear when α ∈ {0, 1}, but necessarily emerge for some
α ∈ (0, 1). Then as the examples in this chapter illustrate, having the cost of a hard link shared
between the parties can be both beneficial and detrimental to the total welfare compared to the
case in which one party bears the full cost.
Two communities. The set of players consists of two groups, N1 and N2, with sizes n1 and n2,
respectively, where 1 ≤ n1 < n2 and the total number of players is n = n1 + n2. Each member of
group N1 has a preference bias normalized to 0, while each member of N2 has a bias b.
In any pairwise stable equilibrium, there is complete communication via cheap talk inside each
group, because the incentive compatibility constraint of truth-telling is always satisfied for the
players who share the same preferences. In addition, all players in the same group receive the
same number of truthful messages, because exactly the same people can report truthfully to them
through links of the same type. I introduce notation similar to [Galeotti et al., 2011]: denote by ki
the maximal in-degree of an arbitrary player in group Ni. Further, ki = kii+kij , where kii = ni−1
reflects the level of intra-group communication—the number of truthful messages that a player
from Ni receives from the members of the same group, and kij stands for the level of cross-group
communication—the number of truthful messages that a player from Ni receives from the members
of the opposite community Nj .
Consider the pure cheap talk case that corresponds to a prohibitively high cost C0 >
h(0)−h(1)
max{α,1−α} .
As mentioned above, in the communication network of any pairwise stable equilibrium the level
22Indeed, the incentives to form hard links are determined by the maximum individual cost of a hard link max{α, 1−
α}C that is lower than the total cost C.
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Figure 1.4: Communication networks of pairwise stable pure cheap talk equilibria.
of intra-group communication is kii = ni − 1. Regarding cross-group communication, note that if
members of a smaller group N1 report truthfully to some members of N2, then by the congestion
effect, the pairwise stability implies that members of a larger group N2 report truthfully to some
members of N1. Thus, depending on the parameters, cross-group communication can take one of
the following three forms (see Figure 1.4):
1. No cross-group communication, i.e., k21 = k12 = 0.
2. Communication from group N2 to group N1, i.e., k12 > 0, k21 = 0.
3. Cross-group communication, i.e., k12 > 0, k21 > 0.
Assume now, that the cost is reduced to C1 > 0, so that hard links become feasible. While
complete soft-link intra-group communication is still a part of the truthful network of any pairwise
stable equilibrium, cross-group communication can change due to the emergence of cross-group
hard links. Because there are only two types of players, pairwise stability requires that members of
the same group receive identical numbers of truthful cheap talk messages and verifiable information
messages across different equilibrium networks. This, in turn, means that the total welfare is the
same across all pairwise stable equilibria. Whether feasibility of hard links results in a welfare gain
or a welfare loss depends on how the informational benefit from hard links compares with the loss
from crowding out soft links.
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In particular, it can be easily seen that introducing feasible hard links in case 1 necessarily
improves the welfare because no soft links are crowded out in a pairwise stable equilibrium. As
the proof of Theorem 4 demonstrates, the same positive welfare result holds in case 3, even though
introducing hard links crowds out some soft cross-group communication. The reason is that the
feasibility of hard links in case 3 increases the in-degrees of all players, which outweighs the cost
of hard links and the crowding out effect. The negative welfare result arises in case 2 for some
parameters, the reason being that the feasibility of hard links increases the in-degrees of only group
N1 members, which is dominated by the negative crowding out effect. The following theorem
describes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the welfare decrease.
Theorem 4. Take any cost C0 >
h(0)−h(1)
max{α,1−α} and consider some pure cheap talk pairwise stable
equilibrium with the communication network g(C0) and the total welfare W (g(C0)). Introduce the
possibility to form hard links with the cost C1 and consider some pairwise stable equilibrium with the
communication network g(C1) and the total welfare W (g(C1), C1). There exists a non-degenerate





2(α+ β + n1 + k + 1)
,
1
2(α+ β + n1 + k)
]
,
for some k, where max{α, 1− α}n− 1 < k ≤ n2 − n1 − 1. Otherwise, for all C1: W (g(C1), C1) ≥
W (g(C0)).
Proof. See Appendix 1.9.
To gain intuition for why introducing feasible hard links can lead to a welfare decrease in case 2,
note that for the negative welfare result to occur, it must be that the two communities are sufficiently
unbalanced in their size: n1 <
n2
3 . In addition, the in-degree of each N1 member in a pure cheap
talk equilibrium must be sufficiently high: k1 > max{α, 1−α}n−1 ≥ n2−1. Assume that hard links
become feasible with the cost C1 being such that the in-degrees of players in group N1 increase by
just 1, while no hard links from N1 to N2 appear. Since in the pure cheap talk equilibrium members
of N1 already receive relatively many signals, increasing their informativeness by 1 signal leads to
a moderate additional individual benefit. Given that the size of community N1 is relatively small,
n1 <
n
4 , this sums up to a moderate increase in the total welfare. At the same time, all cross-group
soft links are crowded out and substituted by hard links, which amounts to a considerable cost,
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given that the level of cross-group communication was k12 > max{α, 1 − α}n − 1 ≥ n2 − 1. As a
result, the net welfare effect is negative.
The structure of pairwise stable equilibria allows to make several observations regarding com-
munication patterns. In particular, individuals with similar preferences can easily communicate
with each other via cheap talk, which leads to complete soft intra-group communication that is
robust to introducing feasible hard links. On the contrary, soft-link cross-group communication is
less intensive, with the information flow being greater towards the smaller group, and is vulnera-
ble to the appearance of verifiable communication (soft cross-group communication can be easily
crowded out with costly verifiable information transmission). This allows one to expect the mode
of communication between individuals with different characteristics to be more substantial and
proof-oriented than between similar individuals.
Diverse group of people. In this setting, players 1, 2, ..., n have equidistant biases that satisfy
b1 = 0 and bi+1 − bi = b > 0, i = 1, ..., n− 1. Assume that for some C > 0 the maximal in-degrees
are k1, ..., kn, and construct a pairwise stable equilibrium that generates the greatest welfare in a
way described in Lemma 4. In the communication network of this equilibrium, player i gets truthful
messages through soft links from players with sufficiently close preferences, truthful messages via
hard links from more distinct players, and no messages from those who are further away in their
preferences. In case of prohibitively costly hard links, max{α, 1 − α}C0 > h(0) − h(1), truthful
reporting to player i boils down to the ki closest players revealing their information to i truthfully
via soft links.
As was demonstrated in the example of three players, for some parameters, introducing feasible
hard links necessarily harms the total welfare in the pairwise stable equilibrium. The following
theorem states that this is no longer the case for bigger groups: if n ≥ 4, then for any difference in
preferences b and any cost C1 <
h(0)−h(1)
max{α,1−α} , there is a pairwise stable equilibrium that generates a
greater total welfare than in the pure cheap talk case.
Theorem 5. Let C0 >
h(0)−h(1)
max{α,1−α} and consider some pure cheap talk pairwise stable equilibrium
with the communication network g(C0) and the total welfare W (g(C0)). Introduce feasible hard links
with the cost of C1 ≤ h(0)−h(1)max{α,1−α} and consider a pairwise stable equilibrium with the communication
network g(C1) that generates the greatest total welfare W (g(C1), C1). There exists a non-degenerate
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α ∈ (13 , 23). Otherwise, for all C1: W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(C0)).
Proof. See Appendix 1.9.
1.6 Extensions
1.6.1 Endogenous costs of hard links
One of the possible extensions of the model is to allow the parties to negotiate the way they split
the cost of a hard link C each time they create a link (e.g., how to share the traveling cost).
Surprisingly, such endogeneity of share α, although implying pairwise efficiency, does not imply
aggregate efficiency, and introducing hard links can still lead to lower total welfare.
To see this, consider players i and j such that player i is not credible in reporting to player j
(with the in-degree kj) via cheap talk. The aggregate benefit of players i and j from creating a
hard link ij is 2(h(kj) − h(kj + 1)), while the total cost of a hard link is C. Thus, as long as the
benefit exceeds the cost, 2(h(kj) − h(kj + 1)) > C, the players can split the cost of a hard link
so that they both strictly benefit from its creation. In particular, the players can always share C
equally between each other and enjoy the additional benefit of h(kj)− h(kj + 1)− C/2 each.
In general, the players can find a way to profitably split the cost C and introduce the hard link
ij if and only if the hard link ij is desired by the players when the cost C is split equally between
the parties, α = 1/2. This observation implies that communication patterns (and hence, the total
welfare) of the pairwise stable equilibria are the same across the two settings: (i) the share α is
endogenous, and (ii) α = 1/2. Because in the latter case of α = 1/2 introducing hard links can
deteriorate the total welfare, it can do so in the case of endogenous α as well.
1.6.2 Heterogeneous costs of hard links
While in some situations a natural assumption about the hard links is that the cost value is similar
across players, it might be not quite adequate in others. Thus, a straightforward extension of the
model would be to allow the cost of a hard link to depend on the players’ identities. As one example
of cost heterogeneity, consider managers of an international corporation who might be located in
different cities or countries, and who need to communicate with each other before making individual
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decisions for their respective divisions. A hard link might correspond to a personal meeting, while
a soft link corresponds to a phone call or an email. In this case, it is relatively easy for two people
from the same location to meet, while a personal meeting of two people from different countries
entails additional time and spending.
In this section, I highlight some insights stemming from the cost heterogeneity assumption in
an extreme setting, where, for some pairs of agents, it is easy to communicate in verifiable way,
while others face a considerable cost. More formally, the cost depends on the pair of agents, i and
j, and is the same independent of the link direction: the cost of a hard link ij is equal to the cost
of a hard link ji, Cij = Cji = C. The cost can be either prohibitively high, C0 >
h(0)−h(1)
max{α,1−α} , or
feasibly low, C1 ≤ h(0)−h(1)max{α,1−α} . For simplicity, I maintain the assumption that the cost structure
that is specified by the share α ∈ [0, 1] is the same across all pairs of agents. In some sense, the
setting with heterogeneous costs is in between the two cases of homogeneous cost values C0 and
C1. In particular, switching from the case of homogeneous cost C0 to heterogeneous costs can be
viewed as lowering the cost to the level of C1 for some pairs; while switching to homogeneous cost
C1 corresponds to lowering the cost values to C1 for all pairs.
Consider a particular case where C1 is sufficiently small: C1 ≤ h(n−2)−h(n−1)max{α,1−α} . Clearly, in
any equilibrium, agents in pairs with the cost C1 must communicate truthfully with each other.
This localization of communication might change the truthful communication network compared
to the pure cheap talk case, while not necessarily leading to an information improvement. Indeed,
consider the previously studied example of three players, where the prior distribution of θ is uniform
[0, 1] and the preference biases are b1 = 0, b2 = b, b3 = 2b, such that
1
10 < b ≤ 18 . Consider
the case of prohibitively costly hard links—homogeneous cost C0. A considerable difference in
preferences prevents players 1 and 3 from truthful communication with each other via cheap talk.
The two pairwise stable pure cheap talk equilibria have the in-degrees k1 = k2 = k3 = 1 and the
communication networks described in Figure 1.1.
Assume now that the cost of a hard link for players 1 and 3 is decreased to the level of C1,
implying the following heterogenous costs setting: C12 = C23 = C0, C13 = C1. In this case, players
1 and 3 must communicate with each other via hard links, thus, the only two pairwise stable
equilibria have the following communication networks (see Figure 1.5):
(i) g12 = s, g13 = g31 = h, g21 = g23 = g32 = 0.
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Figure 1.5: Communication networks of pairwise stable equilibria: heterogenous costs.
(ii) g32 = s, g13 = g31 = h, g21 = g23 = g12 = 0.
Note that the in-degrees of the players are the same as in the pure cheap talk case, k′i = 1, i = 1, 2, 3,
while some links are hard.
The fact that introducing heterogeneous costs creates localization of communication that might
fail to generate an informational gain implies that the ex-ante expected total welfare can decrease
even when only one party bears the cost of a hard link. This contrasts with the case of homogeneous
cost, in which introducing feasible hard links necessarily leads to a welfare improvement when only
one party faces the cost. Thus, heterogeneous costs can result in a welfare lower than in both cases
of homogeneous cost, C0 and C1.
1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I study the communication patterns and the welfare outcomes when agents are
allowed to choose whether to communicate via cheap talk or through a verifiable information
channel. Cheap talk is performed through soft links, while verifiable information transmission
occurs via costly hard links. The way the cost of a hard link is shared between the parties—the
cost structure—is determined by the respective burdens of providing hard evidence and decoding
the underlying private information. In the main part of the chapter, the costs of incoming and
outgoing hard links are the same for all agents.
While the truthful revelation of a signal is always beneficial to both parties from the ex-ante
perspective, there is a credibility issue in cheap talk communication at the interim stage. In
particular, I find the same congestion effect as in [Galeotti et al., 2011], i.e., the willingness of
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player i to report truthfully to player j decreases with the preference divergence and with the
number of truthful messages reported to player j—the in-degree of player j, kj . In the case of
verifiable information transmission, the incentive to form a hard link ij does not depend on the
preference divergence; rather, it depends only on the in-degree of player j and is strictly decreasing
in kj . The straightforward equilibrium implication for the network structure is that hard links
must be directed towards players who receive relatively small numbers of truthful messages via soft
links.
The first—and intuitive—result states that a positive informational effect arises from introduc-
ing a feasible verifiable communication channel, independently of the cost structure. That is, if
a pure cheap talk equilibrium fails to exist when hard links become feasible, then there exists an
equilibrium with hard links, in which every player accumulates a weakly greater number of signals.
The second—and the main—result concerns the welfare implications of introducing feasible ver-
ifiable communication. The appearance of hard links in the pure cheap talk setting has two effects
on the expected total welfare: a positive effect stems from the information improvement and a
negative effect arises from crowding out soft communication with costly verifiable communication.
The crowding out effect—that is at the heart of this study—arises because newly formed hard links
increase players’ in-degrees, which by the congestion result, destroys the credibility of communica-
tion through some soft links. As a result, for the players to transfer their signals truthfully, those
soft links should be replaced by costly hard links.
I show that the positive informational effect always dominates the negative crowding out effect
when only one party bears the cost of a hard link. This positive welfare result no longer holds
when the cost of a hard link is shared between the players. I illustrate this point by means of two
examples. The first example is a two communities setting, in which introducing feasible hard links
can wipe out all cross-group soft communication, resulting in a welfare decrease compared with the
pure cheap-talk case. The second example is the case of a diverse group of people with equidistant
biases, in which adding the possibility to form hard links can decrease the expected total welfare
when the number of players is 3.
In one extension, I allow the parties to negotiate how to split the cost of a hard link between
them. I show that such endogeneity of the cost shares does not necessarily lead to aggregate
efficiency; introducing hard links can still decrease the total welfare. In another extension, I allow
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the costs of hard links to differ across the pairs of players. When the cost difference is substantial, I
show that the availability of hard links is likely to result in the localization of communication with
respect to the low cost of hard links, with the information accumulated by every player being the
same. As a result, expected total welfare can decrease even when only one party bears the cost.
For further analysis, it would be interesting to study the communication pattern under a dif-
ferent timing: the decision to form the links is made after the signals’ realization. In this setting,
the mere fact that player i wants to form a specific link to player j can reveal some information
about i’s signal. Another modification would be to consider dynamic communication, e.g., soft
communication happens first, then players form a verifiable communication network and reveal
their signals accordingly. This setting allows agents to strategically follow up soft communication
with costly verifiable information transmission.
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1.8 Appendix: Pairwise stable equilibria
An equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} is pairwise stable, if no pair of players can change the communica-
tion pattern between them to improve their ex-ante expected utilities, while satisfying the interim
incentive compatibility constraints of truth-telling, holding other strategies fixed. To better under-
stand how the communication pattern can be improved, consider three possible cases of information
transmission from player i to some player j with in-degree kj in g:
1. Player i reports truthfully to player j through a soft link: gij = s. There is no way to improve
communication: making communication uninformative will result in the ex-ante expected loss
of h(kj − 1)− h(kj), while switching to verifiable communication will involve a cost.
2. Player i reports truthfully to player j through a hard link: gij = h. Because the hard link
ij is a part of the equilibrium, it is preferred to no link by both players, and deleting this
link will not improve the ex-ante expected payoffs. It may, however, be possible to reach an
improvement by substituting the costly hard link ij with a soft link ij and inducing truthful
communication through it. This option can be realized if player i can credibly communicate
given that j believes i’s message. Otherwise, it is not possible to change the communication
pattern in a profitable direction.
3. Player i does not report informatively to player j, gij = 0. Here it may be possible to improve
by creating a soft link ij with truthful communication, if it is interim incentive compatible.
If not, then the second-best option is creating a hard link ij. If the latter option is undesired
by at least one player, then there exists no possibility to improve.
Given these alternatives, pairwise stability can be formally defined as follows:
Definition. An equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} is pairwise stable if
(i) For any i, j ∈ {1, .., n}, gij = 0 only if, holding other strategies fixed, i cannot credibly report
to j via a soft link, assuming that j believes i’s message, and communication via a hard link
is not desired by at least one party.
(ii) For any i, j ∈ {1, .., n}, gij = h only if, holding other strategies fixed, i cannot credibly report
to j via a soft link, assuming that j believes i’s message.
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Symmetry. An immediate property of a pairwise stable equilibrium is that any two players i and
j with the same preference biases, bi = bj , must be treated in symmetric way, i.e., they communicate
truthfully with each other via cheap talk and receive the same number of truthful messages from
other players. Moreover, if some other player l truthfully reports to both, i and j, then it must be
the case that l uses the same type of information transmission channel.
Maximality and pairwise stability. There might be multiple maximal equilibria generating
the same vector of maximal in-degrees, among which some maximal equilibria might not be pairwise
stable.
Example. Here I present an example of a maximal equilibrium which is not pairwise stable.
Let the prior distribution of θ be uniform on [0, 1]. Consider 3 players with the preference biases
b1 = b2 = 0, b3 ∈ ( 110 , 18 ]. Assume that hard links are prohibitively costly. Then there are several
maximal pure cheap talk equilibria that generate the in-degrees k1 = k2 = k3 = 1. The examples
of such communication networks are: (1) g12 = g21 = g13 = s, g23 = g31 = g32 = 0, and (2)
g12 = g23 = g31 = s, g13 = g32 = g21 = 0. It is easy to see that the first communication network
corresponds to a pairwise stable equilibrium. In contrast, the second communication network
can not correspond to a pairwise stable equilibrium, because players 1 and 2, who agree in their
preferences, would deviate and induce truthful communication through the soft link 21.
Verifiable information and maximal in-degrees. The informational result, coupled with the
fact that the incentive to form a hard link decreases with the player’s in-degree, ensure that allow-
ing for verifiable information transmission results in weakly greater, and more evenly distributed,
maximal in-degrees.
Strong stability. As with pairwise stability, one can adapt from the networks literature the
notion of strong stability to this framework: coordinated change of communication pattern in a
group of agents cannot strictly improve the welfare of some members, while weakly improving the
welfare of others. Then a pairwise stable equilibrium generates the greatest total welfare if and
only if it is strongly stable.23
23This statement is non-trivial, because there exist pairwise stable equilibria that do not generate the greatest
total welfare. For example, consider 3 players with the preference biases b1 = 0, b2 = b, b3 = 2b, where b ∈ ( 110 , 18 ],
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Proof. The “only if” part of the statement is straightforward. Concerning the “if” part, note that
if a strongly stable equilibrium—which is necessarily maximal—didn’t generate the greatest total
welfare, then there must be a hard link that can be severed and a soft link (with the truthful
reporting through it) that can be introduced. This contradicts the property of strong stability.
1.9 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Because the chosen action ysR is given by ysR = bj+E(θ|sR) and f(θ, sR) =
f(θ|sR)P (sR), the expected input from player j into i’s payoff becomes






















P (sR)− (bj − bi)2
= −E [Var(θ|sR)]− (bj − bi)2.
In what follows, I show that E [Var(θ|sR)] is exactly h(kj). Let l denote the number of signals 1 in
sR, then







α+ β + kj + 1
)2
=
B(α+ l + 2, β + kj + 1− l)
B(α+ l, β + kj + 1− l) −
(
α+ l
α+ β + kj + 1
)2
=
(α+ l)(β + kj + 1− l)
(α+ β + kj + 1)2(α+ β + kj + 2)
.
and assume that θ is uniform on [0, 1] (the same setup as in Subsection 1.5.2). If the cost of a hard link C satisfies
max{α, 1− α}C ∈ (h(1)− h(2), h(0)− h(1)], then the greatest total welfare is generated, for example, in a pairwise
stable equilibrium with the following communication network: g21 = g23 = g12 = s, g13 = g31 = g32 = 0. However,
there exists a pairwise stable equilibrium with the communication network g21 = g12 = s, g13 = h, g23 = g31 = g32 = 0
that achieves a strictly lower total welfare.
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where









sR∈{0,1}kj+1 lP (sR) = (kj + 1)E(s1), because l is the sum of signals in sR and all signals are
identically distributed. The unconditional expectation of each signal is












sR∈{0,1}(kj+1) lP (sR) = (kj + 1)
α
α+β
Note that signals sj are not unconditionally independent: indeed, higher θ will mean higher
signals on average. For example, if 9 signals out of 10 are equal to 1, then the probability that the
10-th signal is also 1 is higher compared to the case where the first 9 signals were 0s. However, the














Since l is equal to the sum of signals in sR, signals sj are identically distributed and independent
conditionally on θ, the term inside the integral can be rewritten as
∑
sR∈{0,1}(kj+1)
l2P (sR|θ) = E(l2|θ) = Var(l|θ) + (E(l|θ))2
= (kj + 1)Var(s1|θ) + (kj + 1)2(E(s1|θ))2
= (kj + 1)θ(1− θ) + (kj + 1)2θ2.
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(α+ β + 1)(α+ β)
[αβ + (kj + 1)α(α+ 1)].
Now E [Var(θ|sR)] can be written as
A
(α+ β + kj + 1)2(α+ β + kj + 2)
=
α(β + (kj + 1)) + (β + (kj + 1)− α)(kj + 1) αα+β −
(kj+1)
(α+β+1)(α+β) [αβ + (kj + 1)α(α+ 1)]
(α+ β + kj + 1)2(α+ β + kj + 2)
,
which after several algebraic transformations boils down to
αβ
(α+ β + kj + 1)(α+ β + 1)(α+ β)
= h(kj)
Finally, the total impact h(bi, bj , kj) becomes
h(bi, bj , kj) = − αβ
(α+ β + kj + 1)(α+ β + 1)(α+ β)
− (bj − bi)2 = −h(kj)− (bj − bi)2,
which proves the result. QED.
Proof of Theorem 1. The necessary conditions for gij = h and gij = 0 follow directly from
the incentive condition to form/maintain a hard link (1.4). To derive the necessary condition
for gij = s—the incentive compatibility constraint of truthful reporting through a soft link ij—
consider player j and let sR be the set of kj signals that player j gets to know apart from player
i. Specifically, kj − 1 signals from his other communication neighbors N−1j (g)/{i} and his own
private signal sj . Assuming that player j believes that i reports truthfully, let ysR,si be j’s action
if he has information sR and i sends him the true signal, mij = si; ysR,1−si be j’s action if he has
information sR and i misreports, mij = 1− si. Player i reports truthfully his signal si to j if and
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(ysR,si − θ − bi)2 − (ysR,1−si − θ − bi)2
]
f(θ, sR|si)dθ ≥ 0,






[(ysR,si − ysR,1−si)(ysR,si + ysR,1−si − 2θ − 2bi)] f(θ, sR|si)dθ ≥ 0.






[(E(θ|sR, si)− E(θ|sR, 1− si))
×(E(θ|sR, si) + E(θ|sR, 1− si) + 2bj − 2θ − 2bi)] f(θ, sR|si)dθ ≥ 0.
Note that







= f(θ|sR, si)P (sR|si).






[∆(E(θ|sR, si) + E(θ|sR, 1− si) + 2bj − 2θ − 2bi)] f(θ|sR, si)P (sR|si)dθ ≥ 0.





∆(E(θ|sR, si) + E(θ|sR, 1− si) + 2bj − 2
∫ 1
0
θf(θ|sR, si)dθ − 2bi)
]








[∆(−∆ + 2bj − 2bi)]P (sR|si) ≥ 0.
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If there are l signals 1 in sR, then
E(θ|sR, si) = E(θ|l + si, kj + 1) = α+ l + si
α+ β + kj + 1
,
E(θ|sR, 1− si) = E(θ|l + 1− si, kj + 1) = α+ l + 1− si




α+ l + si
α+ β + kj + 1
− α+ l + 1− si
α+ β + kj + 1
=
2si − 1
α+ β + kj + 1
,
which is independent on l, and hence on sR. Using that
∑
sR∈{0,1}kj P (sR|si) = 1, the incentive
condition becomes
− 2si − 1
α+ β + kj + 1
(
− 2si − 1
α+ β + kj + 1
+ 2(bj − bi)
)
≥ 0.
If si = 1, then player i is willing to communicate his signal if and only if
− 1
α+ β + kj + 1
(
− 1
α+ β + kj + 1
+ 2(bj − bi)
)
≥ 0;
bj − bi ≤ 1
2(α+ β + kj + 1)
.
If s = 0 then truth-telling is incentive compatible if and only if
− −1
α+ β + kj + 1
(
− −1
α+ β + kj + 1
+ 2(bj − bi)
)
≥ 0;
(bj − bi) ≥ − 1
2(α+ β + kj + 1)
.
As a result,
|bj − bi| ≤ 1
2(α+ β + kj + 1)
,
which completes the proof of Theorem 1. QED.






the players such that their in-degrees in the communication network g(C0) are increasing in their
respective number: k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ... ≤ kn.
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If k1 = n − 1, then the communication network g(C0) is complete. When the cost drops to











generates the same complete truthful network. Indeed, given a complete soft-link network g(C1),
the strategy profile (µg(C0), yg(C0)) forms a PBE. Moreover, no two players would like to substitute
a soft link with a costly hard link, because that will result in ex-ante expected utility decrease.
Consequently, in this case k′1 = k1, ..., k′n = kn.
Assume now that k1 < n− 1, i.e., the equilibrium network g(C0) is not complete and there are
players who don’t have all the signals reported to them. Consider three cases:
Case 1. Sufficiently large cost: max{α, 1−α}C1 > (h(k1)−h(k1 +1)). In this case, there exists






mains an equilibrium when the cost is C1, because the pair (µ
g(C0), yg(C0)) forms a PBE given g(C0)
and no two players would want to add a hard link or substitute a soft link with a hard link, because











hence, in this case k′j = kj for all j ∈ N .
Case 2. Intermediate cost: max{α, 1− α}C1 ∈ (h(k + 1)− h(k + 2), h(k)− h(k + 1)] for some
k, k1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2. Then by Theorem 1, it must be the case that in the equilibrium network every
player has at least (k+1) links directed to him. In particular, this means that player 1 with k1 and
several other players with in-degrees < k + 1 will have a strict improvement in their information
sets.
Consider the two subcases: (i) If k + 1 ≥ kn, then each player gets at least k + 1 ≥ kn signals,
which proves the result. (ii) If k + 1 < kn, then there is player j such that kj < k + 1 ≤ kj+1.
Theorem 1 implies that k′l ≥ k+ 1 > kl, l = 1, ..., j, in any equilibrium network g(C1). Concerning
other players, there exists an equilibrium network with k′l = kl for l = j + 1, ..., n. To see this,
suppose that the only links in g(C1) directed towards players l = j + 1, ..., n are the soft links from
the pure cheap talk equilibrium network g(C0). Clearly, truthful communication along these links
is still incentive compatible. Further, because max{α, 1−α}C1 > h(k+ 1)− h(k+ 2), then no two
players want to deviate and create hard links directed towards players l = j + 1, ..., n. Thus, in the
considered equilibrium network the in-degrees of players l = 1, ..., j are strictly greater than in the
pure cheap talk equilibrium, while the in-degrees of the other players are the same, which confirms
the statement of the theorem.
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Case 3. Sufficiently low cost: max{α, 1− α}C1 ∈ [0, h(kn−1)− h(kn)]. By Theorem 1, in any
equilibrium network g(C1) every player has exactly n− 1 links directed to him, which immediately
implies that n− 1 = k′j ≥ kj for all j ∈ N . QED.
Proof of Lemma 3. I split the proof into three steps:
Step 1: Existence of a maximal equilibrium. Because the number of players and strategies
is finite, the number of the pure strategy equilibria is also finite. Thus, there exists a well-defined
set of numbers, k1, ..., kn, where ki is the highest in-degree of player i that can appear in some
equilibrium: for any equilibrium network g′, ki ≥ k′i = ki(g′). Note that the in-degrees ki and kj ,
i 6= j, in principle, might be achieved in different equilibrium networks. To prove an existence of
a maximal equilibrium, I need to show that k1, ..., kn might be achieved in the same equilibrium,
i.e., that there exists an equilibrium network g such that ki = ki(g) for all i. In order to do this,
I construct the equilibrium in the following way: for each i ∈ N consider an equilibrium where ki
is achieved and let those (and only those) players who report to i truthfully in that equilibrium
to report truthfully to i through the same links (soft or hard) in the constructed equilibrium.
Recall that the incentives to form the hard links depend only on the receiver’s in-degree, while
the incentives of truthful communication through the soft links depend also on the players’ biases.
Hence, it is still incentive compatible for those players to report truthfully to i through the respective
soft links and to sustain the corresponding hard links. Thus, this is, indeed, an equilibrium, and,
by construction, it is maximal.
Step 2: Maximality of a pairwise stable equilibrium. Consider some pairwise stable
equilibrium and assume that it is not maximal. Then there exists player i whose in-degree in the
equilibrium network is lower than his maximal in-degree. Fix some maximal equilibrium; then it
must be the case that there is some agent j who reports truthfully to i (through either a soft or a
hard link) in this maximal equilibrium, but not in the pairwise stable equilibrium. But then it is
profitable for i and j to deviate and induce truthful communication from j to i, which contradicts
the pairwise stability. Hence, every pairwise stable equilibrium must be maximal.
Step 3: Existence of a pairwise stable equilibrium. I illustrate this statement by con-
structing one of (possibly multiple) pairwise stable equilibria. For each i ∈ N perform the following
procedure: order other players j ∈ N/{i} in the increasing absolute values of their preference di-
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vergence from i, |bj − bi|; let this order be i1, ..., in−1. Consider the maximal in-degree of player
i, ki. If ki = 0, then nobody can report truthfully to i in equilibrium. If ki > 0, then take the
closest player i1. If truth-telling through a soft link i1i is incentive compatible for i1, given that i
gets ki − 1 other truthful messages, then let i1 report truthfully to i via a soft link. Otherwise, set
gi1i = h. Repeat this procedure for other ki − 1 closest to i players to set the links of particular
type with truthful communication through them. Note, that for each of these closest ki players,
truthful communication through the corresponding link is desired, because truth-telling through a
soft link is easier to sustain for closer preferences and the expected benefit of a hard link does not
depend on a preference divergence. Since ki is the maximal possible in-degree of player i, players
iki+1, ..., in−1 cannot communicate to i truthfully via either channel.
The described procedure leads to an equilibrium where each player gets truthful messages
through the soft links from the players sufficiently close in their preferences, truthful messages
through the hard links from the less close agents, and gets no messages from the more distinct
players. To see that this equilibrium satisfies pairwise stability, first, note that by construction no
two players i and j such that gji = h, could deviate to truthful communication through a soft link.
Second, no two players i and j such that gji = 0, could implement truthful communication through
either a soft or a hard link ji. Indeed, gji = 0 means that there are ki other players closer to player
i in their preferences than player j. If it were possible for i and j to deviate and implement truthful
communication of j’s signal through a soft link, given that ki other players report truthfully to i,
then truthful communication through soft links from each of the closest ki players is also incentive
compatible (closer biases relax the incentive condition of the truth-telling). But then it means that
the in-degree of ki + 1 can be sustained in the equilibrium network, which contradicts that ki is
maximal. On the other hand, if it were desirable for i and j to deviate and create a hard link ji,
then truthful communication through the hard links from each of the closest ki players must be
desirable for them compared to no communication as well. Again, this means that the in-degree
of ki + 1 can be sustained in equilibrium, which contradicts that ki is maximal. As a result, the
constructed equilibrium satisfies pairwise stability. QED.
Proof of Theorem 3. Reorder the players in the pure cheap talk pairwise stable equilibrium
correspondingly to their in-degrees in g(C0): k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ... ≤ kn. Because any pairwise stable
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equilibrium is maximal, the in-degrees k1, ..., kn are maximal when the cost is C0.
If k1 = n − 1, then the truthful network g(C0) is complete, hence g(C1) must be also com-
plete and consist of only soft links. Evidently, the total welfare is the same across the two cases:
W (g(C1), C1) = W (g(C0)).
Assume now that k1 < n− 1 and consider two cases with regard to the cost C1:
Case 1. Sufficiently large cost: C1 > h(k1) − h(k1 + 1). In this case the in-degrees k1, ..., kn
are still maximal and the pure cheap-talk pairwise stable equilibrium still remains a pairwise stable
equilibrium. Thus, g(C1) = g(C0) and W (g(C1), C1) = W (g(C0)).
Case 2. Moderate cost: C1 ∈ (h(k + 1) − h(k + 2), h(k) − h(k + 1)] for some k, k ≥ k1.
Then by Theorem 1, it must be the case that in any equilibrium network every player has at least
min{k + 1, n− 1} links directed to him.
If k < kn, then there is player j such that kj < k+1 ≤ kj+1. Then the set of maximal in-degrees
becomes:
k′1 = ... = k
′
j = k + 1, k
′
j+1 = kj+1, ... , k
′
n = kn.
There exists a maximal equilibrium with the following communication network: all links directed
towards players 1, ..., j are hard, all links directed towards players j+ 1, ..., n are soft and the same
as in g(C0). The upper bound for the total cost of hard links is:
j(k + 1)C1 ≤ j(k + 1)(h(k)− h(k + 1)).




(h(ki)− h(k + 1)) ≥ n · j(h(k)− h(k + 1)).
The lower bound for the welfare gain strictly exceeds the upper bound for the cost, because n−1 ≥
kn > k, meaning that the constructed maximal equilibrium generates the welfare greater than
W (g(C0)). Lemma 4 ensures that there is a pairwise stable equilibrium with the communication
network g(C1) generating the total welfare greater than in the constructed maximal equilibrium.
Hence, for this pairwise stable equilibrium, W (g(C1), C1) > W (g(C0)).
If k ≥ kn, then the set of maximal in-degrees becomes k′1 = ... = k′n = min{k + 1, n − 1}.
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Analyze two possibilities:
(a) In case where kn < n − 1, consider a maximal equilibrium in which all links are hard. The
upper bound for the total cost of the hard links is
nmin{k + 1, n− 1}C1 ≤ nmin{k + 1, n− 1}(h(k)− h(k + 1)).




(h(ki)− h(k + 1)) ≥ n · n(h(k)− h(k + 1)).
The lower bound for the welfare gain strictly exceeds the upper bound for the cost, because
n > min{k + 1, n− 1}. The considered maximal equilibrium has the greatest level of the total
cost and any other pairwise stable equilibrium generates at least the same total welfare. Hence,
for any pairwise stable equilibrium with the communication network g(C1): W (g(C1) < C1) >
W (g(C0)).
(b) In case where kn = n− 1, there exists j such that
k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ... ≤ kj < n− 1 = kj+1 = ... = kn.
The set of maximal in-degrees becomes k′1 = ... = k′n = n− 1. Consider a maximal equilibrium
in which players 1, ..., j receive signals through only hard links, while players j+ 1, ..., n receive
messages through only soft links which are part of g(C0). The upper bound for the total cost
of hard links is
j(n− 1)C1 ≤ j(n− 1)(h(k)− h(k + 1)),




(h(ki)− h(n− 1)) ≥ n · j(h(n− 2)− h(n− 1)).
Since k ≥ kn = n − 1, h(k) − h(k + 1) < h(n − 2) − h(n − 1) and the welfare gain outweighs
the cost. Thus, W (g(C1), C1) > W (g(C0)).
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QED.
Proof of Lemma 5. Since gx(C0) ⊆ gx(C1) for x = s, h, the in-degrees in g(C1) are larger:
ki(g(C1)) ≥ ki(g(C0)) for all i ∈ N . To see that W (g(C1), C1) ≥ W (g(C0), C0), perform the
following procedure:
First, fix the truthful communication network to be g(C0) and set the cost level at C1. Then
the total welfare W (g(C0), C1) is weakly greater than W (g(C0), C0).
Second, add links from g(C1)/g(C0) one by one and trace the welfare changes. In what follows I
show that at each step of adding a link, the ex-ante expected payoff of every individual (and hence,
the total welfare) increases. Consider some step at which the in-degrees of the players are k1, ..., kn,
where ki(g(C0)) ≤ ki ≤ ki(g(C1)) for all i ∈ N and kj < kj(g(C1)) for at least one player j. If a
soft link ij from the remaining soft links gs(C1)/g
s(C0) is added, then the welfare of every player
goes up by h(kj)− h(kj + 1) > 0. If a hard link ij from the remaining hard links gh(C1)/gh(C0) is
added, then the expected payoff of every player l 6= i, j goes up by h(kj)− h(kj + 1) > 0, while the
payoffs of players i and j increase by at least
h(kj)− h(kj + 1)−max{α, 1− α}C1 ≥ 0,
because by Theorem 1
max{α, 1− α}C1 ≤ h(kj(g(C1))− 1)− h(kj(g(C1))) ≤ h(kj)− h(kj + 1).
QED.
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider the setting in which only soft links are available. Condition
n2 > n1 and the congestion effect ensure that cross-group truthful communication in any pairwise
stable equilibrium might be one of the following 3 kinds:
1. No cross-group communication, i.e. k21 = k12 = 0.
2. Communication from group N2 to group N1, i.e. k12 > 0, k21 = 0.
3. Cross-group communication, i.e. k12 > 0, k21 > 0.
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In what follows, I examine each case separately and show that introducing hard links is welfare
increasing in cases 1 and 3, and is welfare decreasing for some parameters in case 2.




2(α+ β + n1)
,
1




2(α+ β + n1)
.
If costly hard links become feasible, then intra-group soft-link communication remains unchanged.
Regarding cross-group communication, if the cost C1 is such that max{α, 1 − α}C1 > h(n1 −
1) − h(n1), then cross-group communication remains empty and W (g(C1), C1) = W (g(C0)). If
max{α, 1−α}C1 ≤ h(n1−1)−h(n1), then some cross-group communication via hard links appears.
Because the set of links in this equilibrium includes the set of links from the cheap talk case (no
crowding out occurs), by Lemma 5, the equilibrium with hard links generates a greater total (and
individual) welfare, W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(C0)).




2(α+ β + n1 + k12 + 1)
,
1
2(α+ β + n1 + k12)
]
, (1.5)
where n1 + k12 ≤ n2. Consider separately two possibilities: n1 + k12 = n2 and n1 + k12 < n2.
First, consider n1 +k12 = n2, which means that k1 = k2 = n2− 1. The total welfare in the pure
cheap talk equilibrium is
W (g(C0)) = −n(n1h(k1) + n2h(k2))−B = −n2h(n2 − 1)−B,







If the cost C1 is such that max{α, 1−α}C1 > h(n1−1+k12)−h(n1 +k12), then the maximal in-
degrees remain the same and each pairwise stable equilibrium involves only soft-link communication,
meaning that W (g(C1), C1) = W (g(C0)). Now let the cost be Ĉ such that max{α, 1 − α}Ĉ =
h(n1 − 1 + k12) − h(n1 + k12) = h(n2 − 1) − h(n2), which means that in a new pairwise stable
equilibrium k′21 = 1, k′12 = k12 + 1, and hence, k′1 = k′2 = n2.24 Given the preference divergence,
members of the opposite communities can not report to each other truthfully via soft links, thus,
24Recall the assumption that whenever the player is indifferent, the choice is made in favor of a hard link creation.
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all cross-group soft links are substituted out by costly hard links leading to the following welfare:
W (g(Ĉ), Ĉ) = −n(n1h(k′1) + n2h(k′2))−B −
1
max{α, 1− α}(h(n2 − 1)− h(n2))[n1k
′
12 + n2]
= −n2h(n2)−B − 1
max{α, 1− α}(h(n2 − 1)− h(n2))[n1(k12 + 1) + n2].
Thus, the difference between the levels of total welfare is
W (g(C0))−W (g(Ĉ), Ĉ) = (h(n2 − 1)− h(n2))
[
−n2 + 1





max{α, 1− α}(n1(k12 + 1) + n2) ≤ −n
2 + 2(n1(k12 + 1) + n2)
= −(n1 + n2)2 + 2n1(n2 − n1 + 1) + 2n2
= −3n21 − n22 + 2n1 + 2n2 ≤ 0,
given that 1 ≤ n1 < n2. For any lower cost level C1 < h(n2−1)−h(n2)max{α,1−α} = Ĉ, cross-group com-
munication is also carried out through only hard links. Compared to the considered case of
Ĉ, no soft links are severed and w.l.o.g. it can be assumed that all hard links are retained
and some new hard links are added. Then Lemma 5 implies that the total welfare increases:
W (t(C1), C1) ≥ W (g(Ĉ), Ĉ) ≥ W (g(C0)). As a result, any pairwise stable equilibrium with hard
links generates a greater total welfare than the pure cheap talk equilibrium.
Second, consider n1 + k12 + 1 ≤ n2. In this case k1 = n1 − 1 + k12, k2 = n2 − 1 and the total
welfare in the pure cheap talk case is
W (g(C0)) = −n(n1h(n1 − 1 + k12) + n2h(n2 − 1))−B.
If the cost C1 >
1
max{α,1−α}(h(n1− 1 + k12)− h(n1 + k12)), then the maximal in-degrees remain
the same and the pairwise stable equilibria are pure soft-link, hence, W (g(C1), C1) = W (g(C0)).
Let the cost be Ĉ = 1max{α,1−α}(h(n1 − 1 + k12) − h(n1 + k12)). Then cross-group communication
becomes k′12 = k12 + 1, while k′21 remains 0; all cross-group links are hard. The new maximal
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in-degrees are k′1 = n1 + k12 and k′2 = k2 = n2 − 1, implying the following total welfare
W (g(Ĉ), Ĉ) = − n(n1h(n1 + k12) + n2h(n2 − 1))−B
− 1
max{α, 1− α}(h(n1 − 1 + k12)− h(n1 + k12))[n1(k12 + 1)].
The difference in the levels of the welfare is then
W (g(C0))−W (g(Ĉ), Ĉ) = n1(h(n1 − 1 + k12)− h(n1 + k12))
[
−n+ 1
max{α, 1− α}(k12 + 1)
]
,
which is strictly greater than 0 if and only if k12 > max{α, 1−α}n−1. Since the inequality is strict,
there exists C1 < Ĉ such that the welfare difference remains strictly positive for C1 ∈ (C1, C1),
where C1 = Ĉ. Thus, given the preference divergence (1.5), condition max{α, 1−α}n− 1 < k12 ≤
n2−n1− 1 is sufficient for existence of the cost that leads to a lower welfare. The necessity follows
from the fact that for any C1 < Ĉ Lemma 5 implies that W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(Ĉ), Ĉ).
Finally, Case 3 corresponds to a sufficiently small preference divergence:
b ≤ 1
2(α+ β + n2 + 1)
.
Non-zero cross-group communication in both directions implies that the maximal in-degrees are
the same for members of both communities, k1 = k2. If the truthful cheap talk network g(C0) is
complete (k1 = k2 = n − 1), which corresponds to b ≤ 12(α+β+n) , then introducing feasible hard
links does not alter this pairwise stable equilibrium and W (g(C1), C1) = W (g(C0)).




2(α+ β + n2 + k21 + 1)
,
1
2(α+ β + n2 + k21)
]
,
where k21 < n1. The total welfare of the pure cheap talk pairwise stable equilibrium is
W (g(C0)) = −n2h(k1).
If the cost C1 >
1
max{α,1−α}(h(k1)− h(k1 + 1)), then the maximal in-degrees are the same as in
the cheap talk case and any pairwise stable equilibrium involves only soft communication, meaning
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that W (g(C1), C1) = W (g(C0)). Consider Ĉ =
1
max{α,1−α}(h(k1) − h(k1 + 1)). The new maximal
in-degrees become k′1 = k′2 = k1 + 1 and all cross-group communication in any pairwise stable
equilibrium is performed via hard links, such that each member of community N1 gets k12 + 1 hard
links from members of N2 and, similarly, each member of N2 gets k21 + 1 hard links from members
of N1. The total welfare is
W (g(Ĉ), Ĉ) = −n2h(k1 + 1)− 1
max{α, 1− α}(h(k1)− h(k1 + 1))(n1(k12 + 1) + n2(k21 + 1)).
The difference between the levels of the welfare is
W (g(C0))−W (g(Ĉ), Ĉ)
= (h(k1)− h(k1 + 1))
[
−n2 + 1





max{α, 1− α}(n1(k12 + 1) + n2(k21 + 1)) ≤ −n
2 + 2n1(k12 + 1) + 2n2(k21 + 1)
= −n2 + 2n1(k1 + 2− n1) + 2n2(k1 + 2− n2) = −n2 + 2(k1 + 2)n− 2n21 − 2n22
≤ −n2 + 2(k1 + 2)n− n2 = −2n(n− (k1 + 2)) ≤ 0,
given that k1 < n − 1. For any lower level of the cost C1 < Ĉ cross-group communication is
performed through only hard links as well. Since, compared to the case of Ĉ, no cheap talk links
are severed and w.l.o.g. it can be assumed that all hard links are retained and some new hard links
are added, Lemma 5 implies that W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(Ĉ), Ĉ) ≥W (g(C0)). QED.
Proof of Theorem 5. The case of n = 3 was already analyzed in the main body of the chapter;
it remains to show the positive welfare result for n ≥ 4.
Consider prohibitively costly hard links, max{α, 1 − α}C0 > h(0) − h(1), and construct a
pairwise stable equilibrium that generates the greatest welfare in a way described in Lemma 4. In
the corresponding truthful network, player i gets truthful messages from ki closest players. This
type of cheap talk equilibrium corresponds to the utility-maximizing equilibrium considered in
[Galeotti et al., 2011]. Following [Galeotti et al., 2011], the communication network g(C0) can be
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formally described as follows: if b > 12(α+β+2) then g(C0) is empty, otherwise, let V (b) = max{V ∈
{1, ..., n} : b ≤ 12V (2V−1+1+α+β)}, then
1. For every j ∈ {V (b) + 1, ..., n− V (b)}, gij = s if |i− j| < V (b) and gij = 0 if |i− j| > V (b);
if b > 12V (b)(2V (b)+1+α+β) , then gij = s for one and only one player i such that |i− j| = V (b);
if b ≤ 12V (b)(2V (b)+1+α+β) , then gij = s for both players i such that |i− j| = V (b).
2. For all players j ∈ {1, ..., V (b)} ∪ {n− V (b) + 1, ..., n}, gij = s if and only if |i− j| ≤M(j, b),
where M(j, b) = max{M ∈ {1, ..., n} : b ≤ 12M(min{j−1,n−j}+M+1+α+β)}.
In the pure cheap talk equilibrium, the set of maximal in-degrees K = {k1, ..., kn} is the following:
kj = 0, j ∈ N , if b > 12(α+β+2) ; otherwise, for every i ∈ {V (b) + 1, ..., n− V (b)},
ki =

2V (b)− 1, if b > 12V (b)(2V (b)+1+α+β)
2V (b), if b ≤ 12V (b)(2V (b)+1+α+β) ,
and for each j ∈ {1, ..., V (b)} ∪ {n− V (b) + 1, ..., n},
kj = min{j − 1, n− j}+M(j, b).
Given the set of maximal in-degrees K, define
k(n) = max{ki ∈ K},
k(j) = max{ki ∈ K/{k(n), ..., k(j−1)}},
i.e., k(1) ≤ ... ≤ k(n) is a reordering of K in the increasing order. It can be easily seen, that players
with moderate preferences, {V (b) + 1, ..., n−V (b)}, have the highest in-degree k(n). The in-degrees
of other players decrease as their preference biases get closer to the extremes, such that player 1
(with bias 0) and player n (with bias (n − 1)b) have the same in-degree of k(1). Since M(j, b) ∈
{M(j + 1, b),M(j + 1, b) + 1} for j ∈ {1, ..., V (b)} (similarly, M(j + 1, b) ∈ {M(j, b),M(j, b) + 1}
for j ∈ {n− V (b) + 1, ..., n}) and M(V (b), b) = M(n− V (b), b) = V (b), the structure of a pairwise
stable equilibrium ensures that for every i = 1, ..., n− 1 the difference k(i+1) − k(i) is either 0 or 1.
Now introduce hard links with the cost C1 ≤ h(0)−h(1)max{α,1−α} . If the communication network of the
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pairwise stable pure cheap talk equilibrium is empty (b > 12(1+1+α+β)), then there is no crowding
out when hard links become available, and Lemma 5 implies that the welfare increases. Consider
now the case where the pure cheap talk communication network is not empty, i.e., k(n) > 0, and
study three possibilities for C1 separately
1. max{α, 1− α}C1 ∈ (h(k(1))− h(k(1) + 1), h(0)− h(1)].
2. max{α, 1− α}C1 ∈ (h(k + 1)− h(k + 2), h(k)− h(k + 1)], for some k(1) ≤ k < k(n).
3. max{α, 1− α}C1 ∈ (0, h(k(n))− h(k(n) + 1)].
Case 1. For the cost higher than
h(k(1))−h(k(1)+1)
max{α,1−α} , the maximal in-degrees remain the same and
the pure cheap talk equilibrium remains pairwise stable, meaning that w.l.o.g. g(C1) = g(C0) and
W (g(C1), C1) = W (g(C0)).
Case 2. Because the difference k(i+1)−k(i) is either 0 or 1, there must exist i such that k(i) = k
and k(i+1) = k+1. The structure of the pure cheap talk equilibrium implies that i is an even number
less or equal to 2V (b). For any C1 that satisfies max{α, 1−α}C1 ∈ (h(k+1)−h(k+2), h(k)−h(k+1)],
the maximal in-degrees are
k′j =

k + 1, if kj ≤ k,
kj , if kj > k.
Consider a pairwise stable equilibrium that generates the greatest welfare. It must be the case
that in the corresponding communication network g(C1) players {j : kj > k} receive messages via
only soft links, in particular, assume that they receive truthful messages from the same players as
in the pure cheap talk equilibrium. Other players {j : kj ≤ k = k(i)} = {1, ..., i2} ∪ {n − i2 , ..., n}
have the new in-degrees equal to k + 1 and can receive truthful messages through both, soft and
hard links. If j ∈ {1, ..., i2}, then the number of soft links directed to player j in g(C1) is at least
j − 1 + V (b). This implies that the upper bound on the number of costly hard links directed to j
is k + 1− (j − 1 + V (b)). Similarly, if j ∈ {n− i2 , ..., n}, then the number of hard links directed to
player j is less or equal than k + 1 − (n − j + V (b)). Thus, the upper bound for the total cost of
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hard links is





[k + 1− (j − 1 + V (β))]
= i
h(k)− h(k + 1)
max{α, 1− α}
[









[h(kj)− h(k + 1)] ≥ n · i(h(k)− h(k + 1)).
The upper bound for the cost is less than the lower bound for the additional benefit, because
n ≥ 2
[










where the first inequality is satisfied due to n2 + V (β) ≥ k(n) ≥ k + 1 and 1− i+24 ≤ 0. As a result,
W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(C0)).
Case 3. If max{α, 1 − α}C1 ∈ (0, h(k(n)) − h(k(n) + 1)], then there is k ≥ k(n) such that
max{α, 1−α}C1 ∈ (h(k+ 1)−h(k+ 2), h(k)−h(k+ 1)]. There are several possibilities to consider:
1. If k(n) = n−1, then g(C0) is either complete, or not. In case it is complete, the pure cheap talk
equilibrium remains pairwise stable once hard links become feasible, thus, W (g(C1), C1) =
W (g(C0)). If g(C0) is incomplete, then there exists i: 1 ≤ i < N such that
k(1) ≤ ... ≤ k(i) < n− 1 = k(i+1) = ... = k(n).
Consider a pairwise stable equilibrium that generates the greatest welfare when hard links
are available. Condition max{α, 1−α}C1 ≤ h(n−1)−h(n) insures that in the corresponding
communication network g(C1) each player j ∈ N has the in-degree k′j = n − 1. Note that
for the greater cost C2 =
h(n−2)−h(n−1)
max{α,1−α} , a pairwise stable equilibrium that generates the
greatest welfare has the same communication network, g(C2) = g(C1). Since C2 satisfies the
conditions of case 2, then W (g(C1), C1) > W (g(C2), C2) ≥W (g(C0)).
2. Consider k(n) ≤ n − 2. Note that if the positive welfare result W (g(C1), C1) ≥ W (g(C0))
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holds for k = n − 2, then by Lemma 5 it also holds for any k > n − 2. Thus, for the rest
of the proof assume that k ≤ n − 2. The in-degrees in the communication network of any
equilibrium when hard links are available become k′j = k + 1, j ∈ N . The total cost of hard
links in the corresponding g(C1) does not exceed
n(k + 1)
h(k)− h(k + 1)
max{α, 1− α} ,
while the gain in the welfare compared to the cheap talk case is at least
n · n(h(k)− h(k + 1)).
The lower bound for the gain is greater than the upper bound for the cost if k ≤ nmax{α, 1−
α} − 1, meaning that for such C1 the welfare in any equilibrium with hard links exceeds
W (g(C0)), in particular, W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(C0)).
Consider now n− 2 ≥ k > nmax{α, 1− α} − 1 and analyze two possibilities:
(a) If k > k(n), then the lower bound for the additional expected total benefit is
n2(h(k− 1)− h(k+ 1)) = n2(h(k− 1)− h(k) + h(k)− h(k+ 1)) ≥ 2n2(h(k)− h(k+ 1)),
which exceeds the upper bound for the cost n(k + 1)h(k)−h(k+1)max{α,1−α} , because
k+1
max{α,1−α} ≤
2(k+ 1) < 2n. This means, that any equilibrium with hard links outperforms the cheap
talk equilibrium in terms of welfare, hence, W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(C0)).
(b) If k = k(n), then in any equilibrium with hard links each player j has the in-degree
of k′j = k + 1 > nmax{α, 1 − α} ≥ n2 , j ∈ N . Take a pairwise stable equilibrium
that generates the greatest welfare, and consider how many links in the corresponding
communication network g(C1) can be soft. Player i with the bias bi such that |bi−bj | = lb,
will report truthfully via cheap talk to player j if
b ≤ 1
2l(k + 2 + α+ β)
.
Note that this inequality is satisfied for l = V (b)− 1, because by the definition of V (b)
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and the fact that k = k(n) ≤ 2V (b),
1
2l(k + 2 + α+ β)
>
1
2V (b)(2V (b) + α+ β)
≥ b.
Thus, assuming l = V (b) − 1, each player j ∈ {1, ..., l} gets truthful messages through
soft links from j − 1 + l players 1, ..., j − 1, j + 1, ..., j + l. Similarly, each player j ∈
{n − l, ..., n} gets at least n − j + l truthful messages through soft links. Finally, each
player j ∈ {l + 1, ..., n − l − 1} gets at least 2l truthful messages via cheap talk. Thus,
the number of hard links in g(C1) is bounded from above by
n(k + 1)− 2
l∑
j=1
(j − 1 + l)− 2l(n− 2l) = n(k + 1) + l2 + l − 2ln,
meaning that the total cost does not exceed
h(k)− h(k + 1)
max{α, 1− α} (n(k + 1) + l
2 + l − 2ln).
Since k = k(n) ≤ 2V (b) and l = V (b)− 1, then k+ 1 ≤ 2(l+ 1) and the upper bound for
the cost becomes
h(k)− h(k + 1)
max{α, 1− α} (2n(l + 1) + l
2 + l − 2ln) = h(k)− h(k + 1)
max{α, 1− α} (2n+ l
2 + l).
Note that 1max{α,1−α} ≤ 2 and l ≤ n2 − 1, because 2l < 2V (b) − 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2, which
allows to write the upper bound for the cost as:


















The additional welfare is at least
n2(h(k)− h(k + 1)).
The lower bound for the extra welfare is greater than the upper bound for the cost if
n ≥ 6. Thus, W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(C0)) for n ≥ 6.
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It remains to show that W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(C0)) for n = 4 and n = 5 as well, assuming that





max{α, 1− α}C1 ∈ (h(k + 1)− h(k + 2), h(k)− h(k + 1)].
Consider, first, n = 5 and k = 2, 3. Depending on b, case k = k(n) = 2 corresponds to pairwise
stable pure cheap talk equilibria with the following in-degrees (see Figure 1.6):
(i) If 14(3+α+β) < b ≤ 12(3+α+β) , then k1 = k5 = 1, k2 = k3 = k4 = 2.
(ii) If 14(4+α+β) < b ≤ 14(3+α+β) , then k1 = k2 = k3 = k4 = k5 = 2.
When hard links become available with max{α, 1−α}C1 ∈ (h(3)− h(4), h(2)− h(3)], the maximal
in-degrees become k′1 = ... = k′5 = 3. In case (i), the upper bound for the total cost of hard links is
5 · 3 · 2(h(2)− h(3)),
which is lower than the gain in the total welfare
5 · [3(h(2)− h(3)) + 2(h(1)− h(3))],
because h(2) − h(3) < 2(h(1) − h(2)). In case (ii), soft links between the players with adjacent
biases can be a part of the communication network of a pairwise stable equilibrium. Thus, the
total cost of hard links in g(C1) does not exceed 7 · 2(h(2)−h(3)), which, in turn, is lower than the
additional total welfare, 5 · 5(h(2)− h(3)).
Case k = k(n) = 3 corresponds to
1
4(5+α+β) < b ≤ 14(4+α+β) and maximal in-degrees k1 = k5 = 2,
k2 = k3 = k4 = 3 in the pure cheap talk setting (see Figure 1.7 for an example of g(C0)). When hard
links become available with max{α, 1− α}C1 ∈ (h(4)− h(5), h(3)− h(4)], the maximal in-degrees
become k′1 = ... = k′5 = 4. Note that soft links between the players with adjacent biases can be a
part of the communication network of a pairwise stable equilibrium, implying that the total cost of
hard links in g(C1) has an upper bound of 12 · 2(h(3)− h(4)), which is lower than the gain in the
total welfare, 5 · [3(h(3)− h(4)) + 2(h(2)− h(4))]. Hence, W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(C0)), when n = 5.
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Figure 1.6: Communication networks of pairwise stable pure cheap talk equilibria when n = 5 and k = 2.
Figure 1.7: Communication network of pairwise stable pure cheap talk equilibrium when n = 5 and k = 3.
Consider now n = 4 and k = 2. Depending on b, g(C0) can have two different structures with
the following in-degrees (see Figure 1.8):
(i) If 14(3+α+β) < b ≤ 12(3+α+β) , then k1 = k4 = 1, k2 = k3 = 2.
(ii) If 14(4+α+β) < b ≤ 14(3+α+β) , then k1 = k2 = k3 = k4 = 2.
When hard links become available with max{α, 1−α}C1 ∈ (h(3)− h(4), h(2)− h(3)], the maximal
in-degrees become k′1 = ... = k′4 = 3. In case (i), the total cost of hard links has an upper bound of
Figure 1.8: Communication network of pure cheap talk equilibrium when n = 4 and k = 2.
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3·4·2(h(2)−h(3)), which is lower than the gain in the total welfare 4·[2(h(2)−h(3))+2(h(1)−h(3))],
because h(2)− h(3) < h(1)− h(2). In case (ii), soft links between the players with adjacent biases
can be a part of the communication network of a pairwise stable equilibrium. Thus, the total cost
of hard links in g(C1) is below 6 · 2(h(2)− h(3)), which, in turn, is lower than the additional total
welfare, 4 · 4(h(2)− h(3)). As a result, W (g(C1), C1) ≥W (g(C0)), when n = 4. QED.
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Chapter 2
Strategic communication in networks:
Preferences versus opinions
Uliana Loginova
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Abstract
This chapter studies situations in which every agent needs to take an action that matches his pref-
erences given the state of the world and that action affects the payoffs of all other agents. Before
deciding upon the action, agents can choose to whom they communicate their private information
about the state by means of cheap talk. I find that the information transmission pattern crucially
depends on the nature of the disagreement. If the agents diverge in their preferences, then informa-
tion transmission exhibits a negative externality effect : greater information obtained by some agent
discourages further information accumulation by harming the credibility of other agents. In con-
trast, information transmission displays a positive externality effect when the agents have divergent
opinions: greater information obtained by some agent encourages further information accumulation
by improving the credibility of other agents. I show that, under conflicting preferences, the infor-
mation is likely to flow from a larger community to a smaller one; while, under conflicting opinions,
the information flow is reversed and a smaller community is more likely to report to a larger one.
Finally, I demonstrate that replicating the set of agents curbs cross-type communication when the
agents diverge in their preferences; and boosts cross-type communication when the agents disagree
in their opinions.
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2.1 Introduction
In many real-life situations, people need to decide on the most appropriate action to take in the
face of an uncertain environment, actions may influence other participants as well. For example,
managers of a corporation must choose marketing strategies, the effectiveness of which depends
on tomorrow’s market condition. Managers are mainly responsible for their respective divisions
and might differ in their goals and in their perceptions of the uncertain economic environment.
Nevertheless, the divisions are parts of one corporation, and the strategy chosen by some manager
has an effect on other divisions’ payoffs. Another example is a group of politicians, each responsible
for choosing a policy in his respective jurisdiction; the chosen policies generate externalities across
districts. Politicians might have different preferences over the possible strategy courses and different
judgements of an uncertain future political environment that reflect their own political views as well
as the views of their constituencies. In this chapter, I formalize the interdependence of individuals’
payoffs by assuming that each agent faces a loss when his action and the actions of other agents
differ from his own “ideal action”—an action that matches the individual’s preferences given the
state of the world.
Oftentimes, individuals base their decisions not only on their private information, but also
on the information obtained from other agents during preliminary discussions. However, even
when individuals get to know the same information about the state of the world, they might still
disagree on the proper actions, either because they have conflicting preferences or because they have
conflicting opinions. Under conflicting preferences, the individuals agree on the fundamentals of the
uncertain economic environment but simply like different courses of action. E.g., some managers
advocate rather aggressive expansion strategies because they have a taste for empire building.
Under conflicting opinions, the individuals would prefer the same actions had they known the
exact state of the world; however, under incomplete information, they diverge in their opinions
about the uncertain environment and, thus, deem different actions optimal. E.g., some managers
prefer a more aggressive expansion strategy, because they hold a more optimistic belief about the
corporation’s prospects in tomorrow’s market.1
1On possible reasons for the existence and persistence of different priors see, e.g., [Aumann, 1976], [Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974], [Acemoglu et al., 2007], [Sethi and Yildiz, 2009]. Also see [Morris, 1995] for a discussion of the
assumption of different priors in the economics literature.
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This chapter analyzes how information transmission patterns depend on the nature of disagree-
ment. The framework I study is closely related to [Galeotti et al., 2011], [Loginova, 2012b] and
[Hagenbach and Koessler, 2010]. In the model, there are n players with preference biases b1, ..., bn,
who face an uncertain economic environment summarized by θ. Individuals might hold different
beliefs about the economic environment: agent i’s prior of θ is characterized by Beta distribution
with parameters (αi, βi). The state of the world relevant to the decision-making process, S, is com-
posed of D different aspects, S =
∑D
d=1 sd. Conditional on the underlying economic environment
θ, the aspects are independent and identically distributed, with each sd taking a value of 1 with
probability θ and 0 with complementary probability 1− θ. The total number of aspects is greater
than the number of agents, D ≥ n, and each agent i is privately informed of the respective aspect
si.
Individuals can simultaneously communicate their private information to each other according to
the communication network, which is set prior to the aspects’ realization. The network is described
by a directed graph, such that player i can send cheap talk messages to other agents that he has
links to. After the communication takes place, individuals simultaneously choose actions y1, ..., yn
that influence each other’s payoffs, such that every individual i obtains −∑nj=1(yj−S− bi)2. That
is, individual i’s payoff depends on how close his action, as well as the actions of other agents,
are to individual i’s ideal action, θ + bi. Under conflicting preferences, individuals have different
biases b1, ..., bn, but share the common prior belief, (αi, βi) = (α, β) ∀i. Under conflicting opinions,
individuals diverge in their prior beliefs about θ, but have fully aligned preferences, bi = 0 ∀i.
Assume that player i has a link to player j and, apart from i’s message, player j gets to know kj
aspects from other agents. Under either type of disagreement between the agents, the two parties,
i and j, would ex-ante prefer truthful revelation of si to agent j. However, the credibility of
communication and the way it is influenced by kj crucially depends on the nature of disagreement
between the individuals. When the two parties diverge in their preferences, I find a negative
externality effect of information transmission: greater information available to player j—higher
kj—harms the credibility of player i.
2 Intuitively, the magnitude of the effect from an additional
signal on j’s action decreases with the informativeness of agent j. Thus, for sufficiently high kj , the
expected effect might become so small that i would prefer to lie in order to shift j’s action closer
2This corresponds to the congestion effect of [Galeotti et al., 2011] and [Loginova, 2012b].
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towards i’s preferred one.
In contrast, when the parties disagree in their opinions, the communication pattern exhibits
positive externality effect : greater number of aspects obtained by agent j—higher kj—improves the
credibility of agent i. Intuitively, as kj increases, two things happen. First, agent i expects the
ex-post belief of agent j to become more congruent. Indeed, agent i deems other signals revealed to
player j distributed according to i’s belief, hence, he expects player j to be persuaded and adjust
his ex-post belief in the “right” direction (from i’s point of view). Second, the magnitude of the
effect of an additional signal on j’s action decreases with kj . However, the additive nature of the
state S in aspects sd insures that the rate of decrease is sufficiently low, so that the effect of i’s
message on j’s action remains significant enough to prevent player i from misreporting to player j
(given that i expects j to become more congruent).
As one application of the main findings, I study communication patterns between two com-
munities composed of players who agree in their preferences (or priors). Similarly to [Galeotti
et al., 2011] and [Loginova, 2012b], I find that under conflicting preferences, the information is
more likely to flow from a larger community to a smaller one. Intuitively, members of the large
community accumulate many aspects from their like-minded colleagues, which, by the negative
externality effect, curbs truthful reporting from the members of the small community. Under con-
flicting opinions, however, members of the small community are more likely to report truthfully to
members of the large community. The reason being that greater information accumulated inside the
large community, by the positive externality effect, improves the credibility of the small community
members.
As another application, I consider replicas of a diverse group of people. I find that, under
conflicting preferences, increasing the number of individuals of the same type curbs cross-type
communication and can lead to a segregation of communication according to the players’ types.
Indeed, more intense communication between the same-type individuals, by the negative externality
effect, can deteriorate the credibility of the cross-type communication. As a result, adding new
players who are privately informed about other aspects does not necessarily improve the aggregation
of information. Under conflicting opinions, on the contrary, replicating the set of players, by the
positive externality effect, boosts cross-type communication, which necessarily leads to a more
information aggregation.
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops the model and describes the types of
conflict. Section 2.3 studies the credibility of communication and characterizes equilibrium commu-
nication patterns for each type of conflict. Applications of the main results to the particular cases
of two communities and replicas of a diverse group of people are considered in Section 2.4. Section
2.5 concludes the chapter. Finally, Appendix 2.6 provides additional details on characterization of
the pairwise stable equilibria, and Appendix 2.7 contains all the proofs.
2.1.1 Related literature
This chapter contributes to the strand of literature on strategic information transmission, which
builds on the classic model of cheap talk communication by [Crawford and Sobel, 1982] and [Green
and Stokey, 2007]. This literature is very rich, and here I mention only the few of most related
studies.
The setting of this chapter builds on [Galeotti et al., 2011] and [Loginova, 2012b]: it features the
same type of payoff interdependence and departs from their framework by considering the additive
state of the world and allowing for opinion conflict. Naturally, because the marginal value of
learning an additional signal decreases with the informativeness of the individual, I obtain similar
results under conflicting preferences, namely, the negative externality result that replicates the
congestion effect of [Galeotti et al., 2011] and [Loginova, 2012b]. Another closely related paper is
[Hagenbach and Koessler, 2010], who focus on preference conflict and study strategic cheap talk
communication in networks. Importantly, their model differs in two ways: First, the state of the
world is a sum of aspects that are sampled from some known distributions. Hence, knowing one
aspect does not help in predicting some other unknown aspect (while in my model, in which all
aspects come from the same distribution, knowing some aspect allows one to make an inference
about an unknown one). This assumption implies a constant marginal value of every additional
signal; hence, the negative externality result is absent from their model. Second, they consider a
different type of coordination, i.e., each player not only wants others’ actions to be closer to his
action (as is the case in my model), but also also wants to match his action with the actions of
others.
Other related papers with cheap talk communication under preference conflict, include settings
with multiple senders (e.g. [Morgan and Stocken, 2008]) and multiple receivers (e.g. [Caillaud
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and Tirole, 2007]). While in this chapter I focus on private communication, there are studies that
compare private with public information transmission, e.g. [Farrell and Gibbons, 1989], [Goltsman
and Pavlov, 2011] and [Galeotti et al., 2011].
That a difference in the outcomes under conflicting preferences and under conflicting opinions
can be crucial is documented in other papers as well. [Che and Kartik, 2009] show that difference of
opinion between a decision maker and an advisor can increase the advisor’s incentive to exert effort
to persuade the decision maker; at the same time, differences in preferences cannot induce such a
persuasion motive. [Hirsch, 2011], [Van den Steen, 2006] and [Van den Steen, 2009] also analyze
this mechanism. [Hirsch, 2011] illustrates how open disagreement in opinions between a principal
and an agent creates a persuasion-based rationale for deference: the principal can allow the agent
to implement the agent’s preferred policy in the first period in order to let the agent learn from
his own mistakes and increase his effort on the principal’s preferred policy in the second period.
[Van den Steen, 2009] shows that a principal will rely on persuasion—costly alteration of the agent’s
beliefs—for projects that need high agent’s effort. Relatedly, [Van den Steen, 2006] shows that a
principal may delegate decision rights to the agent in order to increase his efforts, which is crucial
for the project’s success. [Loginova and Persson, 2012] demonstrate that a benevolent authority’s
decision to constrain or inform a population of agents crucially depends on whether the authority
deems it a matter of preference or opinion. In the former case, the authority gives truthful advice
and safeguards liberty; in the latter, the authority constrains liberty, believing that she acts in the
population’s interest.
Characterization of communication patterns in cases of two communities and replicas of a
diverse group of people contributes to the literature on organizational design with cheap talk (e.g.
[Alonso et al., 2008], [Rantakari, 2008]), verifiable information (e.g. [Bolton and Dewatripont,
1994], [Radner, 1992], [Radner, 1993], [Sah and Stiglitz, 1986], [Van Zandt and Radner, 2001])
noisy hard talk, where the information is transmitted perfectly with some probability less than 1
(e.g. [Dessein and Santos, 2006]), and combined soft and hard information (e.g. [Dessein, 2007]).
Also related are studies that focus on questions of coordination and adaptation with verifi-
able information transmission in communication networks. In particular, [Chwe, 2000] studies a
collective action problem with preliminary communication regarding participation activity in a de-
terministic exogenous network. [Calvo´-Armengol and de Mart´ı, 2007] and [Calvo´-Armengol and
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de Mart´ı, 2009] analyze how the communication pattern affects individual behavior and aggregate
welfare in a setting in which the agents not only want to coordinate their actions, but also adapt to
an unknown state of the world. Instead, [Calvo´-Armengol et al., 2011] consider local uncertainty
regarding the state, and study information transmission patterns that arise when the agents are
allowed to alter the communication precision.
Finally, the analysis of the communication patterns arising in equilibria contributes to the
literature of strategic network formation, which includes [Bala and Goyal, 2000], [Goyal, 2007],
[Jackson, 2008], [Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996].
2.2 Model
Let the set of players be N = {1, ..., n} with n ≥ 2, where each player i has the preference bias bi.
The underlying economic environment is summarized by θ that is unknown to the players. Each





The preference profile {b1, ..., bn} and the players’ priors are publicly known.
There are D different aspects s1, ..., sD that determine the state of the world as S =
∑D
d=1 sd.
Conditional on the underlying economic environment θ, the aspects {sd}Dd=1 are independent and
identically distributed, and sd = 1 with probability θ and sd = 0 with complementary probability
1− θ. The total number of aspects is greater than the number of players, D ≥ n, and each player i
is privately informed of the aspect si (i.e., player i receives the private signal si). Thus, all players
cumulatively get to know the first n of D aspects. Note that if D = n, then the players jointly hold
all the relevant information regarding the state of the world.
The communication network is set prior to the aspects’ realization and is described by a directed
graph g ∈ {0, 1}n×n, where player i communicates a cheap talk message about his signal si to player
j if and only if gij = 1.
3 It is assumed that the communication links are cheap to sustain: each
involved party, either sending the message or receiving it, bears just an infinitesimal cost ε > 0.
3The assumption that the communication network is set up before realization of the signals can, for example, be
justified by the necessity of forming a communication schedule beforehand.
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While the players are aware of each other’s existence and each other’s preferences and priors, the
communication network g is not commonly known. Rather, each player i knows only the structure
of his respective neighborhood: the set of players to whom player i has links, Ni(g) = {j ∈ N :
gij = 1}, and the set of players who have links directed to player i, N−1i (g) = {j ∈ N : gji = 1}.
Communication. After the signals are realized, players communicate their privately observed
aspects of the state of the world. Each player i sends private message mgij ∈ {0, 1} to every player
j that he has a link to in the communication network g. It is assumed that communication takes
the form of cheap talk, and that messages are sent simultaneously and are observed only by the
sending and the receiving parties. A communication strategy of player i with the private signal si
defines a vector
µgi (si) = {µgij(si)}j∈Ni(g) ∈ {0, 1}|Ni(g)|.
A communication strategy profile is denoted by µg = {µg1, . . . , µgn}. The messages actually sent by
player i are denoted by vector m̂gi ; the profile of all sent messages is m̂
g = {m̂g1, . . . , m̂gn}.4
Decision making. After the communication has taken place, each player i chooses an action
ygi ∈ R. The action strategy of player i is a function of his information set that consists of his own






ygi : {0, 1} × {0, 1}|N
−1
i (g)| → R.
Let yg = {yg1 , ..., ygn} denote the action strategy profile. Conditional on the state of the world S, if





(yˆgj − S − bi)2.
The payoff of player i increases as his own action and the actions of other players get closer to
player i’s ideal action, S + bi.
4The superscript g for communication strategies highlights the dependence on the network structure. For the
sake of simplicity, I use the same superscript g for all players; note, however, that every player i conditions his
communication strategy only on the structure of his respective neighborhood.
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Time notation. Introduce the following time notation in order to distinguish between periods
with different scopes of information available to the agents: “ex-ante” to denote the stage prior to
when the signals are realized, “interim” for the time period after the signals’ realization but prior
to communication, and finally, “ex-post” to represent the period after communication has occurred
but before the actions are taken.
2.2.1 Nature of disagreement
I develop the analysis under two different assumptions about the nature of disagreement between
the players:
Conflicting preferences. Under conflicting preferences, at least some players diverge in their
preference biases, i.e., bi 6= bj for some i and j. However, all agents share the common prior belief
about the underlying economic environment θ that has Beta distribution with parameters (α, β),
i.e., (αi, βi) = (α, β) for every i ∈ N .
Conflicting opinions. Under conflicting opinions, the players have fully aligned preferences,
i.e., bi = 0 for all i ∈ N ; however, at least some players hold different prior beliefs about θ, i.e.,
(αi, βi) 6= (αj , βj) for some i and j. In the main body of the chapter, I assume that the sum of
parameters of Beta distribution is the same across all players: αi + βi = γ, i ∈ N .5
2.2.2 Solution concept
To solve the model, I use the concept of pure strategies Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). The
restriction to pure strategies simplifies the analysis and implies that cheap talk communication can
be either truthful (the message reflects the signal perfectly), or uninformative (for any signal si
player i sends the same message, either 0 or 1). In the case of uninformative communication, I
assume that an off-equilibrium-path message is ignored by the receiving party. This simplification
5Condition αi + βi = γ, i ∈ N , simplifies derivations and presentation of the results. Importantly, it ensures that
the monotone likelihood ratio for prior distributions holds, which, in particular, means that the players interpret
the signals and update their beliefs consistently with each other. Note, however, that the main results hold in a
general case as well, even though the intuition behind them in cases in which the monotone likelihood property fails
is somewhat more subtle.
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implies that the equilibrium beliefs are defined as follows: any message received in truthful com-
munication induces perfect knowledge about the underlying signal, while any message received in
uninformative communication leaves the prior belief about the underlying signal unchanged.
For any given communication network g, it is natural to determine the communication and
action strategy profile (µg, yg) = ({µgi }i∈N , {ygi }i∈N ) by using the standard PBE solution concept.
Note, however, conditional on a particular choice of g and equilibrium (µg, yg), some links might
be ex-ante undesired by at least one involved party. In particular, all links with uninformative
communication through them are ex-ante unprofitable to both parties.6 To account for this, I
define an equilibrium as a triple {g, (µg, yg)} such that (1) the pair (µg, yg) forms a PBE given the
communication network g, and (2) no player would prefer to break some incoming or outgoing link
at the ex-ante stage.
To formally state the equilibrium definition, let Eul (g, µg, yg) be the ex-ante expected utility
of agent l that takes into account all link costs that accrue to agent l. Let g(gij = 0) be the
communication network with the same set of links as in g, except that there is no link from i to j;
let µg(gij=0) be the profile of communication strategies that coincides with µg everywhere, except
that now there is no communication from i to j; and let yg(gij=0) be the same action profile as
yg for all players but j, while player j’s action is now optimally defined conditional on the lower
number of truthful messages. Below is the formal definition,in which, under conflicting preferences,
all expectations are evaluated using the common prior, while under conflicting opinions, each player
uses his own prior when choosing communication and action strategies.
Definition. Equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} consists of a communication network g and a strategy profile
(µg, yg) = ({µgi }i∈N , {ygi }i∈N ), such that the following properties hold:
(1) The pair (µg, yg) forms a PBE given the communication network g.
(i) Given the action strategies profile yg, every agent i ∈ N for any si ∈ {0, 1} and every
player j to whom i has a link, j ∈ Ni(g), chooses a message µgij(si) ∈ {0, 1} in order to
maximize his interim expected utility.
6Note that no player will object to a link with truthful communication. Indeed, as is shown in Lemmas 7 and
8, destroying the link with truthful communication will strictly harm the ex-ante expected payoffs of both parties
involved in the link (provided that the cost ε is infinitesimal).
CHAPTER 2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN NETWORKS: PREFERENCES VERSUS
OPINIONS 82
(ii) Every player i ∈ N , for any private signal, si ∈ {0, 1}, and any set of received messages,
m̂g
N−1i (g),i






to maximize his ex-post
expected utility.
(iii) The beliefs are consistent with the communication strategies.
(2) For any i and j such that gij = 1:
Eul (g, µg, yg) ≥ Eul
(
g(gij = 0), µ
g(gij=0), yg(gij=0)
)
, for l = i, j.
Remark. In any equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)}, communication network g is truthful, i.e., all links of g
represent truthful revelation of private signals. Different equilibria correspond to different commu-
nication networks.
2.3 Analysis
2.3.1 Choice of action
To derive the optimal choice of action, fix the communication network g and consider agent i who
learned his private signal si and received the messages m̂
g
N−1i (g),i
from his neighbors N−1i (g). Player
i then chooses an action ygi (si, m̂
g
N−1i (g),i




(ygj − S − bi)2 si, m̂gN−1i (g),i
 ,
where the subscript i in the expectation operator Ei signifies that player i uses his prior of Beta
distribution with parameters (αi, βi). This means that the agent optimally picks
ygi (si, m̂N−1i (g),i





−(ygi − S − bi)2 si, m̂gN−1i (g),i
)}
= bi + Ei
(
S | si, m̂gN−1i (g),i
)
.







can be equivalently represented as the set of revealed signals. Specifically, assume
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that player i gets to know k signals summarized in a set sR. The unknown D−k signals are denoted
as a set s−R. Using this notation, i’s optimal action can be written as











sd + (D − k)Ei (s | sR) ,
where the second equality holds because the aspects are identically distributed. Thus, the optimal
action is the sum of the preference bias, the known aspects, and the prediction of the unknown
part of the state.
The binary nature of the signal ensures that Ei (s | sR) = Ei (θ | sR). Assume that l signals
in sR are 1. A straightforward algebra implies that player i’s posterior is Beta distribution with
parameters (αi + l, βi + k − l):
fi(θ|l, k) = 1
B(αi + l, βi + k − l)θ
αi+l−1(1− θ)βi+k−l−1.
The expected value of θ then is Ei(θ|l, k) = αi+lαi+βi+k =
αi+l
γ+k and the optimal action becomes
ygi (sR) = bi +
∑
sd∈sR
sd + (D − k)αi + l
γ + k
. (2.1)
Assume now that player i gets to know an additional signal s. The net effect on the optimal
action ygi (sR) consists of two parts: the first is transferring the aspect from the predicted to the
known part of the state; the second is improving the prediction of the unknown part with the
additional information. The following lemma states that for any j ∈ N the magnitude of the effect
from player j’s ex-ante perspective is lower the more aspects that are revealed to player i, but
remains bounded away from 0.
Lemma 6. Consider player i who obtains k aspects sR. Then the magnitude of the effect from an
additional signal s on i’s action from player j ex-ante perspective Ej(yi(sR)− yi(sR, s))2 decreases
with k, but remains greater than
αjβj
(γ+1)2
for all k and D.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.
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Intuitively, the common underlying economic environment insures that the expected magnitude
of the impact from an extra signal decreases, while the additive nature of the state of the world
guarantees that it remains bounded from 0. Indeed, learning an additional signal improves the
information about the underlying economic environment θ by less and less the more signals are
already known. At the same time, the magnitude of the effect from an additional signal remains
strictly bounded away from zero because the state of the world is additive in aspects that have
a non-zero variance for any θ ∈ (0, 1). Importantly, it is this sufficiently slow rate at which the
impact of an additional signal decreases—and not the particular assumptions behind the nature of
the state of the world—that is one of the crucial elements for the main results.7
2.3.2 Equilibrium networks
Assume that the strategy profile (µg, yg) is such that the communication network g is truthful:
communication through each link of g leads to a perfect signal revelation. Define kj(g) to be the
number of other players who report truthfully to j via either channel, and refer to it as the in-degree
of player j.
In order to characterize the structure of equilibrium networks, I study how the ex-ante expected
benefits from signal revelation and the interim credibility of player i in communicating to player
j depend on the number of signals revealed to j by other players. Assume that agent i has a link
to agent j and, apart from player i’s message, player j gets to know kj truthful aspects: 1 aspect
player j obtains himself and kj − 1 aspects he infers from other players’ messages, excluding i.
Denote the set of known kj aspects as sR ∈ {0, 1}kj and the set of other aspects, excluding si, as
s−R ∈ {0, 1}D−kj−1.
I show that under either type of disagreement between the players, the two parties, i and j, would
ex-ante prefer truthful revelation of si to player j. However, the credibility of communication and
the way it is influenced by kj crucially depend on the nature of disagreement between the players.
In what follows, I consider each case of disagreement in turn.
7This pattern is different from [Galeotti et al., 2011], in which the rate of decrease is high and not bounded from
0, when the number of revealed signals increases. It is also different from [Hagenbach and Koessler, 2010], in which
the magnitude of the impact is constant, because each aspect is independently drawn from its individual distribution.
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2.3.2.1 Conflicting preferences
Benefits of signal revelation. First, assume uninformative communication from player i to
player j, which implies that player j conditions his action only on sR and optimally chooses yj(sR) =
bj +
∑
sd∈sR sd + (D − kj) α+lγ+kj . Consider the ex-ante expected input from player j into i’s utility.
Given the quadratic loss utility function, the input is comprised of an expected residual variance






− (bj − bi)2 = −h(kj)− (bj − bi)2.
Next, if player i truthfully communicates his signal to player j, then j conditions his action on
kj + 1 signals (sR, si), and the ex-ante expected input becomes −h(kj + 1)− (bj − bi)2. Thus, the
expected benefit of learning an additional signal si is in reducing the expected residual variance,
h(kj)−h(kj +1) > 0 (because of the smaller unknown part of the state S and greater information).
Clearly, player j himself—as well as any other player from N—enjoys the same ex-ante benefit of
h(kj) − h(kj + 1) independently of the bias difference.8 The following lemma presents the exact
expression for this benefit and establishes that it is a decreasing function of kj .
Lemma 7. Fix a truthful network g and consider player j with the in-degree kj − 1 < n − 1.
If j learns one extra signal si, then each player l ∈ N derives the ex-ante expected benefit of
h(kj)− h(kj + 1) > 0 that decreases with kj, where
h(kj) =
αβ(γ +D)(D − kj)
γ(γ + 1)(γ + kj)
.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.
Negative externality effect. While Lemma 7 states that the truthful reporting of si is desired
by both parties i and j from an ex-ante perspective, it might not be interim credible. To study
the incentive to report truthfully, assume that player j believes i’s message, i.e., j assigns the
probability 1 that si = mij . If i reveals his private signal, mij = si, then player j optimally picks
8That all players derive the same benefit from player j learning an additional signal is due to the assumption that
the inputs from all players are equally weighted in the payoff function.
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an action yj(sR, si) = bj+
∑
sd∈sR sd+si+(D−kj−1) α+l+siγ+kj+1 ; if i misreports and sends mij = 1−si,
then j chooses yj(sR, 1− si) = bj +
∑
sd∈sR sd + 1− si + (D− kj − 1)α+l+1−siγ+kj+1 . Player i reveals his
signal whenever it results in a greater interim expected payoff:
∑
sR∈{0,1}kj ,s−R∈{0,1}D−kj−1
− [(yj(sR, si)− S − bi)2 − (yj(sR, 1− si)− S − bi)2]P (sR, s−R|si) ≥ 0.
As I show in Theorem 6, this incentive compatibility constraint can be rewritten as
|bj − bi| ≤ γ +D
2(γ + kj + 1)
. (2.2)
While this constraint (2.2) is always satisfied when |bj − bi| ≤ 1/2, it might fail to hold when the
preference divergence is significant, |bj−bi| > 1/2. In the latter case, player i can be credible so long
as player j doesn’t get to know too many signals relative to the divergence in their preferences.
To see the intuition behind this, recall that, by Lemma 6, the magnitude of the effect from an
additional signal on j’s action decreases with kj . Thus, for sufficiently high kj , the expected effect
might become so small that i would prefer to lie in order to shift j’s action closer towards i’s
preferred one. On the other hand, when kj is quite low, the expected effect of an additional signal
is quite big, in which case misreporting can change j’s action by too much, making it undesirable.
The incentive compatibility constraint (2.2) corresponds to the congestion effect of [Galeotti et
al., 2011] and [Loginova, 2012b]. In this chapter, I refer to this effect as the negative externality
effect of information transmission—greater information has a negative effect on further information
accumulation by discouraging other players to report truthfully.9 Clearly, in order for player j to
receive truthful messages from kj players in equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraint (2.2)
must be satisfied for each of those players. The following theorem provides the formal equilibrium
characterization.
Theorem 6. Consider a triple {g, (µg, yg)} and assume that each element of yg satisfies the opti-
mality condition (2.1). Then {g, (µg, yg)} forms an equilibrium if and only if the communication
9Another natural way to think about the negative externality effect is to view the privately observed aspects as
substitutes. Indeed, if player i reports to j truthfully, then some other player l might not be credible in communicating
to player j. If, on the other hand, player i does not report to j, then player l might be able to transmit his private
information truthfully. This means that in such a communication process, private signals of i and l act as substitutes.
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network g is truthful, and for any player j with the in-degree kj = kj(g)
|bj − bi| ≤ γ +D
2(γ + kj + 1)
for all i ∈ N−1j (g) = {i ∈ N : gij = 1}.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.
2.3.2.2 Conflicting opinions
Benefits of signal revelation. Start from an uninformative communication from player i to
player j, in which case player j optimally chooses yj(sR) =
∑
sd∈sR sd + (D− kj) αi+lγ+kj . The ex-ante

















Here the first term depends on the ex-post opinion divergence between players i and j given the
information sR, and the second term is the expected residual variance. The subscripts ij and i for
A and B, respectively, signify the priors used in evaluating (parts of) these expressions.
When player j learns an additional signal si, both terms are reduced. Indeed, the greater
information and the smaller unknown part of the state S imply that the expected residual variance
Bi(kj) decreases. Regarding the first term Aij(kj), the monotone likelihood ratio guarantees that
players are “consistent” with each other in updating their priors. Hence, the term Aij(kj) decreases,
because player i expects the additional signal to “persuade” player j, such that they have a smaller
expected divergence in their ex-post opinions. On the whole, player i expects to derive a benefit of
Aij(kj) +Bi(kj)−Aij(kj + 1)−Bi(kj + 1) > 0, which is a decreasing function of kj .
Analogously, some player l ∈ N enjoys an expected benefit of Alj(kj) +Bl(kj)− Alj(kj + 1)−
Bl(kj +1). In particular, player j himself expects to get the benefit only from reducing the residual
variance (evaluated using player j’s prior), Bj(kj)−Bj(kj +1). The exact expressions for the terms
are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Fix a truthful network g and consider player j with the in-degree kj − 1 < n− 1. If j
learns one extra signal si, then player l ∈ N from the ex-ante perspective expects to receive a benefit
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of Alj(kj) +Bl(kj)−Alj(kj + 1)−Bl(kj + 1) > 0 that decreases with kj, where
Alj(kj) =
(αl − αj)2(D − kj)2
(γ + kj)2
and Bl(kj) =
αlβl(D + γ)(D − kj)
γ(γ + 1)(γ + kj)
.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.
Positive externality effect. To study the credibility of communication, assume that player j
believes i’s message. If player i reports truthfully, player j chooses yj(sR, si) =
∑
sd∈sR sd+si+(D−
kj−1)αi+l+siγ+kj+1 ; if player i lies, then player j picks ysR,1−si =
∑
sd∈sR sd+1−si+(D−kj−1)αi+l+1−siγ+kj+1 .
Player i will choose truthful reporting if and only if this induces a greater interim expected payoff:
∑
sR∈{0,1}kj ,s−R∈{0,1}D−kj−1
− [(yj(sR, si)− S)2 − (yj(sR, 1− si)− S)2]Pi(sR, s−R|si) ≥ 0.
Note, that player j uses his prior in determining his actions yj(sR, si) and yj(sR, 1 − si), while
player i uses his own prior in probability assessments Pi(sR, s−R|si) when evaluating the expected
payoffs.
Clearly, if kj = n− 1 = D− 1, then reporting the last remaining signal si truthfully is incentive
compatible because it eliminates any uncertainty about the state of the world. As a result, player
j is able to match his action to the state S—an ideal outcome for each player i ∈ N . Consider now
kj ≤ n − 1 < D − 1 and the baseline case where αi + βi = γ, i ∈ N . The incentive compatibility
constraint of truth-telling takes a simple form of:10
|αj − αi| ≤ γ +D
2(D − kj − 1) , kj < D − 1. (2.3)
Contrary to the conflicting preferences case, under conflicting opinions, greater kj relaxes the
incentive compatibility constraint, so that it becomes easier for player i to report to player j
truthfully the more signals player j gets to know from other players. The intuition behind this
result is the following. As the number of signals that j gets to know increases, two things happen.
First, player i expects the ex-post belief of player j to become more congruent (hence, the optimal
action of player j to become closer to i’s preferred one). Indeed, because player i considers other
10The derivation of this condition is contained in the proof of Theorem 7 presented in Appendix 2.7.
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signals revealed to player j to be distributed according to i’s interim belief, he expects player j
to be “persuaded” and to adjust his ex-post belief in the “right” direction from i’s point of view.
Second, as Lemma 6 demonstrates, the effect of an additional signal on j’s action decreases with
kj . However, the rate of decrease is sufficiently low, so that the effect of i’s message on j’s action
remains significant enough to prevent player i from misreporting to player j, given that i expects
j to become more congruent.
Thus, player i might be non-credible when player j doesn’t have much information because
player i is concerned that if player j has an extreme opinion, he will misuse the reported signal.
On the contrary, player i can become credible when player j’s information improves, because
player i expects player j to be persuaded and to become able to properly take into account i’s
signal when choosing his action. I refer to this effect as the positive externality effect of information
transmission, because greater information has a positive effect on further information accumulation
by encouraging other players to report truthfully as well.11 In any equilibrium network, for player
j to have the in-degree of kj(g) > 0, it must be the case that the incentive compatibility constraint
(2.3) is satisfied for every player i reporting truthfully to j. The formal equilibrium characterization
is provided on the theorem below.
Theorem 7. Consider a triple {g, (µg, yg)} and assume that the individual action strategies satisfy
the optimality condition (2.1). Then {g, (µg, yg)} forms an equilibrium if and only if the commu-
nication network g is truthful, and for any player j with the in-degree kj = kj(g) < D − 1
|αj − αi| ≤ γ +D
2(D − kj − 1) for all i ∈ N
−1
j (g) = {i ∈ N : gij = 1}.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.
It is worthwhile to mention that the positive externality effect is not an artifact of a particular
assumption that αi + βi = γ for all i ∈ N . Rather, the positive externality effect is present in a
general case as well. The corresponding incentive compatibility constraint has a more complicated
form, which is presented and derived in the proof of Theorem 7 (see Appendix 2.7).
11In case of positive externality, it is natural to view the private aspects as complements. Indeed, if player i reports
to j truthfully, then other player l might be credible in truthful reporting to j as well. On the other hand, if player
i does not report to player j, then it might not be incentive compatible for l to transmit his private information
truthfully. Thus, private signals of i and l act as complements.
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Remark. In a particular case when the players collectively hold all the information about the state
of the world, i.e., n = D, reporting the last missing signal truthfully is incentive compatible because
it eliminates any uncertainty and disagreement. Thus, there always exists an equilibrium in which
each player gets to know all aspects of the state, i.e., the communication network is complete.
2.4 Applications
In this section I study the implications of the nature of disagreement on communication patterns
in the particular cases of two communities and replicas of a diverse group of people. In the two
communities setting, I show that under conflicting preferences, the larger group tends to communi-
cate to the smaller group; while under conflicting opinions, the opposite is more likely to arise. In
case of replicas, increasing the number of players of the same type localizes communication under
conflicting preferences; and intensifies cross-type communication under conflicting opinions.
2.4.1 Pairwise stable equilibria
The previous analysis shows that, under both types of conflict, each player i ex-ante prefers that
he and any other player j ∈ N learn more aspects of the state, but the respective communication
may fail to be credible from the interim perspective. There may be multiple equilibria that induce
different truthful networks, and so, as a natural refinement, I adapt the notion of pairwise stability
commonly used in the networks literature (e.g., [Bala and Goyal, 2000], [Goyal, 2007], [Jackson,
2008], [Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996]). Specifically, call an equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} pairwise stable, if
no two players can improve the communication pattern between them, while satisfying the interim
truth-telling incentives and holding other strategies fixed.
Definition. An equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} is pairwise stable if for any i, j ∈ N , gij = 0 only if,
holding other strategies fixed, i cannot be credible in reporting to j, assuming that j believes i’s
message.
To prove the existence and determine the characteristics of pairwise stable equilibria, define the
maximal equilibrium as an equilibrium in which the truthful network has the maximal in-degrees
across all equilibrium networks:12
12The concepts of pairwise stable and maximal equilibria are the same as considered in [Loginova, 2012b].
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Definition. Equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} with the in-degrees k1 = k1(g), ..., kn = kn(g) is maximal if
for any other equilibrium network with in-degrees k′1, ..., k′n:
ki ≥ k′i, i = 1, ..., n.
In turn, the in-degrees k1, ..., kn are called maximal in-degrees.
The following lemma states that the set of pairwise stable equilibria is non-empty and, under
conflicting preferences, is a subset of maximal equilibria. Under conflicting opinions, the maximal
equilibrium is unique and is necessarily pairwise stable.
Lemma 9. There exist a maximal and a pairwise stable equilibrium. Under conflicting prefer-
ences, any pairwise stable equilibrium is maximal. Under conflicting opinions, the unique maximal
equilibrium is pairwise stable.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.
Since each player benefits when any other player receives more signals, the ex-ante expected
payoff of every player is the largest in the maximal equilibria. Clearly, the players are indifferent
between the maximal equilibria, because the ex-ante expected payoffs depend only on the vector
of in-degrees and not on the particular network structure (see Lemmas 7 and 8). Assume that the
maximal in-degrees are k1, ..., kn. Then, the maximal equilibrium that is pairwise stable can, for
example, be constructed in the following way. Let every player i receive truthful messages from
ki players who are the closest to i in their preference divergence |bj − bi| (or opinions divergence
|αj − αi|). Because closer preferences (or opinions) relax the truth-telling incentives, these players
are credible. At the same time, due to the maximality of ki, other players cannot report truthfully
to player i.
Lemma 9 implies that, under conflicting preferences, any pairwise stable equilibrium generates
the same set of in-degrees. These in-degrees are necessarily maximal and, by the negative externality
effect, are neither too low nor too large. On the contrary, under conflicting opinions, players can
have different in-degrees in different pairwise stable equilibria. Moreover, by the positive externality
effect, these in-degrees are either sufficiently low or quite large (it is easy to be credible to a player
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with a high in-degree, and it is difficult to be truthful to a low in-degree player).13
Interested readers are referred to Appendix 2.6 for an additional discussion of the pairwise
stable equilibria.
2.4.2 Two communities
A set of players consists of two homogenous communities (or groups), N1 and N2, with sizes n1
and n2, respectively, where 1 ≤ n1 < n2 and the total number of players is n = n1 + n2. Under
conflicting preferences, group N1 members have preference biases normalized to 0, while group N2
members have biases of b. Under conflicting opinions, all individuals in N1 agree on the same prior
with parameters (α1, β1); all players in N2 have the prior with (α2, β2), and I still maintain the
assumption that αi + βi = γ, i = 1, 2.
Conflicting preferences. Clearly, in any pairwise stable equilibrium, there is complete commu-
nication inside each group. In addition, members of the same group have equal in-degrees, because
exactly the same players can report truthfully to them. Introduce notation similar to [Galeotti et
al., 2011] and [Loginova, 2012b]: denote by ki the in-degree of an arbitrary player in group Ni. Fur-
ther, ki = kii + kij , where kii = ni− 1 reflects the level of intra-group communication—the number
of signals revealed by Ni members, and kij stands for the level of cross-group communication—the
number of truthful messages received from members of the opposite community Nj .
By the negative externality effect, if members of a smaller group N1 report truthfully to some
members of N2, then the pairwise stability implies that members of a larger group N2 reveal their
signals to some members of N1. Thus, depending on the parameters, cross-group communication
can take one of the following 3 forms (see cases 1-3 in Figure 2.1):








b ≤ γ+D2(γ+n1+1) .
13In a particular case in which the players cumulatively possess all the relevant information, D = n, under conflicting
opinions, the unique maximal equilibrium has a complete communication network. However, aside from the maximal
equilibrium, there may also exist pairwise stable equilibria that fail to aggregate all of the information (some players
in the communication networks have quite low in-degrees).
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Figure 2.1: Communication networks of pairwise stable equilibria under conflicting preferences.
3. Cross-group communication, i.e., k12 > 0 and k21 > 0, whenever b ≤ γ+D2(γ+n2+1) . In particular,
when b ≤ γ+D2(γ+n) the network is complete, i.e., k12 = n2 and k21 = n1.
Conflicting opinions. In any pairwise stable equilibrium, communication inside each group is
necessarily complete, because members of the same community agree in their opinions. Regarding
cross-group communication, note that, by the positive externality effect, if one player from Nj
reports truthfully to a particular player in the opposite community Ni, then so do all of the other
players in Nj . These observations immediately imply that the in-degree of a player in Ni can be
either ni − 1 or n− 1.
To simplify the characterization, I focus only on symmetric pairwise stable equilibria, i.e.,
equilibria in which players with the same priors have the same in-degrees. This implies that all
players in group Ni have the same in-degree ki = kii + kij , where kij is the level of cross-group
communication and kii = ni − 1 is the level of intra-group communication. Assuming that D > n,
cross-group communication can take the following 4 forms (see cases 1-4 in Figure 2.2):14
1. No cross-group communication, i.e., k21 = k12 = 0, if
γ+D
2(D−n2−1) < |α1 − α2|.
2. Communication from group N2 to group N1, i.e., k12 = n2 and k21 = 0, if
γ+D
2(D−n2−1) <
|α1 − α2| ≤ γ+D2(D−n) .
14The case of D = n differs in that the pairwise stable equilibrium with the complete communication network
exists for all parameters.
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Figure 2.2: Communication networks of symmetric pairwise stable equilibria under conflicting opinions.
3. Cross-group communication (complete truthful network), i.e., k12 = n2 and k21 = n1, if
|α1 − α2| ≤ γ+D2(D−n) .
4. Communication from group N1 to group N2, i.e., k12 = 0 and k21 = n1, if
γ+D
2(D−n1−1) <
|α1 − α2| ≤ γ+D2(D−n) .
Discussion. Comparing the communication patterns under conflicting preferences and under
conflicting opinions, two things should be noted. First, under conflicting preferences, the preference
divergence uniquely pins down the vector of in-degrees in a pairwise stable equilibrium. Under
conflicting opinions, for some parameters, multiple in-degrees can be realized in different pairwise
stable equilibria. Specifically, a member of Ni can receive truthful messages from either only Ni
members (low in-degree of ni − 1), or from all players (high in-degree of n− 1).
Second, under conflicting preferences, the information is more likely to flow from a larger group
to a smaller one: either only members of a large group report to members of a small group, or
members from opposite groups report to each other (with more information flow from the large
group to the small one). Under conflicting opinions, the opposite communication pattern appears:
for some parameters, there exists a pairwise stable equilibrium in which only members of a small
group report to members of a large group, and not the other way around.
2.4.3 Replicas
Consider a set of m ≥ 2 players and let the total number of aspects be D such that Rm ≤ D <
(R+1)m for some R ≥ 1. Under conflicting preferences, players are characterized by the preference
biases b1, ..., bm with the minimum difference of at least b: mini,j |bi−bj | = b > 0. Under conflicting
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opinions, players’ prior beliefs are described by (α1, β1), ..., (αm, βm) where mini,j |αi−αj | = α > 0
and αi + βi = γ for all i = 1, ...,m. Call by r-replica the setting where there are rm players, r
of each preference type bi (respectively, belief type (αi, βi)), i = 1, ...,m. Assume that r ≤ R, the
total number of aspects in r-replica remains D and each player becomes privately informed of the
respective aspect, so collectively all players in r-replica learn rm aspects. In what follows I focus
on pairwise stable equilibria.
Conflicting preferences. Consider some r1-replica, 1 ≤ r1 < R. In any pairwise stable equilib-
rium, players with the same preference bias communicate truthfully with each other (meaning that
the in-degree of each player is at least r1−1). Now consider r2-replica, where r1 < r2 ≤ R. Clearly,
in r2-replica, intra-type communication is more intense than in r1-replica: each player necessarily
gets to know r2 − 1 > r1 − 1 aspects from players of the same type. By the negative externality
effect, this threatens the credibility of communication between players of different types. The fact
that some player j gains r2− r1 new same-type communication links in r2-replica might crowd out
up to r2 − r1 cross-type communication links directed to j. As a result, in r2-replica players have
(weakly) greater in-degrees caused by more intra-type communication and (weakly) less cross-type
communication.
Interestingly, regardless of the fact that in a higher-order r2-replica the players collectively get to
know more aspects than in r1-replica, the individual awareness might fail to improve—the players’
in-degrees in r2-replica might remain the same as in r1-replica. The following example illustrates
this point. Let the total number of aspects D = 6 and the prior distribution of θ be uniform on
the interval [0, 1] that corresponds to Beta distribution with parameters (1, 1) and γ = 2. Consider
m = 3 preference types b1 = 0, b2 = b, b3 = 2b, where
4
5 < b ≤ 1. Such preference structure
implies that truthful reporting to a player with the bias bj is incentive compatible for a player
with the bias bi 6= bj if and only if |bi − bj | = b and nobody else reports truthfully. Thus, in
1-replica, each player receives exactly one truthful message from a player with an adjacent bias
(see Figure 2.3 for a possible communication network). In 2-replica, the players collectively hold
all of the relevant information about the state of the world, but fail to aggregate it: each player
communicates truthfully only with other same-type player; cross-type communication is necessarily
empty (see Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: Communication networks in 1- and 2-replicas, conflicting preferences. Each circle corresponds
to a group of players of particular type.
This example also demonstrates how increasing the number of same-type players can wipe out
all cross-type communication. More generally, whenever b > γ+D2(γ+r+1) ≥ 12 , D ≥ rm, then in any
pairwise stable equilibrium of r-replica, there is a complete segregation of communication with
respect to the types of preferences.
Conflicting opinions. Consider r1- and r2-replicas with 1 ≤ r1 < r2 ≤ R. Because the intra-type
communication is necessarily complete, players in r2-replica receive r2− r1 more truthful messages
from the same-type players. The positive externality effect implies that some different-type players
that could not be credible in r1-replica might find truthful communication incentive compatible in
r2-replica. Thus, players have strictly greater maximal in-degrees in r2-replica than in r1-replica,
due to (strictly) more intensive intra-type communication and (weakly) more intensive cross-type
communication.
As an illustration of how players’ awareness improves in a higher-order replica, consider the
following example. Assume that the total number of aspects D = 10 and let m = 3 prior belief
types be such that γ = 2, α1 = 1, α2 = 1 + α and α3 = 1 + 2α, where
6
7 < α ≤ 1. Condition
6
7 < α insures that, in 1-replica, the only pairwise stable equilibrium has an empty communication
network. At the same time, condition α ≤ 1 implies that, in 3-replica, the unique pairwise stable
equilibrium has a complete communication network—within and across different types of players
(see Figure 2.4).
This example shows how increasing the number of same-type players can induce complete
available information aggregation. More generally, a soon as maxi,j |αi − αj | ≤ γ+D2(γ+rm) , D ≥ rm,
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Figure 2.4: Communication networks in 1- and 2-replicas, conflicting opinions. Each circle corresponds to
a group of players of particular type.
then the maximal pairwise stable equilibrium of r-replica has a complete communication network.
Discussion. Does introduction of new players who are privately informed about other aspects
help agents to accumulate greater information about the state of the world? As the above analysis
illustrates, the answer crucially depends on the nature of disagreement. Under conflicting prefer-
ences, replicating the set of players curbs cross-type communication and can lead to a segregation
of communication according to the players’ types. As a result, it does not necessarily improve the
aggregation of the available information. Under conflicting opinions, on the contrary, adding new
informed players boosts cross-type communication, which necessarily leads to greater information
aggregation.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I characterize communication patterns when individuals diverge in their preferences
or in their opinions. While, for any type of conflict, truthful communication is always beneficial
from the ex-ante perspective, there is a credibility issue at the interim stage. In particular, I find
that under conflicting preferences, information transmission exhibits a negative externality effect:
the incentive of individual i to report truthfully to individual j deteriorates with the number of
aspects reported to j. Intuitively, as the information of agent j expands, the impact of an additional
aspect lessens; hence, agent i might find it optimal to misreport in order to shift j’s action closer
to i’s preferred action. In contrast, under conflicting priors, information transmission displays a
positive externality effect: the credibility of agent i improves with the number of aspects reported
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to agent j. Intuitively, as agent j becomes more informed, agent i expects j’s belief to become
more congruent with agent i’s, which improves agent i’s incentive to report truthfully.
As one application, I consider the case of two communities and show that, under conflicting
preferences, the information is likely to flow from a larger community to a smaller one; while,
under conflicting opinions, a smaller community is more likely to report to a larger one. As
another application, I study replicas of a diverse group of people and demonstrate that, under
preference conflict, replicating the set of agents curbs cross-type communication and can lead to
a segregation of communication according to the agent’ types. As a result, adding agents with
new private information does not necessarily improve the aggregation of information. In contrast,
under opinion conflict, replicating the set of individuals, boosts cross-type communication, which
necessarily leads to greater information aggregation.
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2.6 Appendix: Pairwise stable equilibria
An equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} is pairwise stable, if no pair of players can improve the communication
pattern between them and increase their ex-ante expected utilities, while satisfying the truth-
telling constraints and keeping other strategies fixed. To better understand how the communication
pattern can be improved, consider the possible cases of information transmission from player i to
some player j with in-degree kj in g. If player i reports truthfully to player j, gij = 1, then there
is no way to improve. If player i does not report informatively to player j, gij = 0, then it is
possible to increase the ex-ante expected payoffs by inducing the truthful reporting through the
link ij, if it is interim incentive compatible. Otherwise, there is no way of improvement. Given
these alternatives, pairwise stability is formally defined as
Definition. An equilibrium {g, (µg, yg)} is pairwise stable if for any i, j ∈ N , gij = 0 only if,
holding other strategies fixed, i cannot be credible in reporting to j, assuming that j believes i’s
message.
Maximality and pairwise stability. Note, that the sets of maximal and pairwise stable equi-
libria might not coincide. In particular, under conflicting preferences, there might be maximal
equilibria that are not pairwise stable. For example, let the prior distribution of θ be uniform on
[0, 1]. Consider 3 players with the preference biases b1 = b2 = 0, b3 ∈ (2+D10 ; 2+D8 ]. Then there are
several maximal equilibria that generate the in-degrees k1 = k2 = k3 = 1. The examples of such
truthful networks are: (1) g12 = g21 = g13 = 1, g23 = g31 = g32 = 0, and (2) g12 = g23 = g31 = 1,
g13 = g32 = g21 = 0. It is easy to see that the first communication network corresponds to a
pairwise stable equilibrium. In contrast, the second communication network doesn’t correspond
to a pairwise stable equilibrium, because players 1 and 2, who agree in their preferences, would
deviate and induce truthful communication through the soft link 21.15
Similarly, under conflicting opinions, there exist pairwise stable equilibria that are not maximal.
For such examples, see the equilibria discussed in the two communities setting.
Symmetry. Under conflicting preference, pairwise stability immediately implies that any two
players i and j with the same preference biases must be treated in a symmetric way, i.e., they
15This example coincides with the one considered in [Loginova, 2012b]
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communicate truthfully with each other and receive the same number of truthful messages from
other players. Under conflicting opinions, players with the same priors might not be treated sym-
metrically in a pairwise stable equilibrium; but they are necessarily symmetric in any maximal
equilibrium. In particular, they communicate truthfully with each other, get truthful reports from
the same set of players and reveal their signals to the same set of players (by the positive externality
effect).
2.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 6. Let l denote the number of signals 1 in sR and consider the effect on i’s
action of an additional signal s. After some algebra, the this effect can be expressed as
yi(sR)− yi(sR, s) = −s+ (D − k)Ei(θ|sR)− (D − k − 1)Ei(θ|sR, s)
= −s+ (D − k)αi + l
γ + k
− (D − k − 1)αi + l + s
γ + k + 1
=
γ +D
γ + k + 1
[




Thus, the expected magnitude of the effect from an additional signal is
Ej(yi(sR)− yi(sR, s))2 = (γ +D
2)




(γ + k + 1)2
[











From the proof of Lemma 7 below, Ej(αj + l)2 =
αj(γ+k)
γ(γ+1) [k(αj + 1) + αj(γ + 1)]. This implies that
Ej (s− Ej(θ|sR))2 = αj
γ
− αj
(γ + k)γ(γ + 1)
[k(αj + 1) + αj(γ + 1)]
=
αjβj(γ + k + 1)
(γ + k)γ(γ + 1)
.
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Consider now the term Ej (Ej(θ|sR)− Ei(θ|sR))2:











As a result, the expected magnitude is
Ej(yi(sR)− yi(sR, s))2 = (γ +D)
2
(γ + k + 1)2
[
αjβj(γ + k + 1)






It is straightforward to see that the magnitude of the effect from an additional signal on i’s action
is a decreasing function of k. For the last aspect, i.e., k = D − 1, it boils down to
Ej(yi(sR)− yi(sR, s))2 = αjβj(γ +D)
(γ +D − 1)γ(γ + 1) +
(αj − αi)2
(γ +D − 1)2 ,
which exceeds
αjβj
γ(γ+1) for any D.
Note that under conflicting preferences, the players agree on the common prior and the expected
magnitude is just Ej(yi(sR) − yi(sR, s))2 = (γ+D)
2
(γ+k+1)2
· αjβj(γ+k+1)(γ+k)γ(γ+1) . In case of conflicting opinions,





, which corresponds to the fact that
the additional signal in expectation makes the posteriors of players i and j closer to each other.
Indeed, because the condition αi + βi = γ, for all i ∈ N , implies the monotone likelihood ratio for
prior distributions, the players interpret the signals and update their beliefs consistently with each
other. QED.
Proof of Lemma 7. Consider player j who learns information sR ∈ {0, 1}kj (kj − 1 signals
coming from other players excluding player i, 1 signal j receives himself) and optimally chooses
action yj(sR) = bj +
∑
sd∈sR sd + E(
∑
sd∈(si,s−R) sd|sR). An ex-ante expected input from player j
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2 P (sR, si, s−R)

























2 P (sR, si, s−R).
It is easy to see that the second term in this sum is zero. The third term is an expected residual






















2 P (si, s−R)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
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In this expression ∑
sR
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Since l is equal to the sum of signals in sR, signals sj are identically distributed and independent
conditionally on θ, the term inside the integral can be rewritten as
∑
sR
l2P (sR|θ) = E(l2|θ) = Var(l|θ) + (E(l|θ))2














[αβ + kjα(α+ 1)].
Substituting these to A yields








kj(αβ + kjα(α+ 1))
γ(γ + 1)
]
= − (D − kj)
2α
(γ + kj)γ(γ + 1)
[α(γ + 1) + kj(α+ 1)] .




l˜2P (si, s−R) =
(D − kj)
γ(γ + 1)
[αβ + (D − kj)α(α+ 1)].
Then after some algebraic transformations, h(kj) = A+B becomes:
h(kj) =
αβ(γ +D)(D − kj)
γ(γ + 1)(γ + kj)
.
Finally, since the ex-ante expected input from player j into i’s payoff is −h(kj)− (bj−bi)2, then
the benefit from improving j’s information by one additional signal is h(kj) − h(kj + 1). Because
h(kj) is a positive, decreasing and convex function of kj , the benefit exceeds 0 and decreases with
kj . QED.
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Proof of Theorem 6. Consider the truthful network g and some player j who gets at least
one truthful message, i.e., N−1j (g) = {i ∈ N : gij = 1} 6= ∅. It must be incentive compatible for
every person i ∈ N−1j (g) to report truthfully, given that player j believes their messages. Fix some
i ∈ N−1j (g) and let sR be the set of kj signals that player j gets to know himself and from other
players apart from player i; denote D − kj − 1 unknown signals excluding si as s−R. If i reports
truthfully, j optimally chooses yj(sR, si); if player i misreports and sends mij = 1− si, j picks the
action yj(sR, si). Player i reports truthfully his signal if and only if it generates a greater interim
expected payoff to i compared to misreporting:
∑
sR,s−R∈{0,1}D−1
− [(yj(sR, si)− S − bi)2 − (yj(sR, 1− si)− S − bi)2]P (sR, s−R|si) ≥ 0.




[(yj(sR, si)− yj(sR, 1− si))(yj(sR, si) + yj(sR, 1− si)− 2S − 2bi)]P (sR, s−R|si) ≥ 0.
Assume that there are l signals 1 in sR and recall that the actions yj(sR, si) and yj(sR, 1− si) are






2si − 1 + (D − kj − 1)
(
α+ l + si
α+ β + kj + 1
− α+ l + 1− si




2bj − 2bi + 1− 2si + (D − kj − 1)( α+ l + si
α+ β + kj + 1
+
α+ l + 1− si







Using P (sR, s−R|si) = P (s−R|si, sR)P (sR|si), this can be simplified to
−(2si − 1) α+ β +D






2(bj − bi) + 1− 2si + (D − kj − 1) 2α+ 2l + 1
α+ β + kj + 1
− 2A(si, sR)
]
P (sR|si) ≥ 0,














= (D − kj − 1)E (θ|si, sR) = (D − kj − 1) α+ l + si
α+ β + kj + 1
.






2(bj − bi) + 1− 2si + (D − kj − 1) 1− 2si
α+ β + kj + 1
]
P (sR|si) ≥ 0,
−(2si − 1)
[
2(bj − bi) + (1− 2si) α+ β +D
α+ β + kj + 1
]
≥ 0.
If si = 1, the truth-telling condition becomes
bj − bi ≤ α+ β +D
2(α+ β + kj + 1)
.
If si = 0, the truth-telling condition becomes
bj − bi ≥ − α+ β +D
2(α+ β + kj + 1)
.
As a result,
|bj − bi| ≤ α+ β +D
2(α+ β + kj + 1)
.
Since this condition must hold for every i ∈ N−1j (g), this completes the proof of Theorem 6. QED.
Proof of Lemma 8. Assume that αi + βi = αj + βj = γ. If player j learns signals sR ∈ {0, 1}kj ,
he optimally chooses the action yj(sR) =
∑
sd∈sR sd + Ej(
∑
sd∈(si,s−R) sd|sR). This implies the
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2 Pi(sR, si, s−R)
= −Aij(kj)−Bi(kj).
The second term of the sum is the expected residual variance, expression for which was derived in






 = αiβi(γ +D)(D − kj)
γ(γ + 1)(γ + kj)
.
The first term from the sum can be rewritten as
Aij(kj) = (D − kj)2
∑
sR
[Ej (θ|sR)− Ei (θ|sR)]2 Pi(sR)
























Because Aij(kj) and Bi(kj) are positive, decreasing and convex functions of kj , the ex-ante expected
benefit Aij(kj) +Bi(kj)−Aij(kj + 1)−Bi(kj + 1) is positive and decreasing in kj . QED.
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Proof of Theorem 7. Consider the truthful network g and some player j who gets at least one
truthful message. A necessary condition for player j to have the in-degree kj = kj(g) < D − 1 is
that for every person i ∈ N−1j (g) it is incentive compatible to report truthfully, given that j believes
the message. Fix some i ∈ N−1j (g) and, as before, let sR be the set of kj signals that player j gets
to know and s−R be the set of D − kj − 1 unknown signals (excluding si). Assuming that player
j believes i’s message, let yj(sR, si) and yj(sR, 1 − si) be j’s actions when i reports truthfully or
lies, respectively. Player i reports his signal si to j truthfully if and only if it results in greater
ex-interim expected payoff compared to lying:
∑
sR∈{0,1}kj ,s−R∈{0,1}D−kj−1




[(yj(sR, si)− yj(sR, 1− si))(yj(sR, si) + yj(sR, 1− si)− 2S)]Pi(sR, s−R|si) ≥ 0.
Let that the number of signals 1s in sR be l, and use the expression (2.1) for optimal actions






2si − 1 + (D − kj − 1)
(
αj + l + si
αj + βj + kj + 1
− αj + l + 1− si




1− 2si + (D − kj − 1)( αj + l + si
αj + βj + kj + 1
+
αj + l + 1− si







Expressing Pi(sR, s−R|si) = Pi(s−R|si, sR)Pi(sR|si), this can be simplified as
−(2si − 1) αj + βj +D






1− 2si + (D − kj − 1) 2αj + 2l + 1


















= (D − kj − 1)Ei (θ|si, sR) = (D − kj − 1) αi + l + si
αi + βi + kj + 1
.








1− 2si + (D − kj − 1)
(
2αj + 2l + 1
γj + kj + 1
− 2 αi + l + si





1− 2si + (D − kj − 1)
(
2αj + 2Bi(kj , si) + 1
γj + kj + 1
− 2αi +Bi(kj , si) + si
γi + kj + 1
)]
≥ 0,
where Bi(kj , si) denotes ex-ante expected number of 1s in a set of kj signals:
Bi(kj , si) =
∑
sR
lPi(sR|si) = kjEi(θ|si) = kj αi + si
γi + 1
.
Substituting this into incentive condition,
−(2si − 1)
[























γj + kj + 1




which after some simplification becomes:
−(2si − 1)
[
1− 2si + (D − kj − 1)2αj(γi + 1) + γi + 1− 2(αi + si)(γj + 1)
(γi + 1)(γj + kj + 1)
]
≥ 0.
In case of si = 1 player i reveals the signal iff
−1 + (D − kj − 1)2αj(γi + 1) + γi + 1− 2(αi + 1)(γj + 1)
(γi + 1)(γj + kj + 1)
≤ 0,
−(γi + 1)(γj + kj + 1) + (D − kj − 1)(2αj(γi + 1) + γi + 1− 2(αi + 1)(γj + 1)) ≤ 0,
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which after some algebraic transformations boils down to
γi − γj + αj(γi + 1)− αi(γj + 1) ≤ (γi + 1)(γj +D)
2(D − kj − 1) .
Subtracting
γi−γj
2 from both sides,
γi − γj
2
+ αj(γi + 1)− αi(γj + 1) ≤ (γi + 1)(γj +D)




Consider now s = 0. The truth-telling condition in this case becomes
1 + (D − kj − 1)2αj(γi + 1) + γi + 1− 2αi(γj + 1)
(γi + 1)(γj + kj + 1)
≥ 0,
which can be simplified to
αj(γi + 1)− αi(γj + 1) ≥ −(γi + 1)(γj +D)
2(D − kj − 1) .
Adding
γi−γj
2 to both sides,
γi − γj
2
+ αj(γi + 1)− αi(γj + 1) ≥ −(γi + 1)(γj +D)




As a result, the truth-telling condition for general signal si is∣∣∣∣γi − γj2 + αj(γi + 1)− αi(γj + 1)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (γi + 1)(γj +D)2(D − kj − 1) − γi − γj2 .
In a particular case where the sum of prior’s parameters is the same across all players, αi+βi = γ
for any i. In this case truth-telling condition simplifies to:
|αj − αi| ≤ γ +D
2(D − kj − 1) .
QED.
Proof of Lemma 9. The logic of the proof (especially in the case of conflicting preferences)
closely follows the one for Lemma 3 of [Loginova, 2012b]. I split the proof into three steps for each
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type of conflict:
Conflicting preferences, Step 1: Existence of a maximal equilibrium. Because the
number of players and strategies is finite, the number of the pure strategy equilibria is also finite.
Thus, there exists a well-defined set of numbers, k1, ..., kn, where ki is the highest in-degree of player
i that can arise in some equilibrium: for any equilibrium network g′, ki ≥ k′i = ki(g′). Note that
the in-degrees ki and kj , i 6= j, in principle, might be achieved in different equilibrium networks.
To prove an existence of a maximal equilibrium, I need to show that the in-degrees k1, ..., kn might
be achieved in the same equilibrium, i.e., that there exists an equilibrium network g such that
ki = ki(g) for all i. In order to do this, I construct the equilibrium in the following way: for each
i ∈ N consider an equilibrium where ki is achieved and let those (and only those) players who
report to i truthfully in that equilibrium to report truthfully to i in the constructed equilibrium.
Because the incentives to report truthfully depend only on the receiver’s in-degree, the sender’s and
the receiver’s preference biases, it is still incentive compatible for those players to report truthfully
to i. Thus, this is, indeed, an equilibrium, and, by construction, it is maximal.
Conflicting preferences, Step 2: Maximality of a pairwise stable equilibrium. Con-
sider some pairwise stable equilibrium and assume that it is not maximal. Then there exists player i
whose in-degree in the equilibrium network is lower than his maximal in-degree. Fix some maximal
equilibrium; then it must be the case that there is some agent j who reports truthfully to i in this
maximal equilibrium, but not in the pairwise stable equilibrium. But then it is profitable for i
and j to deviate and induce a truthful communication from j to i, which contradicts the pairwise
stability. Hence, every pairwise stable equilibrium must be maximal.
Conflicting preferences, Step 3: Existence of a pairwise stable equilibrium. I illus-
trate this statement by constructing one of (possibly multiple) pairwise stable equilibria. For each
i ∈ N perform the following procedure: order other players j ∈ N/{i} in the increasing absolute
values of their preference divergence from i, |bj − bi|; let this order be i1, ..., in−1. Consider the
maximal in-degree of player i, ki. If ki = 0, then nobody can report truthfully to i in equilibrium.
If ki > 0, then let the closest ki players report truthfully to i (clearly, it is incentive compatible,
because closer biases relax the incentive condition of the truth-telling). Since ki is the maximal
possible in-degree of player i, players iki+1, ..., in−1 cannot be credible in communicating to i; hence,
set gji = 0 for these players.
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Conflicting opinions, Step 1: Existence and uniqueness of a maximal equilibrium.
The proof of existence is the same as in conflicting preferences case. I prove the uniqueness by
contradiction. Assume that the set of maximal in-degrees is k1, ..., kn and suppose that there are
two different maximal equilibria with communication networks g 6= g′. Then there is a link ij in
g that is not present in g′. Player i can truthfully communicate his signal to player j when j gets
kj − 1 truthful messages from other players in g. Hence, by the positive externality effect, i can be
credible to j when j gets kj truthful messages from other players in g
′. Thus, there must exist an
equilibrium where j’s in-degree is kj + 1, which contradicts the maximality of kj . Hence, g = g
′.
Conflicting opinions, Step 2: Pairwise stability of a maximal equilibrium. Consider
some maximal equilibrium and assume that it is not pairwise stable. Then there exist players
i and j such that gji = 0, but who can improve their communication pattern to truth-telling.
By the positive externality effect, making communication through ji truthful, doesn’t alter the
credibility of communication through other links. Hence, there exists an equilibrium where player
i receives more truthful signals, which contradicts the maximality condition. Thus, every maximal
equilibrium must be pairwise stable.
Conflicting opinions, Step 3: Existence of a pairwise stable equilibrium. Steps 1 and
2 immediately imply the existence of a pairwise stable equilibrium. QED.
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Abstract
Regulation justified on the grounds that it prevents physical or moral self-harm is wide-spread,
yet controversial. Some favor restriction of individual liberty; others that the government provide
advice, but let each individual choose action. We model a benevolent authority’s decision to
constrain or inform a population of agents, each of whom must choose an action that may cause self-
harm, when the authority has private, relevant information. We show that her decision to regulate
an activity depends on whether she deems it a matter of preference or opinion. In the former case,
she gives truthful advice and safeguards liberty; in the latter, she constrains liberty, believing that
she acts in the population’s interest. This contrasts with the commonly held view that politicians
who wish to regulate simply place a lower value on individual liberty, and provides a precise
prediction for what issues a benevolent authority regulates. We apply the model to regulatory
issues that display a tension between individual liberty and coercion, e.g., safety mandates and
assisted suicide prohibitions.
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3.1 Introduction
Before the prayer warriors massed outside her window, before gavels pounded in six
courts, before the Vatican issued a statement, before the president signed a midnight law
and the Supreme Court turned its head, Terri Schiavo was just an ordinary girl...
So begins the obituary of an ordinary woman with an extraordinary wish: to die.1 When
Schiavo’s husband made his appeal to cease the treatment that kept her alive, a controversy broke
out. The request divided the country, the world, even. Euthanasia – defined as “a deliberate
intervention undertaken with the express intention of ending a life, to relieve intractable suffering”
– is a criminal homicide in most jurisdictions, even if it is committed at the request of the patient
([Harris, 2001]). Yet, debates on the topic are ongoing in several countries, e.g. the U.S. and
France: some deem it the right of an incurably ill to end her own suffering; others repudiate such
requests, demanding that the government protect the requestor from herself.
When a restriction on individual freedom is justified solely on the grounds that it makes him
better off, it represents an instance of paternalism ([Dworkin, 2010]). The word rings of benevolence
– like a father (lat. Pater) disciplining his child out of love, the government constrains the populace
in its best interest. But this raises a central question: Wouldn’t a better informed government – a
benevolent one, at least – just provide advice, and then let each individual decide for himself? This
objection is neither novel nor ours; for centuries, libertarians have argued that individual liberty
cannot legitimately be restricted to prevent self-harm ([Locke, 1689], [Mill, 1859]). This controversy
is at the heart of contemporary debates that pit individual liberty against (supposed) safety: Should
the government require drivers to wear seat-belts or motorcyclists to wear helmets? Should it forbid
swimming at public beaches when lifeguards are not present, prevent women from taking heavy
duty jobs, or require minors to have life-saving blood transfusions even when their religious beliefs
forbid it? Today, lawmakers debate protecting minors against melanoma by banning the use of
tanning beds (in Idaho), protecting the health of sex film workers by requiring the use of condoms
(in California), and the Supreme Court is due to discuss the constitutionality of a mandate to
purchase health insurance.2
1There was no living will. It was, however, affirmed as her wish in court after the testimony from eighteen witnesses
on her end-of-life wishes ([Greer, 2000]). The obituary was written by [Benham, 2005].
2See [Lovett, 2012]; and [Yardley, 2012]. If health insurance would be mandated in order to alleviate externalities
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We use economic theory to analyze when an authority restricts her subjects’ autonomy, and
when she instead simply gives advice. In particular, we start from an authority with no regard for
her subjects, and ask how her behavior changes as her benevolence increases. In our framework,
each individual must choose an action; for example, whether to wear a seat belt, or whether to
buy health insurance. By assumption, this activity exerts no externality on others; this rules out
non-paternalistic regulation, and makes the case for regulation as weak as possible.3 The authority
has private information about an exogenous state of the world that is relevant for the action choice;
e.g., the risks associated with inaction. Even if the authority were to transfer this information
to the individual, they would (still) disagree on the proper course of action, either because they
have different preferences or because they have different opinions (priors) about the true state
of the world. In the context of our example, given the same information about risks, (i) if the
individual agrees with the authority on the risks, but he simply loves living on the edge, then they
have different preferences; (ii) if they disagree on the interpretation of the information about risks,
but are equally risk-loving, then they have different opinions. The authority has two tools at her
disposal. She can issue a recommendation, and then give him the liberty to choose his course of
action. Alternatively, she can coerce him, by mandating a certain action.
Our main insight is that the authority’s choice between advising and coercing a subject crucially
depends on (i) the nature of disagreement between them, and (ii) her regard for the subject. Under
preference disagreement, a self-interested authority coerces the individual. An authority who is
sufficiently altruistic, however, gives truthful advice, and then lets the individual decide; we say that
she is libertarian. Under opinion disagreement, a self-interested authority communicates truthfully.
An authority who is sufficiently altruistic, however, constrains the individual, against his will,
believing that she acts in his best interest; we say that she is paternalistic. Thus, while restrictions
on individual liberty can reflect both self-interest and benevolence, there is a clear dividing line
between the two – the nature of disagreement.
from uninsured on public health, relatives, or insurance markets (e.g., through adverse selection), then this law would
not be paternalistic, as it would restrict individual liberty in order to prevent harm to others. If, instead, it is justified
by a worry that individuals who do not purchase health insurance fail to act in their own best interests, e.g., due to
cognitive constraints ([Abaluck and Gruber, 2011], [Fang et al., 2008], [Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2004]), then the law
would be paternalistic.
3Regulation against behaviors that cause harm to third parties is non-paternalistic, and deemed legitimate also
by libertarians ([Mill, 1859], [Locke, 1689]). [Hanson, 2003] considers non-paternalistic regulation; see the literature
review for a discussion.
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After an illustrative example in Section 3.2, where an authority is faced with a single individual,
Section 3.3 develops our general framework, where she is faced with a continuum of individuals,
forming a population. We start by considering an advisor who can issue recommendations, but
not enact mandates. She privately obtains an imprecise piece of information s about an unknown
state of the world θ ∈ {0, 1}, and sends a public message m, before each individual i chooses
action ai ∈ R. Lying entails a cost c ≥ 0; modulo this cost, talk is cheap (m is non-verifiable).
The advisor’s material payoff is maximized by each individual choosing ai = θ, and individual
i’s ideal action is ai = θ + bi. The advisor’s opinion (prior belief) about θ is piA = Pr(θ = 1);
each individual’s opinion is pii. Under preference disagreement, the population’s preferences are
characterized by a distribution f(b), but their opinions concur with that of the advisor, pii = piA
∀i. Under opinion disagreement, the population’s opinions are characterized by a distribution g(pi),
but their preferences concur with those of the advisor, bi = 0 ∀i.4 For each type of disagreement,
we analyze how the ability to sustain truthful communication depends on the advisor’s benevolence,
or altruism, modeled as the share of the individuals’ material payoffs that she internalizes, ϕ ≥ 0
([Becker, 1974], [Camerer, 2003]).
Under preference disagreement, altruism improves communication. The stronger the advisor’s
altruism, the more she values that each individual gets to implement his preferred action. Hence,
when ϕ increases, the action that the advisor wants each individual to choose approaches the in-
dividual’s own preferred action. Higher altruism is thus akin to smaller preference disagreement
([Crawford and Sobel, 1982]); as disagreement lessens, truthful communication becomes attainable.
By contrast, under conflicting priors, altruism can destroy communication. In this case, the advisor
is convinced that her preferred action, given the signal s, maximizes both her own and each indi-
vidual’s expected welfare. Each individual, however, would interpret a truthfully revealed signal in
light of his own prior, and choose a different action. Even though the advisor represents the median
opinion in the population, she may believe that, on average, the individuals’ are better off with the
action choices they take when she lies. Lying then protects them from misinterpreting a truthful
report. When ϕ increases, the advisor internalizes more of the disutility that she expects each
individual to suffer from his (in her view) suboptimal choice of action. Paradoxically, a sufficiently
4On possible reasons for the existence and persistence of different priors see, e.g., [Aumann, 1976], [Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974], [Acemoglu et al., 2007], [Sethi and Yildiz, 2009]. Also see [Morris, 1995] for a discussion of the
assumption of different priors in the economics literature.
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altruistic advisor may therefore lie.5
We then consider an authority who, after observing the signal s, either can send a public
message, or incur some cost q ≥ 0 to mandate one action for all individuals. Under preference
disagreement, enacting a mandate is unattractive to a benevolent authority, for two reasons: First,
truthful communication can be sustained, so the authority has the ability to transfer all the relevant
information to the individuals before they make their decisions. Second, if the authority lets each
individual i choose his action, then i implements an action that is close to the action that the highly
altruistic authority would want him to choose. Consequently, while a self-interested authority may
enact a mandate, a benevolent authority instead communicates truthfully, and gives each individual
the liberty to choose. By contrast, under opinion disagreement, mandating an action is attractive
to the altruistic authority for two reasons: First, she may not be credible; if she would allow the
individuals to choose their actions, they would thus base their choices on less information than she
would do. Second, when the authority is sufficiently altruistic, she would enact a mandate even
if truthful communication were possible, because she knows that the actions that the individuals
would take differ from the action that she deems optimal for them. Consequently, while a self-
interested authority may communicate truthfully, a benevolent authority instead mandates an
action, believing that she acts in the population’s interest.
While Section 3.4 considers an advisor who can send a single public message to the population,
and an authority who (also) has the option to mandate a single action, Section 3.5 considers
targeted advice or mandates. We start by asking whether an advisor is more credible when she
can send a private signal to each individual than when she issues a single public message. We say
that she is more credible when truthful communication can be sustained with a larger share of the
population. Under preference disagreement, a self-interested advisor is more credible with private
messages, but a sufficiently altruistic advisor is more credible with a public message. Intuitively,
the advisor issues credible private advice to individuals with “ sufficiently moderate” preferences,
and as altruism strengthens, the set of such individuals increases. When altruism is strong enough
to induce the advisor to communicate truthfully with the population’s average-biased individual,
she is also willing to send a truthful public signal. When altruism is too weak to sustain truthful
5This is particularly remarkable given that, before observing the signal s, the advisor’s ex ante utility is higher in
a truthful equilibrium. A strongly altruistic advisor is nevertheless non-credible, as she, ex interim, would prefer to
lie – out of benevolence – given that the individual believes her report.
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public communication, the advisor is more credible with private messages – as she still issues
truthful private advice to some individuals. Otherwise, she is more credible with a public signal.
By contrast, under opinion disagreement, a self-interested advisor is more credible with a public
signal, whereas a sufficiently altruistic advisor is more credible with private messages. Intuitively, a
weakly altruistic advisor may be truthful under public communication, even though she, in private,
would issue false advice (to some, or all, individuals). For strong enough altruism, however, she
may prefer to issue a false public message. Under both preference and opinion disagreement, an
increase in altruism may thus yield a credibility reversal, where the relative credibility of public
and private messages reverses. The direction of this reversal, however, depends on the nature of
disagreement.
We then analyze how the authority’s use of targeted mandates depends on her altruism. Under
preference disagreement, any mandates are individual-specific, as the action that the authority
wants a given individual to take partly reflects his individual preference. A more altruistic authority
enacts fewer mandates, since the actions that she would mandate approaches those taken by the
individuals in the absence of mandates. By contrast, under opinion disagreement, the authority
would enact a single mandate for all individuals whose actions she restricts, as she deems the same
action optimal for all individuals. This mandate is enacted for the individuals whose opinions are
the most extreme; that is, for those who, if left to choose their own actions, would make the largest
mistakes (in her view). For strong enough altruism, her mandate applies to all individuals whom
she believes it would protect.
Equipped with these results, in Section 3.6 we return to the central issue that we set out to
answer: In debates on regulation of activities that can cause self-harm, some (politicians) advocate
a laissez-faire approach – to provide public information, but then let each individual make his
own action choice – whereas others advocate constraining individual liberty, through mandates
or prohibitions. What determines whether a politician advocates one or the other, and why do
those who advocate restrictions in individual liberty deem such restrictions better than information
provision? One commonly held view is that those who advocate restrictions simply place a lower
value on individual liberty. This view, however, is hard to reconcile with the fact that some are in
favor of regulation that others oppose, and vice versa.6
6Indeed, if, say, R places a higher value on individual liberty than does L, then all mandates supported by R
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Our results offer an alternative, precise prediction: A benevolent politician enacts regulation on
issues that she believes is a matter of opinion, but leaves individuals to make their own choices
on issues that she believes is a matter of preference. To understand what issues a benevolent
authority regulates, it thus suffices to ask what issues she deems a matter of of opinion. For
example, a benevolent politician who believes that an individual’s request for euthanasia reflects a
true preference to die would resist a prohibition. A politician would instead advocate a prohibition
if she believes that the requestor has an incorrect understanding of his own wish to die – e.g., if
the politician deems suicide a sin that precludes the individual from afterlife benefits that he, if
were aware of this, would not want to give up. Similarly, a politician who believes that failure to
take up health insurance reflects preferences resists a mandate; a politician who instead fears that
it reflects an underestimation of the true benefits of insurance favors a mandate.
Whenever the authority deems the individuals’ actions to be driven by incorrect beliefs, restrict-
ing liberty is consistent with benevolence. In fact, simply transferring information is not enough –
it is better, even necessary, to coerce. The distinction between preferences and opinions is thus im-
perative for whether intervention is socially beneficial or harmful. As an illustration of this insight,
let us contrast the findings of several recent papers that departs from the empirical observation that
take-up of health insurance cannot be explained by individual risk types alone. [Cohen and Einav,
2007] and [Einav et al., 2010] attribute this unexplained variation in the demand for insurance to
differences in individuals’ preferences for risk. [Spinnewijn, 2012] suggests that another reason why
risks do not fully explain the demand for insurance may be that individuals perceive their own risks
incorrectly; in our terminology, that (incorrect) opinions drives the action choices. In the spirit of
our general insights, [Spinnewijn, 2012] finds that when erroneous risk perceptions (opinions) play
a larger role in insurance decisions relative to preferences for risk, the welfare gain of a universal
mandate is higher.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter is related to [Che and Kartik, 2009], who analyze a communication game with differ-
ence of opinion and contrast differences in opinion with differences in preferences. They show that
difference of opinion between a principal and an agent can incentivize the agent to exert effort to
should be (a strict subset of the mandates) supported by L. We discuss this further in Section 3.6.
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persuade the principal; however, differences in preferences cannot induce such a persuasion motive
for effort provision. [Hirsch, 2011], [Van den Steen, 2006] and [Van den Steen, 2009] also analyze
this mechanism. [Hirsch, 2011] illustrates how open disagreement in opinions between the principal
and the agent creates a persuasion-based rationale for short-term deference: the principal might
find it optimal to allow the agent to implement the agent’s preferred policy. [Van den Steen, 2009]
shows that a principal may incur a cost to alter the agent’s beliefs in order to boost the agent’s
effort, in particular when this effort is critical for the project’s outcome. Relatedly, [Van den Steen,
2006] shows that a principal may exploit the effect of differing opinions on the agent’s effort by
transferring decision rights to the agent. In our model, the uninformed party does not make an
effort choice; hence, we do not rely on the mechanism that drives the results of these papers.
Nevertheless, our result underscores one key message from [Che and Kartik, 2009]: the distinction
between differing opinions and differing preferences may be crucial.7
The key mechanism in this chapter, instead, is altruism. This relates the paper to the emerging
literature on communication and altruism. [Lee and Persson, 2011] analyze how friends transmit
hard information to each other when sharing information dilutes its value. [Carlin et al., 2010] show
that an altruistic (unbiased) principal may share information with an uninformed set of agents so
as to help improve their action choices, but that this may hamper the agents’ individual incentives
to acquire information. This, in turn, may lower aggregate welfare if one agent’s privately acquired
information can be accessed by others, either through social learning or on a market for information.
We add to this literature by analyzing difference of opinion between the communicating parties.
Moreover, we contrast communication with coercive measures to affect the individual’s action
choice. Intuitively, this corresponds to the distinction between libertarian paternalism ([Thaler and
Sunstein, 2003], [Thaler and Sunstein, 2008], [Carlin et al., 2010]) – whereby the government may
recommend a default choice, but not constrain the individual’s choice set – and (hard) paternalism.
Our analysis of targeted advice (but not mandates) relates to [Farrell and Gibbons, 1989] and
[Goltsman and Pavlov, 2011] that compare the credibility of private and public messages of a non-
altruistic advisor in settings with two individuals and preference disagreement. When we shut
down altruism in our model, we replicate their result that the relative credibility of private versus
7Also related is [Loginova, 2012a], who shows that communication patterns in a network of individuals crucially
depend on the nature of disagreement between the agents.
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public messages depends on the preference distribution. We also obtain an analogous insight under
opinion disagreement. In this sense, we extend their results to populations with more than two
individuals, and to opinion disagreement. Further, while the relative credibility of different modes
of communication varies in the absence of altruism, we show that introducing altruism eliminates
or reduces this indeterminacy.
The most closely related paper in spirit is [Hanson, 2003], who models a regulator who is
empowered to ban an activity or to warn the public about it. He shows that when a government is
concerned about some market imperfection, cheap talk may not be credible, so the government may
resort to a prohibition. Our mechanism is distinct in two ways. First, we study a setting without
any externalities, to rule out any motives for regulation else than to prevent self-harm; in [Hanson,
2003], the government would never ban an activity in the absence of market imperfections. Second,
and perhaps more fundamentally, in [Hanson, 2003], regulation is a solution to an information
problem: if it were possible to issue a truthful recommendation, no regulation would be necessary.
In our setting under differences of opinion, however, a benevolent government would regulate even
if it were able to transfer its superior information to the individual. This is because it knows that
the individual – who interprets the recommendation in light of his own distinct prior – will take an
action that differs from the one that the government wishes him to take.
3.2 Example
Before introducing the general model, we present a simple setting with one individual that illustrates
our key results and their underlying mechanisms. Appendix 3.11 presents a more general version of
the model discussed here and proves all results. An individual (I, he) must choose an action a ∈ R.
His payoff from a depends on an unknown state of the world, θ ∈ {0, 1}. Before he chooses, the
individual’s advisor (A, she) privately observes a signal s about the state, with precision Pr(s =
θ|θ) ≡ γ ∈ (0.5, 1), and sends him a message m ∈ {0, 1}. If the advisor lies, m 6= s, she incurs a cost
c ≥ 0. The players’ material (non-altruistic) payoffs are given by uA(a, θ) = −(a − θ)2 − cI{m6=s}
and uI(a, θ) = −(a−θ−b)2, and their priors on the state of the world are given by Pri(θ = 1) = pii,
for i ∈ {I, A}.
In this standard model of communication, we allow the advisor to be altruistic: in addition
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to her own material payoff, she internalizes a share ϕ of the individual’s payoff ([Becker, 1974]).
Her utility is thus given by UA(a, θ) = uA(a, θ) + ϕuI(a, θ). An altruistic advisor not only cares
about the action choice for her own sake, but also because the action affects the individual. We
ask how communication is affected by the strength of the advisor’s regard for the individual, ϕ,
and how this depends on the nature of disagreement. We isolate two pure forms of disagreement.
Under preference disagreement, the players’ material payoffs from a differ (b 6= 0, w.l.o.g. b > 0),
but they have a common prior, or opinion, on the state of the world (piA = piI = 0.5); under
opinion disagreement, the players’ material payoffs are identical (b = 0), but their opinions diverge
(piI 6= piA = 0.5, w.l.o.g. piI > 0.5). All of the above is common knowledge. A pure strategy of the
advisor, m(s), specifies, for each signal s, the message m that she sends. A pure strategy of the
individual, aI(m), specifies, for each message m, the action that he takes. We solve the game for
pure strategies Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.
Our first key result is that the impact of the advisor’s altruism on communication depends
crucially on the nature of disagreement. Under preference disagreement, truthful communication
can arise if and only if altruism is strong enough. Under opinion disagreement, whenever altruism
impacts communication, truthful communication can arise if and only if altruism is weak enough.
The impact of the lying cost c, however, is independent of the nature of disagreement: raising c
always improves the prospects to achieve truthful communication.
The logic driving this result is as follows. In any truthful equilibrium, the individual chooses
aI(s) = pI(s) + b, where pI(s) is his posterior given the (truthfully reported) signal s. This action
always exceeds the advisor’s ideal action given the signal s, aA(s); under preference disagreement
because b > 0, and under opinion disagreement because piI > piA. Consequently, the advisor always
reports the signal s = 0 truthfully. When lying is costless (c = 0), she also reports the signal s = 1
truthfully if and only if (iff) her ideal action, aA(1), is closer to the action induced by a truthful
message, aI(1), than to the action induced by a false message, aI(0).
8 A truthful equilibrium thus
exists iff aI(1)− aA(1) ≤ aA(1)− aI(0), which can be written
2 (aI(1)− aA(1))− τ ≤ 0, (TTc = 0)
8This obtains because the advisor’s loss function is monotonic in the distance between aA(1) and aI(1).
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where τ ≡ aI(1)− aI(0) is a constant (given γ).
Under preference disagreement, the advisor’s ideal action depends on the strength of altruism,
aA(1) = aI(1)− b1+ϕ . Intuitively, the stronger the advisor’s regard for the individual, the more she
values that he gets to implement his preferred action, aI(1). Thus, (TTc = 0) reduces to
2b− τ(1 + ϕ) ≤ 0. (TTpr,c = 0)
Clearly, higher altruism is akin to a lower preference bias b ([Crawford and Sobel, 1982]); as ϕ
increases, their disagreement lessens, and truthful communication becomes attainable. When lying
is costly, c > 0, a truthful equilibrium exists iff
2b− τ(1 + ϕ) ≤ c
τ
. (TTpr, c > 0)
A higher cost of lying and higher altruism thus both make truthful reporting more attractive.
Under opinion disagreement, even though the players’ preferences are perfectly aligned, their
preferred actions differ in any truthful equilibrium, as they interpret the signal s in light of their
(different) priors. The advisor believes that aA(1) maximizes both her own and the individual’s
expected material payoff; consequently, aA(1) does not approach aI(1) as ϕ increases. Defining
K ≡ aI(1)− aA(1), we can thus write (TTc = 0) as
2K − τ ≤ 0. (TTop,c = 0)
When c = 0, the existence of a truth-telling equilibrium is independent of ϕ. The advisor reveals
s = 1 when her ideal action aA(1) is closer to aI(1) than to aI(0). This occurs when opinion
disagreement is minor; for example, when γ = 0.6, a truthful equilibrium exists for piI ≤ 0.604.
When c > 0, a truthful equilibrium exists iff
(2K − τ)(1 + ϕ) ≤ c
τ
, (TTop, c > 0)
The lying cost matters only if the advisor prefers to lie when c = 0, i.e., if (2K − τ) > 0. Then,
a higher lying cost makes truthful reporting more attractive, as under preference disagreement.
Stronger altruism, however, makes truthful reporting less attractive. The logic behind this result
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is as follows. The lying cost induces the advisor to sometimes reveal s = 1 truthfully even when
she believes that the action induced by a false message, aI(0), is better. This occurs if her benefit
from lying – inducing aI(0) instead of aI(1) – is too small to outweigh the cost. Crucially, however,
because the advisor believes that inducing the better action will benefit not only herself, but also
the individual, her expected benefit from lying increases with ϕ. More precisely, when ϕ increases,
the advisor internalizes more of the disutility that she expects the individual to suffer from his (in
her view) suboptimal choice of action following a truthful report. Stronger altruism therefore makes
lying more worthwhile. Importantly, whenever an increase in ϕ induces the advisor to switch from
truth-telling to lying, she lies to protect the individual from the consequences of his misjudgment;
the advisor’s own material benefit from lying is too small to motivate the lie (2K − τ > 0). In
general, whenever the advisor believes that aI(0) dominates aI(1), a sufficiently altruistic advisor
lies. In the context of our example, when piI = 0.85, the advisor believes that aI(0) dominates
aI(1), so she lies if c = 0. For c = 0.06, she reports truthfully so long ϕ ≤ 0.188; when she cares
more about the individual, she lies.
The second part of the chapter replaces the advisor with an authority (A, she). After observing
the signal s, the authority can either behave like an advisor – send a message m to the individual,
who then implements his preferred action, aI(m) – or incur a cost q > c to coerce the individual to
implement her desired action, aA(s).
9 Our second main result is that the impact of altruism on the
authority depends crucially on the nature of disagreement. Under preference disagreement, a non-
altruistic authority may prefer coercion; under sufficiently strong altruism, however, the authority
strictly prefers truthful communication over all other equilibria. We say that the altruistic authority
is libertarian, as she wants to inform the individual and then let him choose action. Under opinion
disagreement, a non-altruistic authority may communicate truthfully; under sufficiently strong
altruism, however, the authority always coerces. We say that the altruistic authority is paternalistic,
as she constrains the individual’s liberty in, as we shall see, his supposed self-interest.
The logic driving this result is as follows. After getting the signal s, the advisor prefers to send
9In most applications we discuss in Section 3.6, constraining the individual’s liberty may be costlier than with-
holding information. To reflect this, we let q > c. Note that coercion differs from delegation; we discuss how these
concepts are related in Appendix 3.11.
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some message m, which induces aI(m), over imposing aA(s) iff
EA {(uA(aA(s), θ) + ϕuI(aA(s), θ))− (uA(aI(m), θ) + ϕuI(aI(m), θ))} < q − cI{m 6=s}. (3.1)
A truthful equilibrium exists if it exists in the advisor game (above) and if truthful communication
is preferred to coercion, i.e., if (3.1) is satisfied for m = s, for both signals.
Under preference disagreement, aA(s) approaches aI(s) as ϕ increases, so the benefit of coercion




− 1. (TTpr, Authority)
Combining this with (TTpr, c > 0) yields that a truthful equilibrium exists when altruism is suf-
ficiently strong. Intuitively, the authority transfers her information to the individual, who then
makes an informed decision which is very close to what the authority would implement under
coercion, but she need not incur the cost q. In the context of our example, where γ = 0.6 and
c = 0.06, if we further let q = 0.10 and characterize preference conflict by b = 1/3, then (3.1) holds
iff ϕ ≥ 0.11 and (TTpr, c > 0) holds iff ϕ ≥ 0.83; hence, a truthful equilibrium exists (and, it can be
shown, is preferred) iff ϕ ≥ 0.83.
Under opinion disagreement, aA(s) does not approach aI(s) as ϕ increases. Instead, the au-
thority’s expected benefit from coercion – implementing aA(s) instead of aI(s) – increases with her
regard for the individual. Formally, when m = s, (3.1) reduces to
ϕ ≤ q
(aA(s)− aI(s))2
− 1. (TTop, Authority)
Combining this with (TTop, c > 0) yields that a truthful equilibrium exists when altruism is suffi-
ciently weak. When altruism is strong enough, however, the authority always forces the individual
to implement aA(s), as she believes that this protects the individual from his (in her view) erro-
neous action choice, and thus ultimately benefits him. As coercion after both signals is the only
equilibrium that implements the authority’s preferred action after both signals, this is the unique
equilibrium, for sufficiently strong altruism. In the context of our example, for piI = 0.85, coercion
after both signals is the unique equilibrium outcome for ϕ ≥ 0.6.
CHAPTER 3. PATERNALISM, LIBERTARIANISM, AND THE NATURE OF
DISAGREEMENT 126
In Appendix 3.11, we formally show that all of the results discussed above (also) obtain in
a richer setting and with general (mixed and pure) strategies; further, we show that the main
insights arise in the presence of both preference and opinion disagreement. In the remainder of the
chapter, we study a more general model where the advisor or authority is faced with a population
– a continuum of individuals with heterogenous preferences or beliefs. We show that the above
insights remain applicable, and we develop additional results. All proofs are in Appendix 3.9.
In Appendix 3.10, we also demonstrate that the main results, driven by intuitively analogous
mechanisms, continue to apply a setting that is closely related in spirit, but where all results arise
in a dominance solvable setting.
3.3 Model and Preliminaries
There is a continuum of individuals of unit mass, indexed by the unit interval [0, 1]. Each individual
(i, he) must take an action ai ∈ R that renders him payoff Ui(ai, θ) = −(ai−θ−bi)2, where bi is his
preference bias, and θ ∈ {0, 1} is an unknown state of the world. The preference biases are described






2f(b)db are finite. Individual i’s prior belief about the state of the world is given by
Pri(θ = 1) = pii ∈ [0, 1]; the beliefs are characterized by a general distribution with density g(pi).10
3.3.1 The Altruistic Advisor
The advisor (A, she), who holds a prior belief PrA(θ = 1) = piA ∈ (0, 1), privately observes one
signal s about the state, with precision Pr(s = θ|θ) ≡ γ ∈ (0.5, 1), and sends a public message
m ∈ {0, 1}. Sending a false message entails the cost c ≥ 0. After observing m, each individual
chooses his action ai.
Preference disagreement. The preference distribution f(b) is not entirely concentrated at 0,
i.e.,
∫
b6=0 f(b)db > 0; the opinion distribution g(pi) is degenerate and satisfies pii = piA for all
i ∈ [0, 1]. The advisor’s material payoff is given by uA(a, θ) = −
∫ +∞
−∞ (ai−θ)2f(bi)dbi−c ·I(m 6= s),
where a denotes the set {ai}i∈[0,1]. Her material benefit is thus maximized when each individual’s
10If F and G are discrete, the integrals below should be substituted by summations.
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action ai matches the state of the world, θ. We allow the advisor to be altruistic, i.e., to internalize
a share ϕ of the individuals’ payoffs ([Becker, 1974]).11 Her utility is thus given by
UA(a, θ) = uA(a, θ)− ϕ
∫ +∞
−∞
(ai − θ − bi)2f(bi)dbi. (3.2)
Opinion disagreement. The opinion distribution is not entirely concentrated at 0.5, that is,∫
pi 6=0.5 g(pi)dpi > 0; the preference distribution f(b) is degenerate and satisfies bi = 0 for all i ∈ [0, 1].
The advisor’s prior belief is equal to piA = 0.5, which is the median of the distribution g(pi), i.e.,∫ 0.5
0 g(pi)dpi ≥ 0.5 and
∫ 1
0.5 g(pi)dpi ≥ 0.5. This assumption implies that the advisor is representative
of the median opinion, which is motivated by our interpretation of the advisor as a government.
As we shall see in the analysis, this assumption makes lying and coercion more unattractive than
if the advisor can hold an extreme, unrepresentative opinion; thus, it stakes the game “against”
intervention.12 The advisor’s material payoff is given by uA(a, θ) = −c · I(m 6= s).13 Her material
payoff is thus independent of the individuals’ action choices. This captures the fact that she does
not care about the individuals’ action choices per se. The utility of an altruistic advisor, who
internalizes a share ϕ of the individuals’ payoffs, is given by




The preference and opinion distributions f(b) and g(pi), the authority’s prior piA, the signal
precision γ, the lying cost c, and the strength of altruism ϕ are common knowledge.
Strategies and equilibrium A pure strategy of the advisor specifies, for each signal s, the
message m(s) that she sends, m : {0, 1} → {0, 1}. The individuals’ posterior beliefs conditional on
message m are described by Pri(θ = 1|m) = pi(m), where superscript i signifies that individual i
forms his beliefs using his prior pii. A pure strategy of individual i specifies, for each message m,
11In Section 3.7, we discuss the alternative formulation where the advisor places a weight (1− ϕ) on herself and ϕ
on the individuals; we show that our main insights carry through to this setting as well.
12Note that, in the setting with preference disagreement, we do not assume that the advisor is representative of
the median preference. As our results in the case of preference disagreement hold for any distribution f(b), they
(trivially) hold for the particular distributions that have a median equal to zero.
13Main results still hold if the material payoff of the advisor is defined similarly to the case of preference disagree-
ment, i.e., uA(a, θ) = −
∫ 1
0
(ai − θ)2g(pii)dpii − c · I(m 6= s).
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the action ai(m) that he takes, ai : {0, 1} → R. We solve for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE).
Under opinion disagreement, each individual evaluates his expected utility, E[Ui(ai, θ)], using his
own prior, pii, and the advisor evaluates her expected utility, E[UA(a, θ)], using her prior, piA.
Importantly, the advisor thus uses her own prior when forming her expectation of the individuals’
payoffs from a. This captures that the advisor may deem another action optimal for an individual
than he does himself. If the advisor instead would evaluate an individual’s expected payoff using
his prior, she would derive utility from him choosing an action that he believes is optimal, although
the advisor is convinced that he makes a mistake, and that he later will come to regret this choice.
This distinction is essential, and it speaks to the notion of altruism that we apply: We say that a
more altruistic advisor cares more about her own valuation of the individuals’ payoffs. We discuss
this further in Section 3.7.
3.3.2 The Altruistic Authority
After observing the signal, s, the authority (A, she) chooses between sending a public message
m, after which the individuals choose actions, and engaging in coercion, whereby the authority
mandates an action for all individuals, aA ∈ R. To capture that coercion may be costly, we let the
advisor’s cost of coercion be given by q, where q ≥ c.14 For simplicity, we assume c = 0.
Under preference disagreement, the authority’s material (non-altruistic) payoff is given by
uA(a, θ) = −
∫ +∞
−∞ (ai − θ)2f(bi)dbi − q · I(coercion); under opinion disagreement, by uA = −q ·
I(coercion). The individuals’ material payoff functions, under preference and opinion disagree-
ment, respectively, remain as specified in the game with an altruistic advisor.
Strategies and equilibrium. A pure strategy of the authority specifies, for each signal s,
whether she chooses to coerce or not coerce, C(s) ∈ {Coerce, Not coerce}, what action aA(s) ∈ R
she mandates under coercion, and what message m(s) ∈ {0, 1} she sends if she does not coerce.
The individuals’ beliefs and strategies remain as specified above. We solve for PBE.
14Depending on the application, this cost may reflect the instrumental cost of active intervention, or the authority’s
intrinsic aversion against removing the individual’s liberty to choose. In most applications we discuss in Section 3.6,
constraining the individual’s liberty may be costlier than withholding information. To reflect this, we let q > c.
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3.4 Libertarianism and Paternalism
3.4.1 Altruism and truthful advice
We search for fully revealing equilibria (FRE), where she transmits each signal truthfully to the
population.
Proposition 8. The impact of stronger altruism on the advisor’s incentives to report truthfully
depend on the nature of disagreement:
• Under preference disagreement, for any bias distribution f(b) and lying cost c, there exists a
threshold ϕ(c, b¯) s.t. a FRE exists if and only if ϕ ≥ ϕ(c, b¯).
• Under opinion disagreement, there exists a non-degenerate set of opinion distributions G such
that the advisor prefers to misreport at least one signal when c = 0. For any g(pi) ∈ G and
c > 0, there exists a threshold level of altruism ϕ(c, g) such that a FRE exists if and only if
ϕ ≤ ϕ(c, g). For any g(pi) /∈ G a FRE exists for any c ≥ 0 and ϕ ≥ 0.
Regardless of the nature of disagreement, a higher cost of lying weakens the advisor’s incentives to
report truthfully: ϕ(c, b¯) (weakly) decreases in c and ϕ(c, g) (weakly) increases in c.
Under preference disagreement, truthful communication can thus arise iff altruism is strong
enough; under opinion disagreement, whenever altruism impacts communication, truthful commu-
nication can arise iff altruism is weak enough. We discuss each setting in turn.
Preference Disagreement. From the setting with a single individual in Section 3.2 we know that
the advisor’s ideal action for individual i, given the signal s, is given by ai,A(s) = p(s) +
ϕ
1+ϕbi =
ai(s) − 1(1+ϕ)bi. As her altruism strengthens, her disagreement lessens with each individual in
the population. With quadratic utility functions, the precise strength of altruism necessary for a
truthful equilibrium to exist when the advisor is faced with a population is equal to the strength
of altruism necessary to sustain a FRE when the advisor is faced with a single individual with bias
b¯, the population’s average preference bias. The proof of Proposition 8 establishes this formally;
to see the logic of this result, w.l.o.g. suppose that b¯ > 0. Then, the advisor reveals the signal
s = 0 to individual b¯, and reveals the signal s = 1 to him iff the incentive compatibility condition,
(TTpr, c > 0), is satisfied for b = b¯. When she is indifferent between revealing and misreporting the
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signal s = 1 to individual b¯, her gain from misreporting it to all types bi > b¯ exactly offsets her loss
from misreporting it to all types bi < b¯; hence, all that matters for her decision to reveal the signal
truthfully is b¯.15 Our result thus follows immediately from the discussion in Section 3.2: For strong
enough altruism, truthful reporting of the signal s = 1 is incentive compatible, and a FRE exists.
Opinion Disagreement. As the advisor does not care about the action choices for her own sake,
she always reports truthfully when ϕ = 0; thus we henceforth consider ϕ > 0. First consider a
simple opinion distribution with two (equally prevalent types of) individuals, t1 and t2, with priors
pi1 ≤ piA = 0.5 ≤ pi2, pi1 < pi2. After observing the signal s, the advisor would like all individuals
to take the action pA(s). Given the individuals’ strategies and beliefs, sending some message m
induces actions p1(m) and p2(m). Suppose that the individuals’ believe that the advisor reports
truthfully. Then, if s = 1, sending a truthful message induces the actions p1(1) < pA(1) < p2(1).
Clearly, the advisor always prefers to report the high signal, s = 1, truthfully to t1, but she may
prefer to lie to t2, whom she deems too optimistic. The advisor can, however, send only one public
message. When lying is costless, she simply trades off the disutility that a lie causes t1 and the
benefit that (she believes that) it brings t2. Figure 3.1 illustrates that this induces her to misreport
s = 1 in two regions of the (pi1, pi2) space, denoted by L1left and L1right, when the signal precision is
γ = 0.6. An analogous argument yields that she misreports s = 0 in the regions L0up and L0low.
16
Consider the region L1left. When pi1 = 0, the action choice of t1 is unaffected by the advisor’s
message. This brings us back to the setting with a single individual, where the advisor reveals
s = 1 when her ideal action aA(1) is closer to a2(1) than to a2(0), i.e., when (TTc = 0) is satisfied.
This occurs when opinion disagreement is minor; in particular, as noted in our example in Section
3.2, when γ = 0.6, a truthful equilibrium exists for pi2 ≤ 0.604.
Now consider some pi2 ∈ (0.604, 1]. The advisor’s benefit from lying derives from the fact that
(she believes that) the lie improves the action choice of t2. When pi1 > 0, the advisor also suffers a
loss from lying, which derives from the fact that lying worsens the action choice of t1. The proof of
15In a setting with two individuals and general loss functions, [Goltsman and Pavlov, 2011] establish that truthful
public communication can be sustained iff it can be sustained with an individual with average bias. This suggests
that our result can be generalized to other loss functions.
16When the priors pi1 and pi2 are equidistant from the advisor’s prior, 0.5−pi1 = pi2−0.5, the loss from misreporting
the signal s = 1 always exceeds the benefit. In general, for any distribution g(pi) that is symmetric around 0.5, a
FRE exists for any ϕ ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0.
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Figure 3.1: Incentives to misreport the signal, γ = 0.6.
Proposition 8 establishes that, as pi1 increases from zero to 0.5, the advisor’s loss from lying to t1
first increases, and then decreases. The loss is outweighed by the (fixed) benefit from lying when
pi1 is close to zero (region L1left) and, potentially, when pi1 is close to 0.5 (region L1right).
The non-monotonicity of the loss from lying to t1 is due to two opposing effects. As pi1 increases,
t1 gets more responsive to the public message; that is, the distortion induced by the lie, a1(1)−a1(0),
increases. This distortion effect raises the advisor’s loss from lying. As pi1 approaches 0.5, however,
the disagreement between t1 and the advisor also lessens; formally, a1(s) approaches aA(s) for both
signals s ∈ {0, 1}. As the advisor’s loss function is flatter close to her own ideal action, her loss
from any given distortion in action choice thus decreases with pi1. This disagreement effect, which
reduces her loss from lying, outweighs the distortion effect for pi1 close to 0.5.
Finally, the region L1left is non-empty for all γ ∈ (0.5, 1]; intuitively, there always exists some
region of extreme pi2 for which t2 would benefit from a lie, and when pi1 = 0, lying entails no loss.
The region L1right, however, disappears as γ increases. Intuitively, when pi1 = 0.5, lying harms t1;
when the signal is precise enough, this loss outweighs the benefit from lying to t2.
Now consider a general opinion distribution g(pi) with median 1/2 = piA. Clearly, when c = 0
the advisor misreports the signal s = 1 iff enough mass of the distribution is contained in L1 ∈
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{L1left, L1right}, and the signal s = 0 iff enough mass is contained in L0 ∈ {L0up, L0down}.17 As
the regions L1left and L0up are non-empty for all γ, the set of such distributions G is uncountable.
For distributions g ∈ G, a FRE fails to exists when c = 0, but may exist when c > 0. For any
given cost of lying, however, increasing the strength of altruism eventually destroys truthful com-
munication, even though the advisor represents the median opinion in the population. Intuitively,
while the advisor knows that withholding information harms some individuals – whose informed
choices would dominate their misinformed ones – she is also convinced that it benefits others, who
would misinterpret a truthful report. For all distributions g ∈ G she believes that, on average,
the individuals’ are better off with their misinformed action choices. This conviction makes her
more inclined to lie, the stronger is her altruism: in essence, the more she cares about the indi-
viduals, the more willing she is to bear the cost of lying, as lying protects the individuals from
their own informed (erroneous) choices. As the population anticipates that the altruistic advisor
lies, no informative communication can take place. Paradoxically, the population may thus prefer
a disinterested advisor, whom can be trusted to tell the truth.
3.4.2 Altruism and Coercion
We now consider an authority who, after observing the signal s, chooses between sending a public
signal or mandating a single action for the population.
Proposition 9. The impact of stronger altruism on the authority’s incentives to report truthfully
or coerce depend on the nature of disagreement:
• Under preference disagreement, for any preference distribution f(b) with b¯2 6= b2 and any
q < q¯, there exist finite thresholds ϕCC(q, b¯, b2) < ϕC(q, b¯, b2) < ϕTT (q, b¯, b2). For ϕ <
ϕCC(q, b¯, b2) there exists a unique equilibrium, in which the authority coerces with probability
one after each signal s. For ϕ < ϕC(q, b¯, b2) every equilibrium involves the authority coercing
with strictly positive probability. A FRE exists if and only if ϕ ≥ ϕTT (q, b¯, b2). In pure
strategies, the FRE is strictly preferred, by both players, to any other equilibrium.
• Under opinion disagreement, for any opinion distribution g(pi) and q ≥ 0, there exist thresh-
olds ϕC(q, g) ≤ ϕCC(q, g). For ϕ > ϕCC(q, g), there exists a unique equilibrium, in which the
17This is discussed in more detail in the proof of Proposition 8.
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authority coerces with probability one after each signal s. For ϕ > ϕC(q, g), every equilibrium
involves the authority coercing with strictly positive probability. For any g /∈ G, there exists a
threshold ϕTT (q, g), s.t. a FRE exists if and only if ϕ ≤ ϕTT (q, g).
Regardless of the nature of disagreement, a higher cost of coercion weakens the authority’s incentives
to coerce: ϕCC(q, b¯, b2), ϕC(q, b¯, b2), and ϕTT (q, b¯, b2) are decreasing in q; ϕTT (q, g), ϕC(q, g), and
ϕCC(q, g) are increasing in q.
Under preference disagreement, for sufficiently strong altruism, truthful communication is pos-
sible; moreover, in pure strategies, it is strictly preferred by the authority.18 Under opinion dis-
agreement, a non-altruistic authority communicates truthfully; under sufficiently strong altruism,
however, she always coerces. We discuss each setting in turn.
Preference Disagreement. The more altruistic the authority, the more she values if each indi-
vidual gets to implement the action that he prefers; that is, ai,A(s) approaches ai(s) as ϕ increases.
This makes the benefit of coercion – the ability to mandate another action than the individuals’
own choices, ai(s) – decreasing in the level of altruism, ϕ. If the authority mandates an action,
she chooses aA(s) = p(s) +
ϕ
1+ϕ b¯, as an authority faced with a single individual of type b¯. She
would, however, prefer to impose different actions on different individuals, ai,A(s) = p(s) +
ϕ
1+ϕbi.
When she enacts a uniform mandate, she cannot take into account the nuances in the population’s
preferences even though she would want to. This “indirect cost” of coercion does not arise in the
single individual setting. The strength of altruism necessary for truthful reporting to dominate
coercion is therefore weakly smaller in the population setting than in the setting with an individual
of type b¯.
Combining the fact that truth-telling dominates coercion for strong enough altruism with Propo-
sition 8 yields that a FRE exists iff the authority’s altruism is sufficiently strong. In the FRE, the
individuals choose actions that she eventually prefers to the action that she would mandate; fur-
ther, she need not incur the cost q. A sufficiently benevolent authority thus prefers to behave in
a libertarian fashion – to transfer the information at her disposal, thereby giving each individual
the means to make as informed a choice as possible, and then give them the liberty to choose the
18When b¯2 = b2, the preference distribution is degenerate; this case is thus equivalent to the single-individual
setting that we analyze in Appendix 3.11 (and in the example in Section 3.2).
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium outcomes under preference disagreement f(b), where b¯2 6= b2.
actions that they want.
Coercion becomes more viable, however, the weaker is altruism. More precisely, for ϕ <
ϕC(q, b¯, b2), the authority coerces with strictly positive probability for at least one signal s, and
for ϕ < ϕCC(q, b¯, b2) < ϕC(q, b¯, b2) coercion after both signals is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Figure 3.2 gives an approximate representation of these sets of (q, ϕ), and illustrates that coercion
is less viable, the higher is q.19
Opinion Disagreement. As the authority does not care about the action choices for her own
sake, communication strictly dominates coercion when ϕ = 0, for any q > 0. When ϕ > 0,
however, the advisor cares about (the actions of) the population. She is convinced that, given
s, the action aA(s) is ideal for all individuals. Thus, she believes that mandating it (strictly)
benefits all individuals who, in the absence of a mandate, would take an action ai 6= aA(s). As
the benefit accrues to the population, her valuation of this benefit increases with her altruism, ϕ,
which makes coercion increasingly viable. Indeed, for ϕ > ϕC(q, f(pi)), every equilibrium involves
coercion with positive probability after at least one signal s. When altruism strengthens further,
19Note, that if ϕC(q, b¯, b2) ≤ ϕ < ϕTT (q, b¯, b2), then the authority cannot behave as a truth-telling advisor. Instead,
there are (possibly, mixed strategy) equilibria, in which the authority communicates some information and/or coerces.
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium outcomes under opinion disagreement g(pi).
for ϕ > ϕCC(q, f(pi)), coercion after both signals is the unique equilibrium; this is true even if a
FRE is sustainable in the advisor game. Intuitively, it is the only equilibrium that implements
aA(s) after both signals, and for sufficiently strong altruism, she is willing to bear the cost q to
mandate these actions, thereby protecting the individuals who otherwise would make (in her view)
erroneous action choices. We say that the altruistic authority is paternalistic, as she constrains the
individuals’ liberty out of affection; i.e., in their supposed best interest.
For weak enough altruism – and in its absence – however, the authority cares too little to
intervene by enacting a costly mandate. Instead, she communicates, and thus a FRE exists for
opinion distributions g(pi) /∈ G. Figure 3.3 gives an approximate representation of these sets of
(q, ϕ), and illustrates that coercion is less viable, the higher is q.20
3.5 Targeted Advise and Targeted Mandates
Above we considered an advisor who can send a single public message to the population, and an
authority who (also) has the option to mandate a single action. We now allow the advisor to engage
20Note, that for ϕTT (q, g) < ϕ ≤ ϕC(q, g) and any distribution g(pi), the authority cannot behave as a truth-
telling advisor. Instead, there are (possibly, mixed strategy) equilibria, in which the authority communicates some
information and/or coerces.
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in targeted communication, whereby she sends different messages to different individuals, and the
authority to also enact targeted mandates.
3.5.1 Altruism and targeted vs. public advice
Under targeted communication, the advisor privately observes the signal s about the state, and
sends one message mi ∈ {0, 1} to each individual i. Then, each individual chooses his action ai.
To capture that lying may be costly, we define the measure of individuals to whom the advisor
sends a false message, η, and let the advisor’s cost of lying be given by ηc, where c ≥ 0. With
the exception of the redefinition of the cost of lying, all utility functions remain as specified above.
A pure strategy of the advisor now specifies, for each signal s, the message mi(s) that she sends
to each individual i, mi : {0, 1} → {0, 1}; the individuals’ posterior beliefs and pure strategies are
redefined accordingly. We solve for pure strategies PBE.
We say that the advisor is more credible when truthful communication can be sustained with
a larger share of the population. For either type of disagreement, in pure strategies, more credible
communication is preferred by the individuals and the advisor. Whether the advisor is more credible
in this setting with private messages than when she sends a single public message, depends on the
strength of the advisor’s altruism and the nature of disagreement.
Proposition 10. The impact of stronger altruism on the relative credibility of public and private
messages depend on the nature of disagreement:
• Under preference disagreement, for any preference distribution f(b) and cost of lying c, the
advisor is more credible with private messages when ϕ ≤ ϕ(c, b¯), but more credible with a
public message otherwise.
• Under opinion disagreement, for any opinion distribution g(pi) ∈ G and cost of lying c, the
advisor is more credible with a public message when ϕ ≤ ϕ(c, g), but more credible with private
messages otherwise. For any opinion distribution g(pi) /∈ G, public communication is (more)
credible for all ϕ.
Preference Disagreement. The setting with a single individual yields that the advisor’s mes-
sage to individual i is credible iff (TTpr, c > 0) is satisfied (for b > 0). For any given level of altruism,
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ϕ, the advisor’s incentive compatibility conditions for truthful reporting of s ∈ {0, 1} define the set
of individuals to whom the advisor can send a credible message, bi ∈ (b(ϕ), b¯(ϕ)). Under targeted
communication, she can thus be credible to the subset of the population with moderate prefer-
ences, but is non-credible to individuals with extreme biases. As altruism strengthens, the advisor
is willing to communicate truthfully to individuals with more extreme preferences (b(ϕ) decreases
in ϕ and b¯(ϕ) increases in ϕ); that is, she gains credibility.
When the advisor sends a public message, Proposition 8 yields that she can be credible whenever
she would send a truthful message to an individual with bias b¯, i.e., when ϕ ≥ ϕ(c, b¯). Consider
ϕ(c, b¯) > 0.21 For ϕ < ϕ(c, b¯), the advisor is more credible under private messages, as she com-
municates truthfully with some individuals; namely, those with bi ∈ (b(ϕ), b¯(ϕ)). As ϕ increases
in this region, the set of individuals to whom the advisor can communicate truthfully under pri-
vate messages increases – as well as the credibility advantage of private over public messages. At
ϕ = ϕ(c, b¯), however, the advisor becomes credible under public messages; hence, she can commu-
nicate truthfully to all individuals when communication is public. Under targeted communication,
she remains non-credible to individuals with more extreme biases than b¯. An increase in altruism
that makes the advisor willing to send a truthful message in public thus strengthens her credibility
among individuals with whom preference divergence is too large for her to be credible in private.
These results relate to those of [Farrell and Gibbons, 1989], and [Goltsman and Pavlov, 2011],
who compare the credibility of private and public messages of a non-altruistic advisor in settings
with two individuals. When we shut down altruism in our model (ϕ = 0), we replicate their result
that the relative credibility of private versus public messages depends on the preference distribution,
f(b).22 In this sense, we extend their results to populations with more than two individuals. More
substantively, while the relative credibility of different modes of communication varies with f(b)
when ϕ = 0, we show that introducing altruism eliminates this indeterminacy: for all f(b), when
the advisor is sufficiently altruistic, public communication is more credible.23 Lastly, we note
21If instead ϕ(c, b¯) = 0, public communication is (more) credible than targeted communication for all ϕ.
22More precisely, all cases that are discussed in these papers – (i) credible communication with both public and
private messages, (ii) no credible communication (in either case), (iii) subversion of (credibility in) private commu-
nication under public communication, and (iv) (one-sided or mutual) discipline under public communication – can
arise, depending on the distribution f(b).
23In the language of [Farrell and Gibbons, 1989] and [Goltsman and Pavlov, 2011], when ϕ < ϕ(c, b¯), the advisor’s
private communication with individuals with bi ∈ (b(ϕ), b¯(ϕ)) is subverted under public communication; when ϕ ≥
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that considering combined communication – where the advisor can send both public and private
messages – does not improve advisor’s credibility (as in [Farrell and Gibbons, 1989]). That is, for
any pure strategies PBE of the combined communication setting, there exists a PBE with either
public or targeted communication that allows the advisor to be (weakly) more credible.
Opinion Disagreement. First, consider the simple opinion distribution with two (equally preva-
lent types of) individuals, t1 and t2, with priors pi1 < piA = 1/2 < pi2, and let lying be costless,
c = 0. When the advisor can target her messages, a message that (she believes) benefits one type
does not exert any negative externality on the other type. She thus simply treats each type as she
would if faced with a single individual with prior pii, for i ∈ {0, 1}: she misreports the signal s = 1
to t2 if he is too optimistic, and misreports the signal s = 0 to t1 if he is too pessimistic (provided
that they believe the messages). From our example in Section 3.2, we recall that, when the signal
precision is γ = 0.6, the advisor misreports the signal s = 1 to t2 iff pi2 > 0.604; similarly, she
misreports s = 0 to t1 iff pi1 < 0.396. This gives rise to four regions in the (pi1, pi2) space, illustrated
in Figure 3.4, where targeted advice is credible to both types (Tpi1Tpi2), only to t2 (L0pi1Tpi2), only
to t1 (Tpi1L1pi2), and to neither type (L0pi1L1pi2).
24
Consider the point A ∈ L0pi1L1pi2/{L1left, L0up}. While the advisor cannot send credible tar-
geted messages to any type, she can issue credible public advice. Similarly, the advisor’s credibility
is higher with public advice in L0pi1Tpi2/L0low and Tpi1L1pi2/L1right, as she can provide credible
private advice to only half of the population. The converse can also arise, however: Consider
B ∈ L1right. Here, the advisor cannot provide credible public advice, but she can provide credible
private advice to half of the population; thus, she is more credible with private messages.
When lying is costly, c > 0, altruism may influence the advisor’s behavior, and thereby the
relative credibility of public and private messages. Again consider B ∈ L1right.25 Regardless of the
strength of altruism, the advisor provides credible private advice to t1, as she believes that the action
she induces t1 to take when sending a truthful message is better than the action she induces when
misreporting. With a single public signal, Proposition 8 yields that she is credible (to the entire
ϕ(c, b¯), for types bi /∈ (b(ϕ), b¯(ϕ)) the advisor is disciplined by the presence of others.
24Here L1pii and L0pii denote the incentives to misreport the signals 1 and 0 to individual i.
25Figure 3.4 plots all regions for c = 0. When c > 0, the size of the regions where the advisor misreports some
signal(s) shrink(s); however, the regions’ relative positions largely remain as in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Incentives to misreport the signal under opinion disagreement, γ = 0.6.
population) iff altruism is sufficiently weak. A weakly altruistic advisor is thus more credible when
issuing public advice, whereas a strongly altruistic advisor is more credible with private messages.
An analogous argument applies to the region L0low. In a similar vein, in the regions L1left and
L0up, the advisor is more credible under public communication when altruism is weak, and equally
(non-)credible under both types of communication when altruism is strong. When we consider
general opinion distributions, similar (weak or strong) credibility reversals arise for all distributions
such that altruism affects public communication, g(pi) ∈ G. For opinion distributions such that
altruism does not impact the credibility of public messages, g(pi) /∈ G, public communication is
credible regardless of ϕ.
When we shut down altruism in our model (ϕ = 0), we obtain, in our setting with opinion
conflict, an insight akin to that obtained by [Farrell and Gibbons, 1989] and [Goltsman and Pavlov,
2011] in settings with preference disagreement: the relative credibility of private versus public
signals depends on the opinion distribution, g(pi).26 Furthermore, we show that in the presence of
altruism, for any opinion distribution g(pi) ∈ G, a sufficiently altruistic advisor is more credible when
26In this sense, we extend their results to the case of opinion conflict (and allow for populations with more than
two individuals).
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communication is private.27 Finally, as in case of preference disagreement, combined communication
does not improve the advisor’s credibility in pure strategies PBE.
To conclude, under both preference and opinion disagreement, an increase in ϕ may thus yield
a credibility reversal, where the relative credibility of public and private messages reverses. The
direction of this reversal, however, depends on the nature of disagreement. Under preference
disagreement, the relative credibility of a public message always increases with altruism; under
opinion disagreement, the reverse is true for all opinion distributions g(pi) ∈ G.28
3.5.2 Altruism and Targeted Mandates
Setting. After observing the signal, s, the authority (A, she) chooses between either sending a
message mi(s) to individual i, after which the individual chooses action himself, or engaging in
coercion, whereby the authority makes the action choice on behalf of individual i, ai,A(s) ∈ R. To
capture that coercion may be costly, we define the measure of individuals whom the advisor coerces,
, and let the advisor’s cost of coercion be given by q, where q ≥ c = 0; else, all utility functions
remain as specified above. A pure strategy of the advisor now specifies, for each signal s and for
each individual i, whether she chooses to coerce or not coerce i, Ci(s) ∈ {Coerce, Not coerce}, what
action ai,A(s) ∈ R she mandates under coercion, and what message mi(s) ∈ {0, 1} she sends if she
does not coerce. The individuals’ posterior beliefs and pure strategies are redefined accordingly.
Again, we solve for PBE.
Proposition 11. The authority’s use of targeted mandates depends on the nature of disagreement:
• Under preference disagreement, any mandates are individual-specific. The share of the popu-
lation subjected to (tailored) mandates is decreasing with the advisor’s altruism.
• Under opinion disagreement, a single mandate is applied to all individuals whose action
27In the language of [Farrell and Gibbons, 1989] and [Goltsman and Pavlov, 2011], when ϕ ≤ ϕ(c, g), the advisor
is disciplined by the presence of others; when ϕ > ϕ(c, g), either credible reporting to one individual is subverted, or
truthful communication arises with neither of them.
28More precisely, all cases that are discussed in these papers can arise, depending on the distribution g(pi). In the
two-individual case depicted in Figure 3.4, (i) credible communication with both public and private signals occur in
Tpi1Tpi2 ; (ii) no credible communication (in either case) in L1left and L0up; (iii) subversion of private communication
in L1right and L0low; (iv) one-sided discipline in L0pi1Tpi2/L0low and Tpi1L1pi2/L1right; and (v) mutual discipline in
LL/{L1left, L0up}.
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choices are restricted. The share of the population subjected to the (single) mandate is in-
creasing with the advisor’s altruism.
When the authority can target her advice and mandates, she treats each individual i as she
would if she were faced with a single individual with preference bi or prior pii. Our analysis in
Section 3.2 (and Appendix 3.11) of the single individual setting thus applies.
Preference Disagreement. The authority’s ideal action for individual i, given the signal s, is
given by ai,A(s) = ai(s) − bi1+ϕ . If she mandates an action for individual i, she chooses ai,A(s);
that is, mandates are individual-specific. If coercion is costless, q = 0, she enacts mandates for
all individuals whose preferences differ from her own, bi 6= 0. When coercion is costly, q > 0, the
authority weighs the cost of each mandate against her expected benefit. For a given strength of
altruism, her expected benefit from imposing the action ai,A(s) on an individual is higher, the larger
is their preference divergence |bi|. For a given cost of coercion q > 0, the share of the population
that is subjected to mandates decreases with the advisor’s altruism. Intuitively, as ϕ increases,
ai,A(s) approaches ai(s), which reduces her benefit from mandating ai,A(s), for each i; eventually,
she behaves in a libertarian fashion towards all individuals.
Opinion Disagreement. After observing the signal s, the advisor deems the action aA(s) =
pA(s) optimal for all individuals. If coercion is costless, q = 0, she mandates this action for all
individuals whose opinions differ from her own, pii 6= piA. When coercion is costly, q > 0, the
authority weighs the cost of each mandate against her expected benefit. For a given strength
of altruism, her expected benefit from imposing the action aA(s) on an individual is higher, the
larger is their opinion divergence |piA − pii|. Whenever she mandates aA(s) for only a subset of the
population, her mandate therefore applies to the individuals whose opinions are the most extreme.
Intuitively, she prioritizes to constrain the individuals who, if left to choose their own actions,
would make the largest mistakes (in her view). For a given cost of coercion q > 0, the share of the
population that is subjected to the mandate increases with the advisor’s altruism; when she cares
more about any given individual, her willingness to intervene – and help improve his action choice
– increases. From strong enough altruism, she mandates the action aA(s) for all individuals with
pii 6= piA.
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3.6 Applications
On any given issue, some (politicians) advocate a laissez-faire approach – to provide public in-
formation, but then let each individual make his own action choice – whereas others advocate
constraining individual liberty, through mandates or prohibitions. Why do those who advocate
restrictions in individual liberty deem such restrictions better than information provision? What
determines whether a politician advocates one or the other, and what distinguishes arguments in
favor of regulation from those in favor of information provision?
One commonly held view is that politicians’ differ in their valuations of personal liberty. Those
with higher valuations of liberty, then, are less prone to intervene in constituents’ lives. This view
has an immediate implication: if R places a higher value on individual liberty than does L, then
all mandates supported by R should be (a strict subset of the mandates) supported by L. In
reality, however, politicians’ desired interventions into individual liberty do not always satisfy this
property. The following stylized example illustrates a violation of the ”cost-of-liberty” hypothesis:
L argues in favor of a citizens right to enter marriage regardless of sexual orientation, whereas R
wants to reserve this right for heterosexual couples; and, at the same time, L favors of a mandate
to purchase health insurance, whereas R argues that a citizen has the right to choose.
Our results offer an alternative, precise lens through which we can understand politicians’ views
on the government’s right to regulate activities that can cause self-harm: they are intimately linked
to whether the conflicted issue is, consciously or subconsciously, framed in terms of preferences or
opinions. We obtain the following, empirically testable predictions:
Regulation vs. Liberty. Any given benevolent politician wants to enact regulation on issues
that she believes is a matter of opinion, but leave individuals to make their own choices on issues
that she believes is a matter of preferences. To understand what issues a benevolent authority
regulates, it thus suffices to ask what issues she views in terms of differing opinions. This prediction
contrasts with the commonly held view that politicians’ differing views on regulation emanates from
differences in their valuations of liberty. Further, this prediction is consistent with the fact that
some politicians are in favor of regulation that others oppose, and vice versa.
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Justifications for Enacted Regulation. Advocates of regulation view differences in observed
individual actions as a result of differing opinions, and thus use arguments based on beliefs; op-
ponents of regulation view differences in observed actions as a result of differing preferences, and
thus use arguments based on liberty. These debates are, literally, clashes of ideas of what drives
individual choices. When regulation does emerge, it is justified on the basis of differing opinions.
3.6.1 Benevolent paternalism
We discuss these predictions in light of concrete, real-world examples of regulation.
Protection from physical self-harm: Euthanasia and assisted suicide. Our framework
suggests that a benevolent authority denies an individual’s request for euthanasia if she believes
that he holds an incorrect belief about his own wish to die. Such differences in opinion can arise,
e.g., if the authority believes (i) that the individual experiences pain that he, if denied euthanasia,
will learn to endure over time, and that (ii) he, then, will be happy that his request was denied.
In contrast, the authority allows euthanasia if she deems the individual to be fully conscious of the
consequences of his decision, and to simply prefer to die.
In the few places where assisted suicide is legal – Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Switzerland and the American states of Oregon, Washington, and Montana – the legal provisions
are precise, and they shed light on precisely the distinction between preferences and opinions. That
is, they indicate a desire to disallow requests for euthanasia that are made by patients who hold
incorrect beliefs, but to accommodate requests that reflect (true) preferences. In Switzerland, for
example, a person who assists a suicide can avoid conviction by proving that the deceased knew
what he or she was doing, was capable of making the decision, and had requested death several
times [Whiting, 2002].29
Valid Consent and Restrictions on Minors. At the heart of the distinction between pref-
erences and opinions is the question of what constitutes a valid consent: paternalism arises when
the benevolent authority disqualifies an individual’s consent to an action or activity, believing that
29Similarly, in Oregon, the patient must have made one written and two oral requests in order for the assisting
physician to escape criminal liability; moreover, the physician must make a written confirmation that the act is
voluntary and informed (Oregon Death with Dignity Act).
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he would change his mind if he were of a sound opinion.30 This highlights the tenuous nature
of paternalism: How can a government know better than a single individual what he or she ac-
tually wants? When can consent be disqualified? Our analysis shows that, when mandates can
be targeted, a benevolent authority enacts restrictions that apply to those whose opinions are the
farthest from piA; that is, the individuals who are the least qualified to make decisions in their own
interests and thus, in the absence of regulation, would make the largest mistakes. A prominent
example of disqualification of consent only for some individuals – that is, targeted mandates – is
restrictions on minors. Many governments require minors to have blood transfusions even when
their religious beliefs forbid it; no such restriction is imposed on adults. Similarly, there is a legal
drinking age, driving age, voting age, an age of criminal responsibility, etc. Our framework suggests
that these distinctions are justified by a view that an adult knows what he or she is doing; the
government may, however, protect a minor from his own misjudgment. This is illustrated by the
below statement, made by Dr. Steven Mings, a past president of the Idaho Dermatology Society,
when discussing a bill to restrict tanning salon use among minors in order to protect them from
skin cancer ([Yardley, 2012]).
“If you want to be 19 and not wear a motorcycle helmet, if you want to be 19 and
smoke a cigarette, if you want to be 19 and go get a sunburn, that’s one issue,” he said.
“But I think it’s hard to argue against protecting someone under 18 from making bad
decisions.”
This also relates to how opinions are formed. Over time, individuals may update their beliefs
about, e.g., the dangers of riding a motorcycle without a helmet. If learning brings the individual’s
opinion closer to that of the authority – which may occur when there exists an “objective truth,”
e.g., the actual risk of death from riding a motorcycle without a helmet, which corresponds to piA
– then individual’s own decisions improve over time. Consequently, she would want to target only
those who, at a given point in time, hold (the most) erroneous beliefs; this is accomplished through
minority regulation, as the law no longer applies when the individual becomes an adult.
30Indeed, dueling was outlawed because lawmakers believed that even those who consented to a duel were giving
invalid consents procured through extreme pressure. Similarly, it is contemporaneously debated whether prostitutes
– even if they earn a decent living and are protected against disease – are giving valid consents ([Suber, 1999]). We
note that such disqualifications are inherently inconsistent with the revealed preference axiom.
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Protection from moral self-harm. If opinions can evolve over time, restrictions on the liberty
of adults may arise primarily on matters where the authority deems it unlikely that individuals’
beliefs approach her own (in her view, correct) belief over time. This may occur when learning is
unlikely to bring individuals’ beliefs (much) closer to some “objective truth,” perhaps because no
such truth exists. For example, an authority with a strong religious faith may deem it unlikely that
individuals who are atheists will update their (in her view erroneous) beliefs over time.
Indeed, many restrictions on the liberty of adults are motivated on moral grounds. If a benevo-
lent authority is convinced that some behavior is sinful or morally corrupting – so that the individual
would be better off resisting, and otherwise would come to regret his behavior in the future – crimi-
nalization can be a benevolent act to improve the citizens’ well-being (in this life, or in the afterlife).
In the absence of such (religious) beliefs on the part of the authority, she would allow the behavior,
thereby giving those who take pleasure from it the liberty to choose. Behaviors that are or have
been banned on the grounds of protecting individuals against morally corrupting behavior include
consumption of (adult) pornography (Time 1969), and some sexual acts between consenting adults,
e.g., of the same gender, or relatives. Externalities arising from these activities are arguably small;
but more to the point, regulation often explicitly rely on moral justifications. The fact that laws
against homosexual acts were justified on moral grounds, for example, was made explicit in the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling Lawrence v. Texas, in 2003, which deemed laws that criminalize homosexual
acts on the grounds of morality unconstitutional, and therefore repealed them.
3.6.2 Coercion and Benevolence
Our results by no means imply that coercion always is an indication of benevolence. On the con-
trary, our framework predicts that coercion arises in two cases: (i) under conflicting opinions when
altruism is sufficiently strong; and (ii) under conflicting preferences when altruism is sufficiently
weak.
To illustrate this fact, consider the issue of whether gay and lesbian couples should have the
legal right to marry. Support for legislation that prohibits homosexual marriage may be consistent
with benevolence if the authority is convinced that the spouses would come to regret their marriage
later. For example, if she believes that homosexual marriage is an offense against God that would
preclude the spouses from afterlife benefits that they, if they were aware of this, would not want
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to give up, then the benevolent authority would behave in a paternalistic fashion and remove this
possibility.
In sharp contrast, among authorities who view an individual’s choice of spouse as a matter of
preferences, only authorities with little regard for the individual would engage in coercion. Coercion
by a tyrannical authority does not represent an instance of paternalism, because she engages in
coercion to promote her own self-interest (rather than the individual’s self-interest). This would
arise, for example, if an authority, for her own sake, dislikes the idea that the institution marriage
is made available to homosexual couples; or if she has a preference for discrimination against
homosexuals.
This highlights that whether a prohibition is enacted by a benevolent or tyrannical authority
cannot be inferred by the prohibition itself; it is necessary to probe the authority’s motivation
or observe the strength of her altruism. Moreover, the same prohibition may be viewed as dis-
crimination by some – who deem the issue as one of differing preferences – and as protection by
others – who deem the issue as one of differing opinions. Those who view a woman’s occupational
choice as a matter of preferences, for example, would view legislation that precludes women from
certain jobs as discrimination; on the contrary, those who fear that a woman who takes such a job
is misinformed about its negative health consequences view the legislation as protection. In the
1970s, a law precluding women from heavy duty jobs was repealed in the U.S. on the grounds that
it was discriminating. This highlights that the line between safety and discrimination is not only
vague, but it may change over time, as predominant beliefs in society change.
3.7 Discussion of assumptions
Altruism. We use the simplest formulation for our purpose. A few choices are noteworthy. First,
A evaluates the individuals’ expected utilities using her own prior, piA. This is essential. If A instead
uses the individuals’ priors, the results under opinion disagreement would be similar to those under
preference disagreement. This is not a qualification of our results; on the contrary, it underscores
our message. If A evaluates an individual’s expected payoff using his prior, then A would want
the individual to take the action that he deems best for himself, even though A is convinced that
the individual later will come to regret this choice. Naturally, this reduces (opinion) disagreement
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to one of preferences. This speaks to the notion of altruism that we apply: We say that a more
altruistic A cares more about her own valuation of the individuals’ payoffs.
Second, A places the same weight on each individual. This is merely a simplification; suitable
versions of our results arise so long as disagreement is non-negligible between A and individuals’
she cares (more) about.
Third, an alternative formulation would be to let A place the weight (1 − ϕ) on her own non-
altruistic payoff (instead of the weight 1). Our main insights would continue to apply. Indeed, under
opinion disagreement, the key feature driving our results – that an increase in ϕ raises A’s valuation
of the individuals’ payoffs relative to her own non-altruistic payoff, and in particular relative to
the cost of lying (or coercion) – remains in both formulations. Then, when A believes that lying
benefits the population, stronger altruism makes her more willing to bear a given cost of lying.
Under preference disagreement, it can be easily verified that greater altruism still makes truth-
telling more attractive to lying (or coercion). Our results thus remain as long as, when ϕ increases,
A’s valuation of the cost of lying (or coercion) remains constant (as in our main formulation),
decreases (as in the alternative formulation), or, more generally, does not rise too fast.
The costs of lying and coercion. We consider all possible costs of lying, c ≥ 0. This en-
compasses the canonical models of cheap talk (c = 0) and verifiable information (c = ∞). In the
authority game, we consider the case of q > c. Relaxing this assumption would not alter the insight
that a sufficiently altruistic authority would prefer to be libertarian under preference disagreement,
and would be paternalistic under opinion disagreement.
The representativeness of the advisor (authority). In the setting with preference disagree-
ment, we consider general distributions, hence, all our results hold for cases when the advisor
(authority) is representative of the population’s median preference, i.e., when f(b) has a median
equal to zero. In the setting with opinion disagreement, we assume that the advisor (authority) is
representative of the median opinion. This assumption makes lying and coercion more unattrac-
tive than if the advisor can hold an extreme, unrepresentative opinion. Indeed, fix some opinion
distribution g(pi) and consider an advisor who gets s = 1. The advisor would always prefer to
report s = 1 truthfully to more pessimistic individuals, with priors pii ≤ piA, and to sufficiently
close individuals, with priors pii > piA. Thus, an advisor with a median opinion piA faces a greater
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loss from lying when sending a public message than does an advisor with an extreme pessimistic
opinion. Similarly, a pessimistic authority may derive a greater benefit from mandating her pre-
ferred action, because she deems the individuals’ beliefs skewed in the optimistic direction, and
that intervention thus yields a considerable improvement in their expected welfare. As a result, for
a given distribution g(pi), the advisor with a more extreme opinion would be more tempted to lie
and coerce. Trivially, all our main results remain with the lower thresholds for lying and coercion.
3.8 Conclusion
We study a model where a population must rely on an altruistic advisor for information before
making a decision. We show that the impact of altruism on communication fundamentally depends
on the nature of disagreement. Altruism improves communication when the parties have different
underlying preferences. In contrast, altruism destroys communication when the parties have dif-
ferent opinions: the advisor believes that the population (on average) will misinterpret a truthful
report, so an altruistic advisor is inclined to lie in order to protect the population. If the advisor
can force the individuals’ actions, the altruistic advisor is libertarian under preference disagree-
ment: she communicates truthfully and gives the individuals the liberty to choose. In contrast,
under differences of opinion, the altruistic advisor is paternalistic: believing that she acts in the
individuals’ best interest, the advisor forces another action than the individuals would choose for
themselves. Thus, whether coercion is perceived as justifiable, and deemed socially desirable, is inti-
mately linked to whether a conflict is, consciously or subconsciously, framed in terms of preferences
or opinions.
Our model offers a lens through which we can understand differing views on a government’s
right to regulate actions that can cause self-harm, and sheds light on why those who advocate
restrictions in individual liberty deem such restrictions strictly better than information provision.
The framework yields a precise prediction about what issues a regulator chooses to regulate, and
on what issues she instead adopts a laissez-faire approach.
3.9 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 8. We consider each type of disagreement in turn.
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Preference disagreement. Assume that the population believes the message announced by the
advisor. If the advisor received the signal s = 1 and reports it truthfully to the population, then
agent i optimally picks the action ai(1) = p(1) + bi, where p(1) is the posterior belief that θ = 1,
i.e., p(1) = Pr(θ = 1|s = 1). Hence, the advisor’s expected utility is
E [UA(a(1), θ)|s = 1] = −p(1)
[∫ +∞
−∞














p(1)2 + 2b¯p(1) + b2 + ϕp(1)2
]
= −p(1) [(p(1) + b¯− 1)2 + ϕ(p(1)− 1)2]
−(1− p(1)) [(p(1) + b¯)2 + ϕp(1)2]+ b¯2 − b2.
If the advisor decides to misreport signal s = 1, it induces individual i to choose ai(0) = p(0) + bi
and results in the following advisor’s expected utility:
E [UA(a(0), θ)|s = 1] = −p(1)
[
(p(0) + b¯− 1)2 + ϕ(p(0)− 1)2]
−(1− p(1)) [(p(0) + b¯)2 + ϕp(0)2]+ b¯2 − b2 − c.
Truth-telling is preferred when
−p(1) [(p(1) + b¯− 1)2 + ϕ(p(1)− 1)2]− (1− p(1)) [(p(1) + b¯)2 + ϕp(1)2]
≥ −p(1) [(p(0) + b¯− 1)2 + ϕ(p(0)− 1)2]− (1− p(1)) [(p(0) + b¯)2 + ϕp(0)2]− c.
This condition is equivalent to the one, where the advisor communicates to just one individual with
the preference difference of b¯, and can be rewritten as
ϕ ≥ −1 + 2b¯
p(1)− p(0) −
c
(p(1)− p(0))2 . (TT1pr)
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Similarly, the advisor will report s = 0 truthfully whenever
ϕ ≥ −1− 2b¯
p(1)− p(0) −
c
(p(1)− p(0))2 . (TT0pr)
Thus, truth-telling is an equilibrium outcome if and only if the altruism level is substantial, ϕ ≥
ϕ(c, b¯) = max{−1 + 2|b¯|p(1)−p(0) − c(p(1)−p(0))2 ,}. Clearly, ϕ(c, b¯) (weakly) decreases in c.
Opinion disagreement. Start from a simple opinion distribution with two types of individuals,
t1 and t2, with priors pi1 ≤ piA = 0.5 ≤ pi2. The types are equally prevalent, i.e., g(pi1) = g(pi2) = 0.5.
Assume that lying is costless, c = 0, and the population believes the reported signal. Consider the
advisor who gets s = 1, which results in her posterior belief equal to γ. If the advisor could
differentiate messages between the people, then she would always prefer to report s = 1 truthfully
to t1 with the prior pi1 ≤ 1/2; and might want to misreport to t2 when pi2 is sufficiently close to 1.
Overall, the advisor would prefer to lie if the benefit from lying to t2 outweighs the loss from lying
to t1. To argue that the lying region L1 has the form as shown in Figure 3.1, below we consider the
properties of the loss and the benefit functions (the analysis of s = 0 case and a respective region
L0 can be performed in a similar way).
First, study the loss from lying. Denote the action choices of t1 after messages 1 and 0 by
a1 = ppi1(1) =
pi1γ
pi1γ+(1−pi1)(1−γ) and a0 = ppi1(0) =
pi1(1−γ)
pi1(1−γ)+(1−pi1)γ .
31 The advisor’s expected loss
from sending the message m = 0 is
l(pi1) = −γ(a1 − 1)2 − (1− γ)a21 + γ(a0 − 1)2 + (1− γ)a20
= −(a1 − γ)2 + (a0 − γ)2.
First, we show that the loss function is strictly concave. Consider the second derivative of l(pi1)
(in the following derivations the prime and the double prime symbols denote the corresponding
31Similarly to the previously introduced notation, ppi(s) stands for the posterior belief of an individual with prior
pi about θ: Prpi(θ = 1|s).
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derivatives with respect to pi1):
l′′(pi1) = 2
[−a′1(a1 − γ) + a′0(a0 − γ)]′
= 2
[−(a′1)2 − a′′1(a1 − γ) + (a′0)2 + a′′0(a0 − γ)] .
In this expression,
(a′1)
2 + a′′1(a1 − γ) =
γ2(1− γ)2
[pi1γ + (1− pi1)(1− γ)]4 −
2γ(1− γ)(2γ − 1)
[pi1γ + (1− pi1)(1− γ)]3 (a1 − γ)
=
γ2(1− γ)
[pi1γ + (1− pi1)(1− γ)]4 [1− γ − 2(2γ − 1)(1− γ)(2pi1 − 1)]
=
γ2(1− γ)2
[pi1γ + (1− pi1)(1− γ)]4 [1 + 2(2γ − 1)(1− 2pi1)] ≥ 0.
Similarly,
(a′0)
2 + a′′0(a0 − γ) =
γ2(1− γ)2
[pi1(1− γ) + (1− pi1)γ]4 −
2γ(1− γ)(1− 2γ)
[pi1(1− γ) + (1− pi1)γ]3 (a0 − γ)
=
γ(1− γ)
[pi1(1− γ) + (1− pi1)γ]4
[
γ(1− γ) + 2(2γ − 1)(pi1(1− γ)2 − (1− pi1)γ2)
]
.
Condition pi1 ≤ 0.5 ensures that
pi1γ + (1− pi1)(1− γ) ≤ pi1(1− γ) + (1− pi1)γ
and
γ(1− γ) [1 + 2(2γ − 1)(1− 2pi1)] > γ(1− γ) + 2(2γ − 1)(pi1(1− γ)2 − (1− pi1)γ2).
Hence, (a′1)2 + a′′1(a1 − γ) > (a′0)2 + a′′0(a0 − γ), meaning that l′′(pi1) < 0.
Second, the loss function achieves its minimum of 0 at pi1 = 0. This, in particular, means that
l(pi1) increases at pi1 = 0. Indeed, t1 with the prior pi1 = 0 does not respond to the revealed signal
and always chooses action 0. For any other 0 < pi1 ≤ 0.5 different messages induce different actions
a0 6= a1, leading to a strictly positive loss from misreporting.
Finally, l(pi1) decreases at pi1 = 0.5. To see this, note that at pi1 = 0.5 the chosen actions are
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a1 = γ and a0 = 1− γ. Hence, l′(pi1) = −a′1(a1 − γ) + a′0(a0 − γ) becomes a′0(1− 2γ) < 0.
Now consider the potential benefit of misreporting to t2 with the prior of pi2. As before, let
a˜1 = ppi2(1) and a˜0 = ppi2(0) denote the actions choices of t2 after messages 1 and 0, respectively.
The potential benefit from misreporting is
b(pi2) = (a˜1 − γ)2 − (a˜0 − γ)2.
The potential benefit realizes with positive values for sufficiently extreme priors pi2 and translates
into a loss when the prior pi2 is close to the advisor’s priors of 0.5. Regarding the properties of
the potential benefit function, we, first, show that it is strictly increasing until pi2 =
γ2
γ2+(1−γ)2 , s.t.
a˜0 = γ under this prior. Indeed, consider the first derivative:
b′(pi2) = 2
[
a˜′1(a˜1 − γ)− a˜′0(a˜0 − γ)
]
.
It is strictly greater than 0 when pi2 ≤ γ2γ2+(1−γ)2 , because a˜′1, a˜′0 > 0, a˜1 ≥ γ and a˜0 ≤ γ.
Next, we show that b(pi2) is strictly concave for priors pi2 s.t. a˜0 ≥ γ, i.e., pi2 ≥ γ2γ2+(1−γ)2 . The




2 + a˜′′1(a˜1 − γ)− (a˜′0)2 − a˜′′0(a˜0 − γ)
]
.
Similarly to what was derived before for t1,
(a˜′1)
2 + a˜′′1(a˜1 − γ) =
γ2(1− γ)2
[pi2γ + (1− pi2)(1− γ)]4 [1 + 2(2γ − 1)(1− 2pi2)]
and
(a˜′0)
2 + a˜′′0(a˜0 − γ) =
γ(1− γ)
[pi2(1− γ) + (1− pi2)γ]4
[
γ(1− γ) + 2(2γ − 1)(pi2(1− γ)2 − (1− pi2)γ2)
]
.
The fact that pi2 ≥ 0.5 ensures
pi2γ + (1− pi2)(1− γ) ≥ pi2(1− γ) + (1− pi2)γ,
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Figure 3.5: Loss and benefit functions from misreporting s = 1, γ = 0.6.
while condition pi2 ≥ γ2γ2+(1−γ)2 > γ guarantees that
max {0, γ(1− γ) [1 + 2(2γ − 1)(1− 2pi2)]} < γ(1− γ) + 2(2γ − 1)(pi2(1− γ)2 − (1− pi2)γ2).
Hence, (a˜′1)2 + a˜′′1(a˜1 − γ) < (a˜′0)2 + a˜′′0(a˜0 − γ), meaning that b′′(pi2) < 0.
Finally, note that the benefit from lying decreases for pi2 sufficiently close to 1 and is 0 when
pi2 = 1: b
′(1) < 0 and b(1) = 0.
The described properties of loss and benefit functions, in particular, imply that l(pi1) and b(pi2)
achieve their unique points of maximum in interiors (0, 0.5) and (0.5, 1), respectively. Moreover,
the maximum of l(pi1) exceeds the maximum of b(pi2), because parabola −(pi − γ)2 has its peak at
γ > 0.5. Typical loss and benefit functions are illustrated in Figure 3.5.
The difference in the advisor’s expected payoffs from lying and truthful reporting is 12b(pi2) −
1
2 l(pi1). The summarized properties of l(pi1) and b(pi2) allow to see why the region L1 where
b(pi2) > l(pi1) has a typical form as shown in Figure 3.1.
Start from L1left. If pi1 = 0, then l(0) = 0 but b(pi2) ≥ 0 for sufficiently large pi2. Now raise pi1
by a little bit. Then l(pi1) becomes strictly positive, while the properties of b(pi2) ensure that the
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interval of pi2 for which b(pi2) > l(pi1) shrinks. Because l(pi1) increases until it reaches its maximum,
raising pi1 further leads to greater shrinking of the interval {pi2 : b(pi2) > l(pi1)}, until it disappears
completely (provided that the maximum of l(pi1) exceeds the maximum of b(pi2)).
Now consider L1right. This region is non-empty if and only if l(0.5) < maxpi2 b(pi2). Assume that
this condition is satisfied. To understand the shape of L1right, start by considering pi1 = 0.5. The
properties of b(pi2) ensure that {pi2 : b(pi2) > l(pi1)} is a non-empty interval inside (0.5, 1). Now
start decreasing pi1. Then the interval {pi2 : b(pi2) > l(pi1)} shrinks until it disappears completely.
Now we show that the condition l(0.5) < maxpi2 b(pi2) holds if γ sufficiently close to 0.5. The
loss at pi1 = 0.5 is
l(0.5) = (a0 − γ)2 = (2γ − 1)2.
Now consider the benefit when:
b(pi2) = (a˜1 − γ)2 − (a˜0 − γ)2
= (a˜1 − a˜0)(a˜1 + a˜0 − 2γ)
=
(2γ − 1)pi2(1− pi2)
(pi2γ + (1− pi2)(1− γ))(pi2(1− γ) + (1− pi2)γ)(a˜1 + a˜0 − 2γ).
Because l(0.5)2γ−1 = 2γ − 1 → 0 as γ → 0.5, while b(pi2)2γ−1 → pi2(1 − pi2)(2pi2 − 1) > 0 as γ → 0.5, then
l(0.5) < maxpi2 b(pi2) if γ is small enough.
On the other hand, l(0.5) > maxpi2 b(pi2) for any sufficiently large γ. Indeed, l(0.5) = (2γ − 1)2
increases as γ increases, while maxpi2 b(pi2) is strictly less than (1 − γ)2. As a result, when γ ≥ 23 ,
the loss l(0.5) strictly exceeds the benefit for b(pi2) for any pi2.
32
When lying is costly, c > 0, the advisor will misreport the signal s = 1 whenever ϕ(12b(pi2) −
1
2 l(pi1)) > c. Clearly, the advisor remains credible for all (pi1, pi2) ∈ TT (see Figure 3.1) indepen-
dently of the levels of ϕ > 0 and c > 0. Further, for any c > 0 and (pi1, pi2) ∈ L1 ∪ L0, there exists
a threshold level of altruism ϕ(c, pi1, pi2) such that a FRE exists if and only if ϕ ≤ ϕ(c, pi1, pi2).
This result that a FRE exists if and only if ϕ is below some threshold can be easily generalized
to some other distributions of priors g(pi) as well. To see this, take some distribution g(pi) and
define the two distribution functions g1 and g2 so that g1(pi1) = 2g(pi1) if pi1 < 0.5 and g1(pi1) = 0
32While we do not show analytically that l(0.5) < maxpi2 b(pi2) if only if γ is below a specific threshold, computa-
tional exercises suggest that this is the case.
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if pi1 > 0.5; similarly, g2(pi2) = 2g(pi2) if pi2 > 0.5 and g2(pi2) = 0 if pi2 < 0.5.
33 Clearly, functions
g1 and g2 are uniquely defined for each distribution g. When lying is costless, c = 0, the advisor
will lie after the signal s = 1 as long as enough mass of joint distribution g1(pi1)g2(pi2) is inside L1.
Similarly, the advisor will misreport s = 0 provided that sufficient mass of the joint distribution
is concentrated inside region L0. This implies that the set G in Proposition 8 is non-empty and
consists of uncountably many members. For distributions g ∈ G, a FRE may exist when c > 0.
For any given cost of lying, however, increasing the level of altruism eventually destroys truthful
communication, because greater ϕ makes the net benefit from lying larger relative to the cost c.
Clearly, ϕ(c, g) (weakly) increases in c.
Consider now some opinion distribution g(pi) /∈ G. Truth-telling is incentive compatible for
some ϕ > 0 when c = 0, hence, it is incentive compatible for any ϕ ≥ 0 (when c = 0). Because, for
any given ϕ, an increase in c makes truth-telling even more attractive, a FRE exists for all c ≥ 0
and ϕ ≥ 0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 9. We consider each type of disagreement in turn.
Preference disagreement. The proof consists of two steps, each described by a corresponding
lemma.
Lemma 10. For any cost of coercion q ≥ 0 and preference distribution f(b) there exists a threshold
ϕTT (q, b¯, b2), s.t. a FRE exists if and only if ϕ ≥ ϕTT (q, b¯, b2).
Proof. Assume that the authority gets the signal s. If the authority coerces, she chooses the action
a that maximizes her expected utility given by:
E(UA(a, θ)|s) = −p(s)
[∫ +∞
−∞





[a2 + ϕ(a− bi)2]f(bi)dbi
]
− q.
33The values g1(0.5) and g2(0.5) are defined so that the functions g1 and g2 integrate (in discrete case, sum up) to
1 over the interval [0.1].
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Thus, the authority optimally imposes the action:




Her expected utility from coercion is
E(UA(a, θ)|s) = −p(s)
[





2 − 2ϕb¯aA(s) + ϕb2
]
− q
= −(1 + ϕ)E ((aA(s)− θ)2|s)+ 2ϕb¯ [aA(s)− p(s)]− ϕb2 − q















b¯2 − (1 + ϕ)p(s)(1− p(s))− ϕb2 − q.
If instead the authority communicates some message m to the population, then the population’s
posterior becomes pˆ = p(m) (by symmetry, in any equilibrium all individuals hold the same poste-
riors after observing the authority’s message). Hence, each individual i picks his preferred action
ai(m) = pˆ+ bi, which generates the following expected payoff to the authority:
E (UA(a(m), θ)|s) = −p(s)
[∫ +∞
−∞















(1 + ϕ)pˆ2 + 2b¯pˆ+ b2
]
= −(1 + ϕ)(pˆ2 − 2pˆp(s) + p(s))− 2b¯(pˆ− p(s))− b2
= −(1 + ϕ)(pˆ− p(s))2 − (1 + ϕ)p(s)(1− p(s))− 2b¯(pˆ− p(s))− b2.
Communication generates greater expected payoff to the authority than coercion if
ϕ2
1 + ϕ
b¯2 − ϕb2 − q ≤ −(1 + ϕ)(pˆ− p(s))2 − 2b¯(pˆ− p(s))− b2. (3.3)
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In particular case of truthful advising this boils down to
ϕ2
1 + ϕ
b¯2 − ϕb2 + b2 − q ≤ 0,
−ϕ2(b2 − b¯2)− ϕq + b2 − q ≤ 0. (3.4)
The parabola in the LHS is concave and achieves its maximum at ϕ ≤ 0. This implies that the LHS
decreases in ϕ for ϕ ≥ 0. In particular, the authority prefers to act as a truth-telling advisor if and
only if the level of altruism is sufficiently large: ϕ ≥ ϕTT (q, b¯, b2). The threshold ϕTT (q, b¯, b2) ≤ 1
if the average bias is sufficiently small: b¯
2
2 − q ≤ 0.
Note, that if coercion is costless, q = 0, then the truthful advising is preferred for sufficiently
large ϕ, for any non-degenerate distribution (b¯2 6= b2), i.e., ϕTT (0, b¯, b2) < +∞; while coercion is
always preferred for any degenerate distribution (b¯2 = b2), i.e., ϕTT (0, b, b
2) = +∞.
Clearly, ϕTT (q, b¯, b2) strictly exceeds 0 and decreases in q for q < b2, and ϕTT (q, b¯, b2) = 0 when
q ≥ b2
Lemma 11. For every f(b) and q < qC(b¯, b2) there exists a threshold ϕC(q, b¯, b2) > 0, s.t. for
any ϕ < ϕC(q, b¯, b2) every equilibrium outcome involves the authority imposing her preferred ac-
tion with non-zero probability. Moreover, for every b and q < qCC(b¯, b2) there exists a threshold
ϕCC(q, b¯, b2) > 0, s.t. for any ϕ < ϕCC(q, b¯, b2) there is a unique equilibrium, in which the authority
coerces the individual for each signal s ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. As regards the first part of the Lemma, we show that sufficiently low cost q and altruism ϕ
preclude the existence of communication equilibria. We study two different types of communication
equilibria: (i) only one population’s posterior belief pˆ is induced, and (ii) two different posterior
beliefs pˆ0 < pˆ1 are induced.
In case (i), the authority’s communication leads to the same population’s posterior belief inde-
pendently of the underlying signal, i.e., no informative communication takes place and the posterior
belief necessarily coincides with the prior, pˆ = pi. This means that each individual i picks an action
ai = pi+bi. Such a communication equilibrium fails to exist when, after some signal s, the authority
would rather exercise her power to choose her preferred action, i.e., when inequality (3.3) hold with





b¯2 − ϕb2 − q > −(1 + ϕ)(pi − p(s))2 − 2b¯(pi − p(s))− b2.
Assume that the authority does not incorporate the individual’s payoff into her utility: ϕ = 0.
Then, for sufficiently low cost q < maxs[(pi − p(s))2 + 2b¯(pi − p(s)) + b2], the authority coerces the
individual for at least one signal s.
Now consider case (ii), in which the induced posterior beliefs of the population are different,
pˆ0 < pˆ1. The authority cannot be indifferent between these beliefs after both signal realizations.
Thus, for these actions to be induced in equilibrium, it must be the case that the authority mixes
between messages for no more than one signal. It implies that pˆs = p(s) for at least one signal
s. Hence, a non-altruistic authority who obtained s will choose to impose her preferred action
whenever inequality (3.4) breaks down, i.e., q < b2. Clearly, she will still do so for sufficiently low
levels of altruism.
Together, cases (i) and (ii) imply that for a sufficiently low coercion cost, q < qC(b¯, b2), and
altruism level, ϕ < ϕC(q, b¯, b2), each equilibrium involves coercion with a non-zero probability.
Clearly, ϕC(q, b¯, b2) decreases in q for q < qC(b¯, b2).
As regards the second part of the Proposition, we argue that for sufficiently low q and ϕ no com-
munication is sustainable in equilibrium. Below we consider two possibilities of how communication
can arise.
First, assume that the authority communicates with positive probability for both signal real-
izations s = 0, 1. If only one population’s posterior pˆ ∈ [p(0), p(1)] is induced in equilibrium, then
a non-altruistic authority would strictly prefer to coerce for at least one signal when
q < q(pˆ, b¯, b2) = max
s
[(pˆ− p(s))2 + 2b¯(pˆ− p(s)) + b2]. (3.5)
Clearly, q(pˆ, b¯, b2) > 0 for every pˆ. Because q(pˆ, b¯, b2) is a continuous function of pˆ, there exists 0 <
q¯(b¯, b2) = minpˆ∈[p(0),p(1)] q(bˆ, b¯, b2). Inequality (3.5) is strict for any q < q¯(b¯, b2) and pˆ ∈ [p(0), p(1)];
hence, the authority still prefers to coerce whenever the level of altruism is below the threshold
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ϕ(q, pˆ, b¯, b2) > 0.34 Because ϕ(q, pˆ, b¯, b2) is continuous in pˆ ∈ [p(0), p(1)], there exists
0 < ϕ(q, b¯, b2) = min
pˆ∈[p(0),p(1)]
ϕ(q, pˆ, b¯, b2).
As a result, for q < q¯(b¯, b2) and ϕ < ϕ(q, b¯, b2), there exists no equilibrium with non-zero commu-
nication after both signals and only one induced posterior belief. Next, if two different posterior
beliefs pˆ0 < pˆ1 are induced in equilibrium, then the authority strictly prefers inducing one action
over the other for at least one signal, meaning that pˆs = p(s) for some s ∈ {0, 1}. Clearly, such an
equilibrium cannot exist for q lower than b¯2 and sufficiently low ϕ.
Second, suppose that the authority communicates with non-zero probability for one signal and
coerces with certainty for the other signal. For example, assume that the authority sometimes
communicates after s = 1 and always coerces after s = 0. In this case, the mere fact that the
authority didn’t impose an action indicates to the population that the signal is s = 1. As a result,
the induced population’s posterior pˆ necessarily equals p(1). Such an equilibrium fails to exist for
q lower than b2 and sufficiently low ϕ. The case when the authority sometimes communicates the
low signal s = 0 and always coerces when s = 1 is analogous. It follows that for every q < b2,
communicating after only one signal cannot be an equilibrium if ϕ is sufficiently low.
Combining the results of the two cases, when the coercion cost q and altruism level ϕ are below
the respective bounds qCC(b¯, b2) and ϕCC(q, b¯, b2), the unique equilibrium is the one where the
authority always coerces the individual.
Denoting q¯ = qCC(b¯, b2), Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 imply the preference disagreement result of
Proposition 9. Evidently, ϕCC(q, b¯, b2), ϕC(q, b¯, b2), and ϕTT (q, b¯, b2) are decreasing in q.
Clearly, a FRE is preferred by the individuals to any other (pure or mixed strategies) PBE.
Now we show that a FRE is preferred by the authority to any other pure strategies PBE, when ϕ
exceeds ϕTT (q, b¯, b2). First, the FRE is always preferred to a purely uninformative advising, where
the same message is sent after both signals. Indeed, the FRE generates a greater expected utility
34Assuming that the maximum in (3.5) is achieved at sˆ, the threshold ϕ(q, pˆ, b¯, b2) is determined as a closest to 0
positive root of ϕ
2
1+ϕ
b¯2 − ϕb2 − q = −(1 + ϕ)(pˆ− p(s))2 − 2b¯(pˆ− p(s))− b2.
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to the advisor whenever
(piγ + (1− pi)(1− γ)) [−(1 + ϕ)(pi − p(1))2 − 2b¯(pi − p(1))]
+ (pi(1− γ) + (1− pi)γ) [−(1 + ϕ)(pi − p(0))2 − 2b¯(pi − p(0))] ≤ 0.
This inequality can be rewritten as
−(1 + ϕ) [(piγ + (1− pi)(1− γ))(pi − p(1))2 + (pi(1− γ) + (1− pi)γ)(pi − p(0))2] ≤ 0,
which satisfied for all ϕ. Second, the FRE is preferred to equilibria where the authority coerces
after some or after both signals. Indeed, as the previous analysis illustrates, after any signal s the
authority prefers truth-telling to coercion for ϕ ≥ ϕTT (q, b¯, b2).
Opinion disagreement. The proof is split in two steps; each step is formulated as a correspond-
ing lemma.
Lemma 12. For any opinion distribution g /∈ G, there exists a threshold ϕTT (q, g), s.t. a FRE
exists if and only if ϕ ≤ ϕTT (q, g).
Proof. Consider some opinion distribution g(pi) /∈ G. That is, truthful reporting to population
described by g(pi) is incentive compatible when c = 0, given that the individuals believe the message





pA(pi − 1)2 + (1− pA)(pi)2
] ≥ −q − ϕ∫ 1
0
[
pA(pA − 1)2 + (1− pA)(pA)2
]
g(pii)dpii,
where pA = pA(s) and pi = pi(s) = ai(s) are the authority’s and individual i’s posterior beliefs





pA(pi − 1)2 + (1− pA)(pi)2 − pA(pA − 1)2 − (1− pA)(pA)2
]
g(pii)dpii ≤ q.
The integral in the LHS is strictly positive, because pA(pi − 1)2 + (1 − pA)(pi)2 > pA(pA − 1)2 +
(1 − pA)(pA)2 for any pi 6= pA (i.e., pii 6= 0.5) and
∫
pii 6=0.5 g(pii)dpii > 0. Thus, a FRE exists if and
only if ϕ is below a threshold ϕTT (q, g). Note that ϕTT (q, g) > 0 when q > 0 and ϕTT (0, g) = 0.
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Lemma 13. For any opinion distribution g(pi) and q ≥ 0, there exist thresholds ϕC(q, g) ≤
ϕCC(q, g). For ϕ > ϕCC(q, g), there exists a unique equilibrium, in which the authority coerces
with probability one after each signal s. For ϕ > ϕC(q, g), every equilibrium involves the authority
coercing with strictly positive probability.
Proof. First, we prove that all equilibria with communication after both signal realizations break
down for a sufficiently high level of altruism ϕ > ϕC(q, g). To show this, we distinguish between (i)
communication equilibria where each individual i takes only one action aˆi, and (ii) communication
equilibria where each individual i takes two different actions aˆi,0 < aˆi,1 with positive probabilities.
In case (i), the communication is necessarily uninformative, and hence, each individual i chooses






pA(pii − 1)2 + (1− pA)(pii)2 − pA(pA − 1)2 − (1− pA)(pA)2
]
g(pii)dpii ≥ q,
where pA = pA(s). The integral in the LHS is strictly positive, because pA(pii−1)2 +(1−pA)(pii)2 >
pA(pA − 1)2 + (1 − pA)(pA)2 for any pii 6= pA and
∫
pii 6=pA g(pii)dpii > 0. Thus, coercion is strictly
preferred for sufficiently large ϕ, so such a communication equilibrium breaks down.
In case (ii), the communicating authority induces the individuals to take different actions
aˆi,0 < aˆi,1. Clearly, rational behavior on the part of each individual i ensures that aˆi,0, aˆi,1 ∈
[pi(0), pi(1)]. Because
∫
pi 6=0.5 g(pi)dpi > 0 and 0.5 = piA is a median of g(pi), w.l.o.g. we assume that∫








pA(aˆi,m − 1)2 + (1− pA)(aˆi,m)2 − pA(pA − 1)2 − (1− pA)(pA)2
]
g(pii)dpii ≥ q,
where pA = pA(0). Now we show that the integral in the LHS has a lower bound δ > 0 that is
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pA(p0.5+ε(0)− 1)2 + (1− pA)(p0.5+ε(0))2 − pA(pA − 1)2 − (1− pA)(pA)2
]
g(pii)dpii
= δ > 0,
where p0.5+ε(0) is the posterior of the individual with the prior 0.5 + ε after getting the signal
s = 0.35 Here the first inequality holds, because the expression inside the integral is always positive
and for every i the action ai,0 is closer to the advisor’s preferred action pA than ai,1 is. The second
inequality holds, because pA(0) < p0.5+ε(0) < ai,0 for any communication equilibrium of this type.
As a result, the authority prefers coercion over communication when her altruism level exceeds
some threshold (which is independent of particular actions aˆi,0 and aˆi,1).
Combining the results of the two cases, we obtain that for a sufficiently high level of altruism,
ϕ > ϕC(q, g) (where the subscript C denotes coercion), the authority cannot communicate with
probability one in equilibrium.
Second, we argue that for a sufficiently large ϕ no communication is sustainable in equilibrium.
In order to do this, we consider two manners in which information transmission can arise: (i)
the authority communicates with positive probability after both signal realizations, and (ii) the
authority communicates with non-zero probability after one signal realization and coerces with
certainty after the other.
In case (i), we consider two possibilities: either each individual i takes only one action aˆi, or
each individual i takes two different actions aˆi,0 < aˆi,1 with positive probabilities. In the first case





pA(aˆi − 1)2 + (1− pA)(aˆi)2 − pA(pA − 1)2 − (1− pA)(pA)2
]
g(pii)dpii ≥ q,
where pA = pA(0), and we continue to assume that
∫
pi>0.5+ε g(pi)dpi > 0 for some ε > 0. As it
was shown, the integral in the LHS exceeds some δ > 0 that is independent of particular actions
35Note that the individual with the prior 0.5 + ε is hypothetical, i.e., he might not be a part of the population.
CHAPTER 3. PATERNALISM, LIBERTARIANISM, AND THE NATURE OF
DISAGREEMENT 163
aˆi. Hence, for ϕ exceeding some threshold (which is independent of particular actions aˆi), there
exists no equilibrium with non-zero communication for both signals where each individual i takes
only one action. Second, every individual i takes different actions aˆi,0 < aˆi,1, then, by the similar
analysis, the authority will prefer to coerce for sure when ϕ is greater than some threshold (which
is independent of particular actions aˆi,0 and aˆi,1).
In case (ii), suppose, for example, that the authority coerces for sure after getting the signal
s = 0. In this equilibrium, the authority’s decision to communicate perfectly reveals that she






pA(pi − 1)2 + (1− pA)(pi)2 − pA(pA − 1)2 − (1− pA)(pA)2
]
g(pii)dpii > q.
where pA = pA(1) and pi = pi(1), and the authority would choose to improve upon this action;
consequently, such an equilibrium breaks down.
Combining the results of (i) and (ii), for sufficiently high ϕ > ϕCC(q, g) the unique equilibrium
is the one where the authority always coerces the individual. Note that ϕCC(q, g) ≥ ϕC(q, g) ≥
ϕTT (q, g) > 0 when q > 0 and ϕCC(0, g) = ϕC(q, g) = 0.
Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 imply the opinion disagreement result of Proposition 9. Evidently,
ϕCC(q, g), ϕC(q, g), and ϕTT (q, g) are increasing in q. QED.
Proof of Proposition 10. The case of preference disagreement is considered in the main text;
here we present a proof for opinion disagreement case. Consider some distribution g(pi) ∈ G and
the cost of lying c > 0. By Proposition 8, the advisor can be credible (to entire population) under
public communication iff ϕ ≤ ϕ(c, g). At the same time, under targeted communication, the advisor
can report truthfully to a part of population with sufficiently close opinions. Thus, the advisor is
(weakly) more credible with public messages when ϕ ≤ ϕ(c, g), and is (weakly) more credible with
private messages when ϕ > ϕ(c, g).
Assume that ϕ(c, g) > 0 and that every individual believes the message he gets (either public
or private). If ϕ = ϕ(c, g), then the advisor can be credible (to entire population) in public
communication, but can not be credible to all individuals with private messages. Indeed, under
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public communication, the advisor is indifferent between reporting some signal s ∈ {0, 1} truthfully
or lying (the advisor weakly prefers to report the other signal truthfully). That is, the benefit from
lying about s to extreme individuals of measure η equals the loss from lying to other 1 − η less
extreme individuals plus the cost c. This implies that there is a set of individuals of measure η′,
0 < η′ ≤ η such that the individual benefit of lying to these individuals exceeds c. Hence, under
targeted communication, the advisor will strictly prefer to misreport the signal s to η′ extreme
individuals.
Now consider some distribution g(pi) /∈ G. Then for any the cost of lying c ≥ 0 and altruism
level ϕ ≥ 0 public communication is credible. At the same time, the advisor can be non-credible to
some individuals with private messages. Thus, for all ϕ ≥ 0 the advisor is (weakly) more credible
under public communication.
Clearly, all individuals prefer a FRE to any other (pure or mixed strategies) PBE. Now we show
that in private communication with individual i, a FRE is also preferred by the advisor to any other
pure strategies PBE for any pii ∈ (0, 1). Hence, a FRE is preferred under public communication as
well; and more credible communication is always beneficial to the advisor with the prior piA = 0.5
compared to less credible communication.
Assume that pii > 0.5 (case of pii < 0.5 is similar and case of pii = 0.5 is straightforward). In a
FRE, individual i takes actions p0 = pi(0) and p1 = pi(1) after messages 0 and 1, respectively. In
the uninformative equilibrium the advisor sends the same message independently on the signal, and
i takes action pi = pii. The FRE generates a greater expected payoff utility to the advisor whenever
1
2





γ(p1 − 1)2 + (1− γ)p21 − γ(pi − 1)2 − (1− γ)pi2
]
.
This inequality can be rewritten as
(pi − p0)(pi + p0 − 2(1− γ)) > (p1 − pi)(pi + p1 − 2γ).
First, note that pi−p0 > p1−pi > 0, i.e., the individual with the prior pi > 0.5 is more responsive to
a low signal s = 0 than to s = 1. Second, it is easily verified that p1 − p0 < 2γ − 1 (the individual
with the prior pi > 0.5 is on average less responsive than the individual with the prior 0.5). Hence,
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pi + p0 − 2(1− γ) > pi + p1 − 2γ, which by pi + p0 − 2(1− γ) > 0, implies that the FRE in private
communication with i is preferred to the uninformative equilibrium. QED.
3.10 Appendix: Dominance solvable setting
3.10.1 The altruistic advisor
Here we consider the following modification of the baseline model of Section 3.3. In the first stage
of the game, a signal about the state, s, with precision Pr(s = θ|θ) ≡ γ ∈ (0.5, 1) is realized.
This signal is privately observed by the advisor with probability α ∈ (0, 1); the advisor remains
uninformed with a complementary probability (1 − α). Whether the advisor gets to know the
signal does not depend on a particular signal realization, and is not observable by the population.
Second, if the advisor did not obtain the signal, no information transmission happens. If the advisor
is informed, she can either pass the signal s on to all individuals, or hide it at a cost c ≥ 0, in which
case the individuals learn nothing about the state – denoted as ∅. That is, the advisor can incur
a costly effort to hide information from the population. Importantly, when the individual observes
∅, he can not tell apart whether the advisor did not receive a signal or just hid it. Third, upon
learning the sinal s or observing no information ∅, the individuals choose an action a ∈ R. The
assumptions about individuals’ preferences, opinions and payoffs are the same as in the baseline
model, and the advisor’s utility is given by
UA(a, θ) = −
∫ 1
0
(ai − θ)2di− cIA hides info − ϕ
∫ 1
0
(ai − θ − bi)2di.
Consider the action that individual i optimally chooses given the available information. In case
individual i gets to know the signal, his action is ai(1) = pi(1) + bi if s = 1 and ai(0) = pi(0) + bi
if s = 0. When no information is revealed to i, he rationally chooses ai(∅) = pi(∅) + bi, where
pi(∅) ∈ [pi,0, pi,1] ⊂ (pi(0), pi(1)), where the upper bound pi,1 corresponds to i’s posterior given
that the advisor passes on the signal s = 0 and incurs effort to hide s = 1. Similarly, the lower
bound pi,0 is i’s posterior when that the advisor reveals s = 1 and incurs effort to hide s = 0. The
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expressions for pi,1 and pi,0 are given by:
pi,1 =
pii(1− α+ αγ)
pii(1− α+ αγ) + (1− pii)(1− α+ α(1− γ)) ,
pi,0 =
pii(1− α+ α(1− γ))
pii(1− α+ α(1− γ)) + (1− pii)(1− α+ αγ) .
Preference disagreement. Under preference disagreement, if the level of altruism is sufficiently
large, the advisor necessarily passes on the signal to the population whenever she has one.
Lemma 14. For any cost c ≥ 0 preference distribution f(b) with the mean b¯ there exists ϕ(c, b¯),
s.t. for every ϕ > ϕ(c, b¯) there is a unique rationalizable outcome, in which the advisor reveals the
signal if she has one.
Proof. Assume that the population’s belief after observing no signal ∅ is given by some p(∅) ∈
[p0, p1]. If the informed advisor does not hide the signal s = 1, she gets an expected payoff of:
36
E [UA(a(1), θ)|s = 1] = −p(1)
[
(p(1) + b¯− 1)2 + ϕ(p(1)− 1)2]
−(1− p(1)) [(p(1) + b¯)2 + ϕp(1)2]+ b¯2 − b2.
If the advisor exerts an effort to hide s = 1, her expected payoff becomes
E [UA(a(∅), θ)|s = 1] = −p(1)
[
(p(∅) + b¯− 1)2 + ϕ(p(∅)− 1)2]
−(1− p(1)) [(p(∅) + b¯)2 + ϕp(∅)2]+ b¯2 − b2 − c.
The advisor prefers to pass the signal s = 1 on to the population whenever
−p(1) [(p(1) + b¯− 1)2 + ϕ(p(1)− 1)2]− (1− p(1)) [(p(1) + b¯)2 + ϕp(1)2]
> −p(1) [(p(∅) + b¯− 1)2 + ϕ(p(∅)− 1)2]− (1− p(1)) [(p(∅) + b¯)2 + ϕp(∅)2]− c.
This condition is equivalent to the one, where the advisor communicates to just one individual with
36See the proof of Proposition 8 in Appendix 3.9 for a more detailed derivation of this and the following expressions.
CHAPTER 3. PATERNALISM, LIBERTARIANISM, AND THE NATURE OF
DISAGREEMENT 167
the preference difference of b¯, and because p(∅) < p(1), it can be rewritten as




Similarly, using p(∅) > p(0), the advisor’s incentive to pass on the signal s = 0 to the population
can be expressed as




Because p(∅) ∈ [p0, p1] ⊂ (p(0), p(1)), for sufficiently large ϕ > ϕ(c, b¯) it is a dominant strategy for
the informed advisor to reveal the signal independently of p(∅).
Opinion disagreement. Under opinion disagreement, there exists a non-degenerate set of dis-
tributions, for which the the advisor necessarily hides some signal when the level of altruism is
sufficiently large.
Lemma 15. There exists a non-degenerate set of opinion distributions Ĝ such that hiding some
signal is a strictly dominant strategy for the advisor when c = 0. For any g(pi) ∈ Ĝ and c > 0, there
exists a threshold level of altruism ϕ(c, g) such that the unique rationalizable outcome involves the
advisor hiding some signal for sure when ϕ ≤ ϕ(c, g).
Proof. First, we show that Ĝ is non-empty and is, in fact, uncountable. Consider a simple opinion
distribution with two types of individuals, t1 and t2, with priors pi1 < piA = 0.5 < pi2. The types are
equally prevalent, i.e., g(pi1) = g(pi2) = 0.5. Assume that type t1 is extreme and is not responsive
to the signal s, pi1 = 0. Assume that pi2 is sufficiently high to ensure that any p(∅) ∈ [p2,0, p2,1] is
closer to pA(1) = γ than p2(1). This implies that in the case of c = 0 a strictly dominant strategy
for the advisor is to always hide the signal s = 1. Clearly, Ĝ contains all such (and, by continuity,
many more other) distributions, hence it is uncountable.
Second, we note that for any g(pi) ∈ Ĝ and c > 0, the advisor’s strictly dominant strategy is
to hide some signal when ϕ is sufficiently large. Indeed, for any given cost of lying, increasing the
level of altruism makes the net benefit from hiding the signal larger relative to the cost c.
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3.10.2 The altruistic authority
After observing the signal, s, or observing no signal, ∅, the authority (A, she) chooses between
sending a public message m, after which the individuals choose actions, and mandating an action
for all individuals, aA ∈ R. As before, the cost of coercion is q, where q ≥ c = 0.
Preference disagreement. Under preference disagreement, for sufficiently high levels of altru-
ism, the authority never coerces or hides information.
Lemma 16. For any for any preference distribution f(b) with b¯2 6= b2 and any q ≥ 0, there exists
a threshold ϕ(q, b¯2, b2), such that for any ϕ > ϕ(q, b¯2, b2) there is a unique rationalizable outcome
where the authority never coerces the individuals and reveals the signal if she has one.
Proof. Assume that the authority obtained the signal. By Lemma 14, for sufficiently large ϕ >
ϕ(c = 0, b¯) the authority always prefers revealing the signal to hiding it independently of p(∅) ∈
[p0, p1]. Next, comparing signal revelation with coercing and imposing aA(s) = aA(s) = p(s)+
ϕ
1+ϕ b¯,
signal revelation is preferred when:37
− ϕ2(b2 − b¯2)− ϕq + b2 − q ≤ 0. (3.6)
Thus, for sufficiently large ϕ > ϕ(q, b¯2, b2) ≥ ϕ > ϕ(c = 0, b¯) it is a dominant strategy of the
informed authority to pass on the signal and never coerce the individual.
Now consider an uninformed authority and assume ϕ > ϕ(q, b¯2, b2). If the authority does
nothing, each individual i rationally chooses action pi+ bi (the individuals know that the authority
never hides information, because ϕ > ϕ1(q, b¯
2, b2)). If the authority coerces, she chooses aA(∅) =
pi + ϕ1+ϕ b¯. Thus, the authority and the individuals hold the same beliefs about the state, in which
case the authority prefers not to coerce whenever (3.6) is satisfied. As a result, provided the
rational behavior of the population, whenever ϕ > ϕ(q, b¯2, b2) it is a strictly dominant strategy for
the authority not to coerce the individuals and pass the signal on to them when she is informed.
Opinion disagreement. Under opinion disagreement, for sufficiently high levels of altruism, the
authority necessarily coerces the population.
37See the proof of Proposition 9 in Appendix 3.9 for a more detailed derivation of this and the following expressions.
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Lemma 17. For any for any opinion distribution g(pi) and any q ≥ 0, there exists a threshold
ϕ(q, g), such that for any ϕ > ϕ(q, g) there is a unique rationalizable outcome where the authority
coerces the individuals with probability one.
Proof. W.l.o.g. we assume that
∫
pi>0.5+ε g(pi)dpi > 0. Consider the authority who obtained the
signal s = 0. If the authority reveals it to the population, then every individual i optimally chooses
an action pi(0) 6= pA(0) if pii 6= 0.5. Thus, for sufficiently large ϕ > ϕ0(q, g) the benefit from
coercing gets larger than the cost and the authority finds it strictly optimal to impose her preferred
action pA(s) on the population. If the authority hides the signal s = 0 and does not coerce, then













pA(pi(∅)− 1)2 + (1− pA)(pi(∅))2 − pA(pA − 1)2 − (1− pA)(pA)2
]
g(pii)dpii
≥ δ0 > 0,
where pA = pA(0). Here the first inequality holds because the expression inside the integral is
always positive, and the second inequality holds because for every i the action pi(∅) ≥ p0.5+ε(∅) >
pA(0) when pii > 0.5 + ε. Thus, for ϕ > ϕ1(q, g) ≥ ϕ0(q, g) the authority strictly prefers to
coerce the population after the signal s = 0 independently of pi(∅). This, in turn, implies that
pi(∅) ∈ [pii, pi(1)].













piA(pi(∅)− 1)2 + (1− piA)(pi(∅))2 − piA(piA − 1)2 − (1− piA)(piA)2
]
g(pii)dpii
≥ δ1 > 0.
Here the first inequality holds because the expression inside the integral is always positive, and the
second inequality holds because for every i the action pi(∅) ≥ pii > piA when pii > 0.5. Thus, the
authority strictly prefers to coerce after observing ∅ if ϕ > ϕ2(q, g) ≥ ϕ1(q, g).
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Assume that ϕ > ϕ2(q, g) and that the authority observed the signal s = 1. By the same logic as
before, she would strictly prefer coercing to revealing the signal when ϕ > max{ϕ2(q, g), ϕ3(q, g)}.
If she hides the signal and does not coerce, then each individual i optimally chooses pi(∅) = pi(1)
(because if the individuals get to choose the action, it necessarily means that s = 1, provided that
ϕ > ϕ2(q, g)). This is strictly dominated by coercion for ϕ > max{ϕ2(q, g), ϕ3(q, g)}.
As a result, when ϕ > ϕ(q, g), the unique rationalizable outcome is the one in which the
authority always coerces the individuals.
3.11 Appendix: Setting with one individual
3.11.1 Model
We first develop a framework where an individual obtains information from an altruistic advisor
before making a decision. We then consider an alternative framework where the advisor in fact is
an authority, who can communicate with the individual before he makes his decision, but who also
can choose to simply coerce the individual to take a certain action. In both of these frameworks,
we analyze the impact of altruism under two different assumptions on the nature of disagreement
between the two parties: conflicting preferences and conflicting opinions.
3.11.1.1 The altruistic advisor
There are two players, an individual (I, he) and an advisor (A, she). The individual must take an
action, a ∈ R. His payoff from the action depends on an unknown state of the world, θ ∈ {0, 1}.
While he is unable to obtain information about the state by himself, he can rely on the privately
informed advisor for such information. The players’ prior beliefs about the state of the world are
characterized by Pri(θ = 1) = pii ∈ (0, 1), for i ∈ {I, A}.38 Following [Che and Kartik, 2009], we
say that the players have different opinions when piI 6= piA.
In the first stage of the game, the advisor privately observes a signal about the state, s, with
precision Pr(s = θ|θ) ≡ γ ∈ (0.5, 1). Second, she sends a message m ∈ {0, 1} to the individual. If
38Given that the state is binary, all beliefs can be characterized by Pr(θ = 1).
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the advisor lies, i.e., sends message m 6= s, she incurs a cost c ≥ 0.39 Third, upon receiving the
advisor’s signal, the individual chooses an action a ∈ R.
The players’ material payoffs from this action are given by uI(a, θ) = −(a − θ − b(θ))2 and
uA(a, θ) = −(a − θ)2 − cI{m6=s}, where the bias b(θ) ≥ 0 captures their preference disagreement,
and I{m 6=s} is an indicator variable taking the value one if and only if the advisor lies, and zero
otherwise. In this standard model of communication, we allow the advisor to be altruistic, i.e., the
players’ utilities are given by
UI(a, θ) = uI(a, θ) = −(a− θ − b(θ))2,
UA(a, θ) = uA(a, θ) + ϕuI(a, θ) = −(a− θ)2 − cI{m 6=s} − ϕ(a− θ − b(θ))2,
where ϕ ≥ 0 captures the degree to which the advisor cares about the (material) well-being of the
individual.40
The prior beliefs piI and piA, the signal precision γ, the lying cost c, the preference alignment
b(θ), and the degree of altruism ϕ are common knowledge.
Strategies and equilibrium. A pure strategy of the advisor specifies, for each signal s, the
message m(s) that she sends, m : {0, 1} → {0, 1}. The individual’s posterior beliefs conditional on
message m are described by PrI(θ = 1|m), where superscript I signifies that the individual forms
his beliefs using his prior piI . A pure strategy of the individual specifies, for each message m, action
aI(m) that he takes, aI : {0, 1} → R. We use a solution concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(PBE), where the advisor maximizes her expected utility for each signal s given the individual’s
strategy aI(m); the individual maximizes his expected utility given his beliefs PrI(θ = 1|m) after
each message m; and the beliefs PrI(θ = 1|m) satisfy Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
39This formulation encompasses cheap-talk (c = 0) and hard information (c = ∞). We maintain that c ∈ (0,∞)
unless we explicitly consider one of these two cases.
40We show in Section 3.11.5 that all the main results remain valid if friendship is mutual. We choose unidirectional
friendship as our baseline formulation not only for simplicity, but also because it better reflects a social planner who
cares about a citizen.
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3.11.1.2 The altruistic authority
We now replace the advisor with an authority. The authority can choose to behave like an advisor—
that is, to provide the individual with information before he chooses a ∈ R himself—but the au-
thority also has the option to instead impose an action on the individual. Formally, after observing
the signal, s, the authority chooses between sending a message m(s) to the individual (in which
case the game proceeds as in the altruistic advisor framework), and engaging in coercion, whereby
the authority simply picks her desired action a ∈ R for the individual.41
We assume that the authority must incur a cost q > 0 if she coerces the individual. Depending on
the application, this cost may reflect the instrumental cost of active intervention, or the authority’s
intrinsic aversion against removing the individual’s liberty to choose.
In this altruistic authority framework, we let c = 0. This reflects the fact that in many of the
applications we consider, it is reasonable to assume that the lying cost is negligible relative to the
cost of coercion.42 This is merely a simplification; all insights remain valid for c > 0. The parties
utilities are thus given by
UI(a, θ) = uI = −(a− θ − b(θ))2,
UA(a, θ) = uA + ϕuI = −(a− θ)2 − qI{coercion} − ϕ(a− θ − b(θ))2,
where I{coercion} takes value one if and only if coercion occurs.
Strategies and equilibrium. A pure strategy of the authority specifies, for each signal s,
whether she chooses to coerce or not coerce the individual, C(s) ∈ {Coerce, Not coerce}, what
action aA(s) ∈ R she takes if she chooses to coerce, and what message m(s) ∈ {0, 1} she sends if
she chooses not to coerce. The individual’s posterior beliefs conditional on receiving message m
are given by PrI(θ = 1|m) and a pure strategy of the individual specifies an action aI(m) ∈ R for
each message m. As before, we use the solution concept of PBE, in which the authority maximizes
41Note that such coercion differs from delegation, whereby the individual decides that the authority should exercise
the action choice. In contrast, under coercion, the authority herself decides when she should exercise the action choice
on behalf of the individual. Moreover, because the authority observes the signal s before deciding whether to coerce,
whereas the individual does not observe the signal s, the coercion choice is taken ex interim, whereas a delegation
choice must be made ex ante. We discuss how these concepts are related in Section 3.11.4.
42This is discussed in depth in Section 3.11.3.
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her expected utility for each signal given the individual’s strategy; the individual maximizes his
expected utility given his beliefs after each message; and the beliefs satisfy Bayes’ rule whenever
possible.
3.11.1.3 Nature of disagreement
We analyze this model under two different assumptions on the nature of disagreement between the
individual and the advisor:
Conflicting preferences. Under conflicting preferences, the individual’s preferences are biased
relative to those of the advisor, i.e., b(θ) 6= 0 for at least one value of θ; however, the parties have
the same opinions, i.e., piI = piA ≡ pi. In the main body of the study we assume that preference
biases are independent on the state: b(0) = b(1) = b.43
Conflicting opinions. Under conflicting opinions, the parties have fully aligned preferences, i.e.,
b(θ) = 0; however, they have different opinions, i.e., piI 6= piA.
3.11.2 Analysis: the altruistic advisor
In this section, we study communication between the individual and his altruistic advisor. The
stages of this game are summarized in Figure 3.6 below. In particular, we analyze how the possibility
to sustain truthful communication is influenced by the advisor’s regard for the individual. Because
this crucially depends on the nature of disagreement between the individual and his advisor, we
consider each case in turn in order to isolate the mechanisms.
Figure 3.6: Stages of the setting with altruistic advisor.
43This merely simplifies the exposition and makes the underlying intuition more transparent; as we show in the
Appendix, all our results hold in the more general case of conflicting preferences.
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3.11.2.1 Conflicting preferences
Because the parties share the same prior beliefs, piI = piA ≡ pi, they hold the same posterior beliefs
p(s) = Pr(θ = 1|s) about the state of the world, conditional on the signal s,
p(1) =
piγ
piγ + (1− pi)(1− γ) ,
p(0) =
pi(1− γ)
pi(1− γ) + (1− pi)γ .
Under perfect information, when the state of the world θ is known, the individual and the
advisor prefer different actions because b 6= 0. This disagreement carries on to the case of imperfect
information when the individual and the advisor have the same beliefs about the state of the world.
We analyze the game backwards. In stage 3, the individual observes the message m, forms his
posterior belief Pr(θ = 1|m), and chooses the action that maximizes his expected payoff:
aI(m) = arg max
a∈R
E(UI(a, θ)|m).
Because the loss function is quadratic, the individual’s maximization problem has a straightforward
solution: aI(m) = Pr(θ = 1|m)+b; that is, the individual optimally chooses the action that matches
his expected state of the world plus the bias b. If the individual believes that the advisor reports
truthfully at stage 2, i.e., that m(s) = s, then the individual optimally chooses aI(m) = p(m) + b.
In this case, a FRE exists whenever the advisor’s incentive compatibility conditions for truthful
reporting are satisfied.
Now consider stage 2. For the advisor to report a signal s truthfully, inducing the action
aI(m = s) must generate a greater expected payoff than inducing the action aI(m 6= s). First,
suppose that the advisor obtained the signal s = 1 in stage 1. In this case, her posterior belief that
θ = 1 is p(1), and her posterior belief that θ = 0 is (1− p(1)). The advisor’s expected utility from
sending m = 1 and inducing action aI(1) = p(1) + b is given by
E [UA(aI(1), θ)|s = 1] = −p(1)
[
(aI(1)− 1)2 + ϕ(aI(1)− 1− b)2
]
−(1− p(1)) [aI(1)2 + ϕ(aI(1)− b)2] .
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If the advisor instead lies, i.e., sends the message m = 0, she incurs the cost c and induces the
action aI(0) = p(0) + b < aI(1). In this case, her expected utility is given by
E (UA(aI(0), θ)|s = 1) = −p(1)
[
(aI(0)− 1)2 + ϕ(aI(0)− 1− b)2
]
−(1− p(1)) [aI(0)2 + ϕ(aI(0)− b)2]− c.
Hence, after getting the signal s = 1, the advisor prefers to send a truthful message over lying if and
only if the following inequality (denoted (TT1pr), where the subscript “pr” indicates the conflicting
preferences setting) is satisfied:
ϕ ≥ −1 + 2b
p(1)− p(0) −
c
(p(1)− p(0))2 . (TT1pr)
Second, suppose that the advisor gets the signal s = 0. An analogous analysis leads to the
following incentive compatibility condition for truth-telling
ϕ ≥ −1− 2b
p(1)− p(0) −
c
(p(1)− p(0))2 . (TT0pr)
Combining (TT1pr) and (TT0pr) yields that altruism improves communication when the parties
have different underlying preferences. In particular, truthful communication can be sustained when
the level of altruism ϕ is sufficiently high. This result is formally stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 12. For any bias b and lying cost c there exists a threshold ϕ(c, b) s.t. a fully revealing
equilibrium exists if and only if ϕ ≥ ϕ(c, b).44
Clearly, if b = 0, the individual and the advisor prefer the same action, and truthful communi-
cation can be sustained. When the parties have different preferences, however, communication may
break down. If so, strengthening the level of altruism eventually restores truthful communication,
because altruism mitigates the preference conflict. To gain intuition for the result, consider the








44This result holds in the general case of state dependent preferences, i.e., when b(0) 6= b(1).
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This is a weighted sum of the preferred action of a non-altruistic advisor, p(s), and the preferred
action of the individual, (p(s) + b). For her own sake, the advisor would like the action p(s) to be
implemented. Nevertheless, when she cares about the individual, her optimal action also reflects
that he is better off with the action (p(s) + b). The stronger the advisor’s care for the individual,
the more she internalizes the individual’s preferences, and the closer is aA(s) to aI(s). Clearly, for
a high enough level of altruism, truthful communication is attainable.
To better understand the exact form of the truth-telling conditions, consider the cheap-talk
case with a zero cost of lying, c = 0. The symmetric quadratic loss function yields that the
advisor wants to induce an action as close to her own preferred action, aA(s), as possible. If the
individual’s bias is positive, b > 0, then the advisor always reports the signal s = 0 truthfully,
because aA(0) = aI(0) +
ϕ
1+ϕb is closer to aI(0) than to aI(1) > aI(0). If she obtains the signal
s = 1, the advisor reports it truthfully if and only if action aA(1) is closer to aI(1) than to aI(0);
that is, if aI(1) − aA(1) ≤ aA(1) − aI(0). This condition can be rewritten 2b1+ϕ ≤ aI(1) − aI(0),
which is equivalent to (TT1pr) for c = 0. Analogously, if the bias is negative, b < 0, the advisor
always reports s = 1 truthfully, and reveals s = 0 if and only if the incentive constraint (TT0pr) is
satisfied.
Corollary 1. The threshold ϕ(c, b) decreases with c and increases with |b|.
The truth-telling threshold has intuitive properties. First, a higher cost of lying c makes truth-
ful reporting more attractive for the advisor. When a FRE can be sustained for a larger range of
altruism levels, the level of altruism necessary to induce truth-telling, ϕ(c, b), decreases. Second,
a more severe bias |b| intensifies the preference conflict, which increases the advisor’s relative at-
tractiveness of misreporting her signal. Consequently, the level of altruism required to mitigate the
preference divergence, ϕ(c, b), increases.
3.11.2.2 Conflicting opinions
When the individual and the advisor have different opinions, piI 6= piA, they have different posterior
beliefs pi(s) = Pri(θ = 1|s) given the same signal s:
pi(1) =
piiγ
piiγ + (1− pii)(1− γ) , pi(0) =
pii(1− γ)
pii(1− γ) + (1− pii)γ , i ∈ {I, A}.
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In terms of preferences over outcomes, the individual is fully aligned with the advisor, i.e., b = 0,
which implies that they have the same material payoffs. Their resulting utilities are given by:
UI(a, θ) = −(a− θ)2,
UA(a, θ) = −(a− θ)2 − cI{m6=s} − ϕ(a− θ)2.
Under perfect information about the state of the world, there is no disagreement between
the parties; they prefer the same action, a = θ. In contrast, under imperfect information, the
individual and the advisor prefer different actions even if they have the same signal s about the
state of the world, because they interpret this signal in light of their respective (different) priors. In
our framework, information is always imperfect, since the signal s is not fully informative (γ < 1).
We analyze the game backwards. In Stage 3, given the individual’s belief about the state of
the world, PrI(θ = 1|m), he optimally chooses the action that matches this expected state of the
world, aI(m) = PrI(θ = 1|m). If the individual believes that the advisor reports truthfully at
stage 2, i.e., that m(s) = s, then the individual chooses action aI(m) = pI(m). The necessary
and sufficient conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium to exist thus coincide with the advisor’s
incentive compatibility conditions for truthful reporting.
Now consider stage 2. First, suppose that the advisor obtained the signal s = 1 in stage 1. In
this case, her posterior belief that θ = 1 is pA(1), and her posterior belief that θ = 0 is (1− pA(1)).
Given the individual’s strategy, sending m = 1 induces action aI(1) = pI(1), while sending m = 0
induces action aI(0) = pI(0) < aI(1). The advisor’s expected payoff from sending m = 1 is given
by
EA (UA(aI(1), θ)|s = 1) = −pA(1)
(









where the subscript A on her expectation reflects that the advisor evaluates the expected utility
using her posterior about the state of the world, whereas the individual chooses the action that is
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optimal given his posterior. The advisor’s expected payoff from sending m = 0 is given by
EA (UA(aI(0), θ)|s = 1) = −pA(1)
(








The advisor’s incentive compatibility condition for truthful reporting when s = 1 (denoted (TT1op),
where the subscript “op” indicates the conflicting opinions setting) is given by the inequality
EA (UA(aI(1), θ)|s = 1) ≥ EA (UA(aI(0), θ)|s = 0), which can be rearranged as
aI(1) + aI(0)
2
≤ pA(1) + c
τ (1 + ϕ)
, (TT1op)
where τ ≡ 2 (aI(1)− aI(0)). An analogous calculation yields the truth-telling condition when the
advisor gets the signal s = 0, and combining these two conditions yields that a fully revealing
equilibrium can be sustained if and only if
pA(0)− c
τ (1 + ϕ)
≤ aI(1) + aI(0)
2
≤ pA(1) + c
τ (1 + ϕ)
. (TTop)
As we shall see, this condition yields that greater level of altruism worsens the prospects to achieve
truthful communication. In particular, if truthful communication can be sustained, raising the level
of altruism may eventually destroy it; and if truthful communication cannot be sustained, raising
the level of altruism cannot help. Before stating this result formally, we develop its intuition,
starting from the special case when c = 0. Then, (TTop) reduces to
pA(0) ≤ aI(1) + aI(0)
2
≤ pA(1). (TT′op)
Since aI(1) = pI(1) and aI(0) = pI(0), this condition identifies the set of (piI , piA) for which a FRE
can be sustained, given γ. Figure 3.7 below displays this region when γ = 0.7.
The top solid line represents the advisor’s truth-telling condition when getting the signal s = 1:
she communicates s = 1 truthfully for all (piA, piI) below this line. Similarly, she communicates
s = 0 truthfully for all (piA, piI) above the solid lower line. Hence, a FRE can be sustained in their
intersection, which we denote by TT ′.
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The location of TT ′ illustrates that truthful communication requires the priors of the individual
and his advisor to be sufficiently similar. Along the 45◦-line, their priors are identical; hence, the
action that the individual chooses if she gets signal s, aI(s) = pI(s), coincides with the action that
the advisor desires him to take, aA(s) = pA(s). Everywhere else, their priors differ, so aI(s) 6= aA(s).
Nevertheless, the advisor prefers to tell the truth so long as aA(s) is closer to the action that a
truthful report induces than it is to the action induced by a false report. To see this formally,
we can re-write the right inequality in (TT′op) as aI(1) − aA(1) ≤ aA(1) − aI(0), using the fact
that pA(1) ≡ aA(1). The advisor reports the signal s = 1 truthfully so long as the action that
she wants the individual to take, aA(1), is closer to the action that the individual chooses under
truthful reporting, aI(1), than to the action that he chooses if the advisor lies, aI(0). This obtains
because the advisor’s expected loss function is monotonic in the distance between the action that
she prefers, aA(1), and the action that the individual takes, aI(m).
When the priors are so different that the advisor prefers the action that he induces by lying
to the action that he induces by telling the truth in some state of the world, the FRE breaks
down. For all (piA, piI) below the lower solid line, the advisor is considerably more convinced than
the individual that the state of the world is θ = 1 (from ex-ante perspective). In this case, the
advisor would communicate truthfully when getting the signal s = 1; however, when getting the
signal s = 0, she would prefer to lie and send the message m = 1. Intuitively, the advisor prefers
lying over truth-telling—even though there is no preference conflict—because she believes that the
individual is so misinformed about the true prior that the individual will take a worse action if the
advisor sends a true message than if she lies. A similar logic applies to the region above the top
solid line, where the FRE breaks down because the advisor would report the signal s = 0 truthfully,
but lie when s = 1.
The shape of TT ′ does not depend on the advisor’s care for the individual, ϕ. Intuitively, this
is because altruism does not influence whether the advisor prefers the action that is induced by
telling the truth, aI(m = s), or the action that is induced by lying, aI(m 6= s). Rather, the level of
altruism influences how much the advisor suffers from the implementation of an action that deviates
from her own preferred action, aA(s). Indeed, when the advisor cares about the individual, on top
of her own material expected loss the advisor also internalizes a share of the disutility that she
expects the individual to suffer from his erroneous choice of action.
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Figure 3.7: Truth-telling incentives for different priors (piA, piI).
We now consider the case when lying entails a cost, c > 0. In this case, truth-telling can be
sustained for a larger set of (piA, piI). Formally, this is immediate from the truth-telling condition,
(TTop): for all (piA, piI) such that the advisor is indifferent between lying and telling the truth
when c = 0—i.e., along the boundaries of TT ′—she strictly prefers to tell the truth when c > 0.
Intuitively, when lying entails no cost, the advisor would like to lie whenever she believes that
lying induces the individual to take a better action than does telling the truth. However, when
the advisor is averse to lying, she weighs the cost of incurring a lie against the cost of inducing the
individual to take (what she believes to be) a suboptimal action. Clearly, in the presence of a lying
cost, she will be more prone to reveal the true signal.
The above discussion yields that there exists a nonempty set of (piA, piI) such that a FRE can
be sustained in the presence of lying cost c, but not when c = 0. We refer to this region as T (ϕ, c).
The dotted lines in Figure 3.7 plot the region T (ϕ, c) for ϕ = 0 and c = 0.2. The shape of T (ϕ, c)
illustrates that a FRE always exists when the individual’s prior is close to zero or one. This is
because the benefit of lying is increasing in the distance between aI(s = m) and aI(s 6= m). This
distance vanishes as the individual’s prior approaches either 0 or 1; intuitively, when the individual
has a strong belief about the state of the world ex ante, the new signal will have a negligible effect
on her desired action. Hence, if lying entails a cost, the advisor strictly prefers to send a truthful
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message.
The dependence of T (ϕ, c) on ϕ reflects that, when lying is costly, the advisor’s altruism is
crucial for the existence of a FRE. In particular, T (ϕ, c) shrinks as ϕ increases; formally, when ϕ
increases, (TTop) converges to (TT
′
op). This implies that, in all circumstances when the advisor’s
lying aversion can promote truthful communication, increasing the degree of altruism eventually
destroys truthful communication. When ϕ = 0, the advisor’s sole benefit from lying is that the
lie can induce the individual to take an action that the advisor deems better, which benefits the
advisor. Because the advisor and the individual have identical preferences, the advisor also believes
that if she lies, this benefits the individual. However, in the absence of altruism, the advisor does
not take this into account. When this sole benefit of lying is not large enough to outweigh the lying
cost c, the advisor communicates truthfully. In contrast, in the presence of altruism, the advisor
benefits from lying for two reasons: first, because she anticipates that the lie will increase her own
ex-post utility; and second, because she believes that the lie will benefit the individual. As the
altruism strengthens, the advisor internalizes more of the individual’s benefit from her lie, so the
advisor’s expected benefit from lying increases. As the cost of lying remains constant, the FRE
eventually breaks down as the level of altruism increases.
We make these notions precise in the following proposition:
Proposition 13. For any lying cost c > 0, when ϕ = 0, a FRE exists if and only if (piA, piI)
∈ TT ′⋃T (0, c). For all (piA, piI) ∈ TT ′ a FRE exists independently of the level of ϕ. For all
(piA, piI) ∈ T (0, c), there exists a threshold level of altruism ϕ(piA, piI , c) such that a FRE exists if
and only if ϕ ≤ ϕ(piA, piI , c). When no FRE exists, for (piA, piI) /∈ TT ′
⋃
T (0, c), raising the level
of altruism cannot improve communication.
Paradoxically, when the advisor cares too much about the individual, communication can break
down. If anything, altruism destroys communication because, when the parties have different opin-
ions, the advisor believes that the individual will misinterpret a truthful report. Consequently, the
altruistic advisor is inclined to lie in order to protect the individual from his own misinterpretation.
Clearly, as the individual anticipates that the altruistic advisor lies, no informative communication
can take place. This implies that the individual may prefer to hear the opinion of a disinterested
advisor, whom he can trust to tell him the truth, over hearing the opinion of an altruistic advisor.
CHAPTER 3. PATERNALISM, LIBERTARIANISM, AND THE NATURE OF
DISAGREEMENT 182
Corollary 2. The threshold ϕ(piA, piI , c) increases with c.
A higher cost of lying c makes truthful reporting more attractive for the advisor. When a FRE
can be sustained for a larger range of altruism levels, the upper boundary for the levels of altruism
supporting truth-telling, ϕ(piA, piI , c), increases.
3.11.3 Analysis: the altruistic authority
In this section we study interaction between the individual and the altruistic authority. The stages
of the game are summarized in Figure 3.8 below. We analyze when the authority coerces the
individual, and how this choice depends on the advisor’s regard for the individual. Because this
crucially depends on the nature of disagreement between the individual and his advisor, we consider
each case in turn in order to isolate the mechanisms.
Figure 3.8: Stages of the setting with altruistic authority.
3.11.3.1 Conflicting preferences
The authority’s expected payoff from coercion. Upon receiving the signal s, the authority
forms her posterior about the state, p(s) = Pr(θ = 1|s). Then, if the authority imposes an action on





Her expected utility from coercion is given by
E(UA(aA(s), θ)|s) = −q − (1 + ϕ)p(s)(1− p(s))− ϕ
1 + ϕ
b2.
For a formal derivation of this expression, see the proof of Proposition 14.
The authority who truthfully advises. When does the altruistic authority act as a truth-
telling advisor in equilibrium? First, revealing the true signal must be incentive compatible, given
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that the individual believes the message. From Proposition 12 in Section 3.11.2.1, we know that
this occurs if and only if the level of altruism is sufficiently high; ϕ ≥ ϕ(c = 0, b). Second, when
the advisor has the authority to force the individual’s action, she must prefer communication
over coercion. More precisely, for each signal s, the authority must prefer to communicate with
the individual—and let him choose his preferred action conditional on the message m, aI(m) =
pI(m) + b, where pI(m) = Pr(θ = 1|m)—over incurring the cost q to impose her own preferred
action, aA(s). This condition, E(UA(aI(m), θ)|s) ≥ E(UA(aA(s), θ)|s), can be expressed as
q(1 + ϕ) ≥ [(1 + ϕ)(pI(m)− p(s)) + b]2 . (Communicationpr)
Under truth-telling, m = s and pI(m) = p(s), implying that condition (Communicationpr) simplifies
to q(1+ϕ) ≥ b2. Combining the two requirements yields that a FRE exists if and only if the authority
cares sufficiently about the individual.
Proposition 14. For any cost of coercion q > 0 and preference bias b, there exists a threshold
ϕTT (q, b), s.t. a FRE exists if and only if ϕ ≥ ϕTT (q, b).
Proof. See Appendix.
The more the advisor cares about the individual, the more she values that the individual gets to
implement the action that he prefers. Hence, as ϕ increases, the authority’s preferred action, aA(s),
approaches the individual’s preferred action, aI(s). This makes the benefit of coercion—the ability
to implement aA(s) instead of the individual’s choice, aI(s)—decreasing in the level of altruism, ϕ.
Consequently, for high levels of altruism, the benefit of coercion does not outweigh the (fixed) cost
of coercion, q. Instead, the authority chooses to communicate truthfully with the individual, which
ascertains that he makes as informed an action choice as possible. We refer to this behavior on the
part of the individual as libertarian: after transferring all of her information to the individual, she
gives the individual the liberty to choose the action that he wants.
The region of (q, ϕ) described in Proposition 14 is schematically illustrated in Figure 3.9. The
threshold ϕTT (q, b) has intuitive properties. First, it decreases in q, because a higher cost of coercion
makes communication more attractive relative to coercion. Second, the threshold decreases with
the bias b, because a greater level of altruism is required to mitigate the preference divergence, the
higher is b.
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Figure 3.9: Equilibrium outcomes under conflicting preferences.
The authority who coerces. We now address the opposite question: under what circumstances
does the authority exercise her power to choose which action to implement? We consider all (pure
and mixed strategy) equilibria, and examine how the authority’s coercion decision depends on her
care for the individual. Because the individual, if he gets to implement an action, always takes the
action which is equal to his (posterior) belief about the state of the world, he never plays a mixed
strategy. There exist multiple equilibria in which the authority plays a mixed strategy, however:
she may mix between coercion and communication, after one or both signals; or, conditional on
communicating, she may mix between sending different messages. Given the individual’s (pure)
strategy—to take the action aI(m) = Pr(θ = 1|m) + b = pI(m) + b upon receipt of the message
m—the authority, after getting the signal s, prefers to coerce over sending the message m if and
only if
q(1 + ϕ) < [(1 + ϕ)(pI(m)− p(s)) + b]2 . (Coercionpr)
Under truthful reporting (m = s for s ∈ {0, 1}), we know from Proposition 14 that this condition
is violated, for both s = 1 and s = 0, for large levels of altruism. Conversely, for low levels of
altruism, when (Coercionpr) is satisfied for both signals, the authority coerces regardless of the
signal.
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This intuition carries on beyond pure strategies, to the general case: as made precise in the
below Lemma, coercion is more viable, the lower is the level of altruism. Hence, coercion is the
most achievable when the authority does not care about the individual, ϕ = 0. We denote by qC(b)
the cost of coercion below which the non-altruistic authority (ϕ = 0) coerces with strictly positive
probability for at least one signal s, and by qCC(b) the cost below which coercion regardless of the
signal is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 18. For every b and q < qC(b) there exists a threshold ϕC(q, b) > 0, s.t. for any ϕ <
ϕC(q, b) every equilibrium outcome involves the authority imposing her preferred action with non-
zero probability. Moreover, for every b and q < qCC(b) there exists a threshold ϕCC(q, b) > 0, s.t.
for any ϕ < ϕCC(q, b) there is a unique equilibrium, in which the authority coerces the individual
for each signal s ∈ {0, 1}.
See Figure 3.9 for an approximate representation of these sets of (q, ϕ). Clearly, a greater cost q
as well as lower preference bias b make coercion less attractive compared to communication, which
implies that both thresholds, ϕC(q, b) and ϕCC(q, b), decrease with q and increase with b.
Together, Proposition 14 and Lemma 18 show that, under preference disagreement, a tyrannical
authority (with ϕ = 0) may coerce the individual. A sufficiently benevolent authority, however,
can communicate truthfully. In essence, the benevolent authority behaves in a libertarian fashion:
she truthfully passes on her private information to the individual, thereby equipping him with the
means to make as informed a choice as possible; then, she lets him choose his course of action.
3.11.3.2 Conflicting opinions
The authority’s expected payoff from coercion. When the advisor gets the signal s, she
forms her posterior belief pA(s) = P (θ = 1|s). If the action a is implemented, her expected utility
is given by
EA (UA(a, θ)|s) = −pA(s)
[
(a− 1)2 + ϕ(a− 1)2]− (1− pA(s)) [a2 + ϕa2]− qI{coercion}. (EUA)
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If the advisor executes her right to force the action choice, she implements her preferred action,
a = aA(s) = pA(s). Then, her expected utility simplifies to
EA (UA(aA(s), θ)|s) = −pA(s)(1− pA(s))(1 + ϕ)− q. (EUA(Coercion))
Intuitively, she incurs the cost of coercion, q; however, she benefits from picking exactly the action
that she believes to be the best, aA(s), rather than any other action a implemented by the agent.
The authority who truthfully advises. When can the altruistic authority refrain from coerc-
ing, and instead communicate truthfully with the individual? From Section 3.11.2.2, we know that
truthful communication can be sustained only if (TT′op) is satisfied; that is, only if (piA, piI) ∈ TT ′.
When the advisor has the authority to force the individual’s action, the existence of a FRE also
requires that the authority prefers truthful communication over coercion. More precisely, for each
signal s, the authority’s expected utility from truthful communication must exceed her utility from
coercion.
If the authority gets the signal s, her optimal action is aA(s) = pA(s) and the individual’s
optimal action (in a FRE) is aI(s) = pI(s) 6= aA(s). The authority communicates the signal
truthfully if and only if EA (UA(aI(s), θ)|s) ≥ EA (UA(aA(s), θ)|s). By (EUA) and (EUA(Coercion)),
when s = 1, this simplifies to
ϕ ≤ q
(aA(1)− aI(1))2 − 1, (TT1op,C)
(where the subscript “C” signifies coercion). An analogous calculation yields the incentive com-
patibility condition for truthful reporting of the signal s = 0, (TT0op,C). Clearly, truthful commu-
nication can most easily be sustained in the absence of friendship, ϕ = 0, in which case (TT1op,C)
and (TT0op,C) yield that a FRE exists if and only if the cost of coercion, q, exceeds the benefit
of coercion for both signals, i.e., if q ≥ qTT = max
{
(aA(0)− aI(0))2, (aA(1)− aI(1))2
}
. For all
strictly higher costs of coercion q, a FRE can be sustained if and only if the authority does not
care too much about the individual.
Lemma 19. For any coercion cost q ≥ qTT and for any (piA, piI) ∈ TT ′, there exists a threshold
ϕTT (q, piA, piI) such that a FRE exists if and only if ϕ ≤ ϕTT (q, piA, piI).
Intuitively, after observing signal s, the authority prefers truth-telling over coercion if and only
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if the cost of coercion, q, exceeds the benefit. The benefit from coercion is an improvement in action
choice: the authority implements aA(s), whereas the individual would implement aI(s) 6= aA(s).
Because the authority believes that this benefit also accrues to the individual, she values the benefit
less, the less she cares about the individual. When the level of altruism falls below some threshold,
she therefore prefers to pass on signal s truthfully. A FRE exists when the authority prefers
truthful communication over coercion after observing both signals; that is, when both (TT1op,C)
and (TT0op,C) are satisfied (Figure 3.10 depicts this region of (q, ϕ)).
The authority who coerces. An authority who cares more about the individual, however,
exercises her power to force the individual’s action choice. From the above discussion about truth-
telling equilibria when (piA, piI) ∈ TT ′, it follows immediately that partial coercion equilibria exist
for the intermediate levels of ϕ for which one of the two conditions, (TT0op,C) and (TT1op,C),
is violated. To see this, suppose w.l.o.g. that ϕ exceeds the threshold in (TT0op,C), but not the
threshold in (TT1op,C). Then, an equilibrium exists in which the authority coerces after getting the
signal s = 0, but refrains from coercion otherwise. Clearly, when the individual gets to implement
an action, he realizes that the authority observed the signal s = 1; consequently, he chooses
aI(1). If ϕ rises further, so that (TT1op,C) is violated as well, an equilibrium exists in which the
authority coerces after observing both signals. Intuitively, the partial coercion equilibrium breaks
down because the authority prefers the action aA(1) over aI(1) after observing s = 1, and the
threshold in (TT1op,C) defines the level of altruism above which the authority’s expected benefit
from improving the action choice from aI(1) to aA(1) exceeds the cost of coercion.
In general, moving beyond pure strategy equilibria and considering all (piA, piI), there exist
equilibria in which the authority mixes between (i) coercion and communication; and (ii) sending
different messages when communicating. The above intuition carries on to the general case as
well: as established formally in the following Proposition, for levels of altruism exceeding some
threshold, some coercion necessarily occurs in equilibrium; and for levels of altruism exceeding
some higher threshold, the authority always coerces (see Figure 3.10 for schematic illustration of
these parameter sets).
Proposition 15. For any coercion cost q and for any (piA, piI), there exist thresholds ϕC(q, piA, piI) ≤
ϕCC(q, piA, piI) such that, for ϕ > ϕC(q, piA, piI), every equilibrium involves the authority coercing
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Figure 3.10: Equilibrium outcomes under conflicting opinions.
the individual with strictly positive probability. For ϕ > ϕCC(q, piA, piI), there exists a unique equi-
librium, in which the authority coerces the individual with probability one, regardless of the signal
s she obtains.
Proof. See Appendix.
To show that coercion after both signals eventually is the unique equilibrium, we proceed in two
steps. First, we show that in every equilibrium such that the authority coerces with probability
one after getting one signal, and communicates with some probability p ∈ (0, 1] after getting the
other signal, the agent takes his preferred action conditional on the signal for which the authority
communicates. Because aA(s) 6= aI(s), the authority can improve upon the individual’s action
choice; consequently, for a high enough level of altruism, she prefers to coerce for both signals.
Second, we show that in every equilibrium where the authority communicates with strictly positive
probability for both signals, the actions that the agent is induced to take cannot be pA(s) after the
authority observes s for both signals. Thus, for a sufficiently high level of altruism, the authority
will find it worthwhile to improve the action choice(s).
Together, Lemma 19 and Proposition 15 show that, under opinion disagreement, a tyrannical
authority (with ϕ = 0) may communicate truthfully with the individual. A sufficiently benevolent
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authority, however, counteracts the will of this individual. Intuitively, the authority forces the
individual to give up his preferred action choice, even though it is costly for her, because she
believes that this, ultimately, is in the individual’s best interest. In essence, she employs coercion
to protect the individual from (what she believes to be) his own misguided view of the world. Thus,
the authority behaves in a paternalistic fashion: she restricts the individual’s freedom solely on the
grounds that it makes him better off.
3.11.4 Granting authority
In Section 3.11.3, we considered an authority who can, at some cost q > 0, coerce the individual.
In this section, we endogenize the coercion cost. In particular, we add a stage zero to the game
analyzed in Section 3.11.3, in which the individual chooses some cost of coercion q ∈ [0,∞]. If,
given the chosen cost of coercion, multiple equilibria exist, we assume that the individual’s preferred
equilibrium is induced.
Intuitively, we can think of the individual as deciding how readily coercion should be available to
the authority. Put differently, the individual chooses how much authority to concede. If he chooses
q =∞ (or a sufficiently large finite q), coercion is de facto made unavailable; hence, we say that the
individual grants no authority. If he chooses q = 0 (or a sufficiently small q > 0), the authority is
given the ability to coerce at almost no cost. In this case, (in the unique equilibrium) the authority
chooses to coerce—regardless of the nature of disagreement—for both signals: coercion enables her
to implement exactly her preferred choice of action, whereas the individual would choose a different
action after at least one signal realization. Hence, we refer to this case as the individual granting
full authority. If the individual chooses some intermediate cost of coercion that triggers partial
coercion in equilibrium, we say that he grants intermediate authority.
[Dessein, 2002] analyzes the problem of an uninformed party (in our setting, the individual) who
chooses between the two extreme options—granting no authority and granting full authority—in
a setting where the parties’ have different preferences. When the uninformed party grants the
informed party full authority, [Dessein, 2002] refers to it as delegation.45 We generalize the analysis
45In [Dessein, 2002], the uninformed party first chooses whether or not to delegate. Then, the informed party
observes the signal, after which she always picks the action; hence, after observing the signal, she does not face any
choice between coercion and communication. In our context, if the individual sets q = 0 (or sufficiently small q > 0),
then the authority always chooses to coerce. Hence, if the individual sets q = 0, it does not matter whether the
informed party has the right to choose whether to coerce or not. Thus, if the individual sets q = 0, he delegates the
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in [Dessein, 2002] in the sense that we consider the full range of possible costs of coercion q ∈ [0,∞];
moreover, we consider both types of disagreement. 46
Proposition 16. Consider either type of disagreement between the individual and the authority.
If a FRE exits when q = ∞, then the individual grants no authority. If no FRE exists when
q =∞, then the individual chooses to grant intermediate authority if the divergence in preferences
or opinions is limited, and to grant no authority under severe disagreement; the individual never
finds it strictly optimal to grant full authority.
When a FRE exists if the individual makes coercion infinitely costly, the individual optimally
concedes no authority. Intuitively, he has no incentive to give up his decision-making powers when
his most preferred alternative is available: he gets access to the authority’s information, and he then
implements his desired action. When no fully revealing equilibrium exists, however, the individual
does not make coercion infinitely costly.
The decision to grant some authority. Why does the individual grant some authority? That
is, why does he refrain from choosing q = ∞? When informative communication cannot be sus-
tained, the individual faces a trade-off between loss of information (if he keeps the decision-making
powers) and loss of control (if he concedes them). This logic is demonstrated by [Dessein, 2002],
who shows that the individual may prefer to grant full authority over granting no authority. Propo-
sition 16 shows that this trade-off between loss of control and loss of information carries on to the
case of disagreement in priors: indeed, when no FRE exists and the divergence in opinion is limited,
the individual does not make coercion infinitely costly.
The decision not to grant full authority. What keeps the individual from granting full
authority? That is, why does he refrain from choosing q = 0? When the individual can choose
any cost of coercion q ∈ [0,∞], he chooses an intermediate cost, thereby granting partial authority.
The mechanism that drives this result is novel, as it arises only when we allow the individual to
choose intermediate costs of coercion.
decision in the precise sense of [Dessein, 2002].
46Dessein assumes that, if multiple equilibria exist, then the equilibrium preferred by the two players is chosen.
We assume that, if multiple equilibria exist, the equilibrium preferred by the individual is chosen; this differs from
the assumption of Dessein whenever, in our setting, multiple equilibria exist and the two players’ preferred equilibria
do not coincide.
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For intermediate costs of coercion, partial coercion equilibria exist. In a partial coercion equilib-
rium, the authority coerces after getting one signal, while communicating with positive probability
after getting the other signal. Without loss of generality, suppose that she coerces after getting
the signal s = 0. Clearly, when the individual gets to implement an action, this perfectly reveals
that the authority observed the signal s = 1; consequently, he chooses his preferred action aI(1).
From the individual’s perspective, this equilibrium is strictly preferred to the equilibrium in which
the authority coerces with certainty after getting both signals: then, the authority implements
aA(1) 6= aI(1) after getting the signal s = 1. Yet, if the individual grants full authority, the unique
equilibrium is the equilibrium in which the authority coerces after both signals. Consequently,
the individual always prefers to set the coercion cost high enough to induce some partial coercion
equilibrium.47
Self-paternalism. Under conflicting opinions, the result that the individual may voluntarily
concede some authority can be interpreted as an instance of self-paternalism (reference): The
individual is aware of the fact that, if he grants a benevolent leader authority, the leader engages
in coercion (for the signal s = 0). On the contrary, if the individual does not grant the benevolent
leader authority, no such coercion will take place. Ex ante, he may prefer to grant partial authority
over retaining all decision-powers. Ex post, however, he may regret having granted this authority.
More precisely, if the authority obtains the signal s = 0, she implements her preferred action aA(0),
which may be strictly worse for the individual than the action that she would have taken, for
example, in a babbling equilibrium, a = piI .
Such self-paternalism is, in fact, consistent with the harm principle. To see this, recall that
the harm principle holds that individual freedom should take priority over benevolent legislative
limits on our liberty. Thus, an individual that, ex ante, asks, of free will, to be coerced for his own
good in the future, de facto paternalizes himself. Because he explicitly consented to the regimen in
which others paternalize him, such self-paternalism is consistent with the harm principle.
47We conjecture that the result that the uninformed party would choose an intermediate cost of coercion would
arise in [Dessein, 2002] as well if the uninformed party were allowed to choose an intermediate cost of coercion. As
[Dessein, 2002] considers a more general state space, partial coercion would not perfectly reveal which signal the
informed party observed; however, it would be partially informative.
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Moderate regulatory powers. Most governments have some powers to enact regulation. At the
same time, governments are typically not empowered with unconstrained powers to coerce. (In fact,
if a government has such extensive powers, our framework suggests that they have been assumed;
not granted!) Such moderate regulatory powers is precisely what our framework suggests that a
populace would consent to yielding to their (benevolent) government. Ex ante, the populace may
find it optimal to write a constitution that does not prohibit its leaders from coercion; nevertheless,
to ensure that coercion does not occur more often than necessary, coercion entails some cost. For
example, the cost of coercion can be thought of as the trouble that the government has to go
through to enact a new law: debates, several rounds of acceptance, etc.
3.11.5 Extensions
3.11.5.1 General conflict
We now allow the parties to have both conflicting preferences and conflicting opinions. In this
setting, conditional on the signal s, the individual’s preferred action is aI(s) = pI(s) + b and the
advisor’s preferred action is aA(s) = pA(s) +
ϕ
1+ϕb.
The altruistic advisor. Stronger altruism improves communication under (pure) conflicting
preferences, but impedes it under (pure) conflicting priors. We now ask how (stronger) altruism
affects communication under two-dimensional conflict. To simplify the exposition, we assume a
zero lying cost, c = 0.
The advisor reports s = 1 truthfully if and only if inducing aI(1) yields a higher expected utility
than inducing aI(0). This can be written
(ϕ+ 1)[2pA(1)− (pI(1) + pI(0))] ≥ 2b. (TT1general)
Similarly, the incentive compatibility constraint for truthful reporting of s = 0 is
(ϕ+ 1)[−2pA(0) + (pI(1) + pI(0))] ≥ −2b. (TT0general)
Clearly, whenever the coefficients on (ϕ + 1) in (TT1general) and (TT0general) exceed zero, both
constraints are satisfied for sufficiently high ϕ. This condition coincides with (TT′op); thus, whenever
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the priors (piA, piI) are in the region TT
′ depicted in Figure 3.7, raising the level of altruism, ϕ,
eventually leads to the existence of a FRE. On the other hand, if at least one of the coefficients
on (ϕ + 1) in (TT1general) or (TT0general) is strictly below 0, then the corresponding constraint is
violated for a sufficiently large ϕ; hence, no FRE exists. This corresponds to (piA, piI) outside of
the region TT ′.
Proposition 17. For any bias b and for any priors piA, piI , we have that: (i) if (piA, piI) ∈ TT ′,
there exists a level of altruism above which a FRE exists; (ii) if (piA, piI) /∈ TT ′, there exists a level
of altruism above which a FRE cannot exist.
Remark. The set of parameter values for which a FRE can be achieved are independent of b. In
particular, they are equivalent to the set of parameter values for which a FRE exists when b = 0.
Thus, when the conflict is two-dimensional, the effect of altruism crucially depends on how
severe the opinions conflict is. If, on the one hand, the opinions conflict is moderate, so that
truthful communication possible when b = 0 (i.e., if (piA, piI) ∈ TT ′), then any negative effect
on communication arising from conflicting preferences can be offset by an increase in the level of
altruism. This reflects the intuition in the pure conflicting preferences case.
If, on the other hand, the opinions conflict is severe, so that a FRE does not exist when b = 0
(i.e., if (piA, piI) /∈ TT ′), then too high a level of altruism destroys communication. To see why this
is the case, consider some (piA, piI) /∈ TT ′ such that the advisor is considerably more convinced that
the state of the world is 1 than is the individual. Then, increasing altruism will eventually lead
to truth-telling when she gets the signal s = 1. However, increasing the level of altruism will also,
eventually, lead to the advisor withholding information from the individual when the advisor gets
the signal s = 0: when altruism is strong enough, the preference divergence is mitigated, so the
advisor starts to lie (just as she would do if there were no preference conflict).
Intuitively, when the conflict is two-dimensional, a high level of altruism mitigates the preference
divergence, which eventually brings us back to the case of (pure) conflicting opinions.
Non-monotonicity of truthful communication. Interestingly, if (piA, piI) /∈ TT ′, the level of
communication need not be a monotonic function of the level of altruism. In particular, a FRE may
exist only for some intermediate levels of altruism. For example, if piA = 0.9, piI = 0.6, b = 0.4,
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and γ = 0.6, then a FRE exists only for ϕ ∈ [0.194, 0.533]. Intuitively, for ϕ < 0.194, the preference
conflict destroys truthful communication. In particular, the advisor’s IC constraint for truthful
reporting of s = 1 is violated: she prefers to misreport, to induce a lower action. When the level of
altruism increases, the preferences of the advisor and the individual are gradually aligned, and at
ϕ = 0.194, advisor finds it optimal to report s = 1 truthfully (as well as s = 0). Once the preference
conflict is mitigated, however, raising the level of altruism further has the same effect as in the pure
conflicting opinions setting: for high enough level of altruism (in this case, for ϕ > 0.533), the
advisor cares so much about the individual that she withholds information to protect him. In
this particular case, the advisor believes that the individual underestimates the probability that
θ = 1. Consequently, she prefers to misreport the signal s = 0, in order to alleviate the individual’s
disutility from an (in the advisor’s view) incorrect action choice.
The altruistic authority. When the advisor is endowed with the ability to coerce, the same
results obtain. In particular, whether increasing altruism eventually leads to coercion solely depends
on the difference in priors: (i) for (piA, piI) ∈ TT ′, there exists a level of altruism above which a FRE
exists; (ii) if (piA, piI) /∈ TT ′, there exists a level of altruism above which the authority necessarily
coerces after both signals.
3.11.5.2 Mutual altruism
A natural extension of the model is to consider a setting in which the individual holds the same
regard for the advisor/authority as she does for him. Then, his utility function is given by UI(a|θ) =
−(a− θ − b(θ))2 − ϕ(a− θ)2. In what follows we show that our main results hold in this setting.
Conflicting preferences. First, we consider communication between the individual and the
advisor. Conditional on the signal s, the individual and the advisor hold the same posterior beliefs
p(s) = Pr(θ = 1|s). Because both players take each others’ preferences into account, their optimal
actions are weighted sums of the preferred actions of a non-altruistic advisor, p(s), and a non-
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Naturally, as ϕ increases, the players’ preferred actions converge.
To find conditions for truthful reporting, we assume that the individual believes that the
advisor reports truthfully. Then the advisor reports the signal s = 1 truthfully if and only if
E[UA(aI(1), θ)|s = 1] ≥ E[UA(aI(0), θ)|s = 1], which can be written
ϕ(p(1)− p(0) + 2b) ≥ −(p(1)− p(0)) + 2b− c
p(1)− p(0) . (TT1pr,mutual)
Analogously, the advisor reports s = 0 truthfully if and only if
ϕ(p(1)− p(0)− 2b) ≥ −(p(1)− p(0))− 2b− c
p(1)− p(0) . (TT0pr,mutual)
Truth-telling conditions (TT1pr,mutual) and (TT0pr,mutual) imply that a higher level of altruism
improves communication. More precisely, there exists a threshold ϕ(c, b) ∈ [0, 1), s.t a FRE exists
if and only if ϕ ≥ ϕ(c, b).
Next, we consider the individual’s interaction with the authority. The result that a FRE can be
sustained for high enough levels of altruism remains in this setting, because for a sufficiently large
ϕ, (i) truth-telling is incentive compatible, and (ii) the preferred actions of the individual and the
advisor converge, which reduces the benefit from coercion. Clearly, the results regarding coercion
for low levels of altruism remain valid as well.
Conflicting opinions. Because the utility function of the advisor/authority and the preferred
action of the individual given the signal s, aI(s) = pI(s), are the same as in the previously considered
setting with a non-altruistic individual, the analysis—and hence all of the results—is identical in
this alternative case.
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3.11.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 14. We prove a more general version of Proposition 14 for state dependent
preferences: For any coercion cost q > 0 and any preference biases b0 = b(0), b1 = b(1), there exists
a threshold ϕTT (q, b0, b1), s.t. a FRE exists if and only if ϕ ≥ ϕTT (q, b0, b1).








(p(s) + E(b(θ)|s)) = p(s) + ϕE(b(θ)|s)
1 + ϕ
.
To simplify the notational exposition, denote p = p(s), a = aA(s), b¯ = E(b(θ)|s) and b2 = E(b(θ)2|s)
. Then the expected utility of the authority is
E(UA(a, θ)|s) = −q − p
[
(a− 1)2 + ϕ(a− 1− b1)2
]− (1− p) [a2 + ϕ(a− b0)2]
= −q − p [(1 + ϕ)(a− 1)2 − 2ϕ(a− 1)b1 + ϕb21]− (1− p) [(1 + ϕ)a2 − 2aϕb0 + ϕb20]
= −q − (1 + ϕ) [(a− p)2 + p(1− p)]+ 2ϕ[ab¯− pb1]− ϕb2
= −q − (1 + ϕ)p(1− p) + ϕ
2b¯2
(1 + ϕ)
− 2ϕp(1− p)(b1 − b0)− ϕb2.
Assume that the individual’s beliefs are such that the individual takes action a1 when he receives
m = 1 and a0 when m = 0. The authority who obtained the signal s prefers communicating over
coercing and imposing her preferred action iff
max
a˜∈{a0,a1}
E(UA(a˜, θ)|s) ≥ E(UA(aA(s), θ)|s).
Suppose that the maximum of the left-hand side is achieved at a˜ that generates the expected utility
of
E(UA(a˜, θ)|s) = −(1 + ϕ)
[
(a˜− p)2 + p(1− p)]+ 2ϕ[a˜b¯− pb1]− ϕb2.
State independent biases. When b0 = b1, the expected utility of the authority after imposing
her preferred action simplifies to
E(UA(aA(s), θ)|s) = −q − (1 + ϕ)p(1− p)− ϕ
(1 + ϕ)
b2.
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The authority’s expected payoff from inducing action a˜ = p˜+b, where p˜ is the individual’s posterior,
can be expressed as
E (UA(a˜, θ)|s) = −(1 + ϕ)
[
(p˜− p)2 + 2b(p˜− p) + b2 + p(1− p)]+ 2ϕ[b2 + b(p˜− p)]− ϕb2
= −(1 + ϕ)(p˜− p)2 − (1 + ϕ)p(1− p)− 2b(p˜− p)− b2.
Communication and inducing action a˜ generates greater expected payoff to the authority than
coercion if
−(1 + ϕ)(p˜− p)2 − 2b(p˜− p)− b2 ≥ −q − ϕ
(1 + ϕ)
b2,
which can be simplified to
q(1 + ϕ) ≥ [(1 + ϕ)(a˜− p) + b]2 .
In particular case of truthful advising this boils down to
q(1 + ϕ) ≥ b2.
Hence, the threshold for the level of altruism is ϕTT (q, b) = max{−1 + b2q , −1 + 2|b|p(1)−p(0)}, where
ϕ(c = 0, b) = −1 + 2|b|p(1)−p(0) = is the threshold for truthful reporting in case of advising.
State dependent biases. Under truthful communication the individual chooses the action
aI(s) = p(s) + b¯, i.e., a˜ = p+ b¯. This implies
E(UA(a˜, θ)|s) = −(1 + ϕ)
[
b¯2 + p(1− p)]+ 2ϕ[b¯2 − p(1− p)(b1 − b0)]− ϕb2.
The authority prefers truthful reporting of the signal s to coercion whenever
−(1 + ϕ) [b¯2 + p(1− p)]+ 2ϕ[b¯2 − p(1− p)(b1 − b0)]− ϕb2
≥ −q − (1 + ϕ)p(1− p) + ϕ
2b¯2
(1 + ϕ)
− 2ϕp(1− p)(b1 − b0)− ϕb2,
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that simplifies to




q(1 + ϕ) ≥ b¯2.
As a result, truthful communication generates a greater expected payoff for the authority if q(1 +
ϕ) ≥ [E(b(θ)|s)]2 , for every s ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, the threshold for the level of altruism is




[E(b(θ)|s)]2 , ϕ(c = 0, b(0), b(1))},
where ϕ(c = 0, b(0), b(1)) is the threshold for truthful reporting in case of advising. QED.
Proof of Lemma 18. As regards the first part of the Lemma, we show that sufficiently low cost
q and altruism ϕ preclude the existence of communication equilibria. We study two different types
of communication equilibria: (i) only one action aˆ is induced, and (ii) two different actions aˆ0 < aˆ1
are induced.
In case (i), the authority induces the same action independently of the underlying signal, i.e.,
no informative communication takes place and the induced posterior belief necessarily coincides
with the prior, meaning that aˆ = pi + b. Such a communication equilibrium fails to exist when,
after some signal s, the authority would rather exercise her power to choose her preferred action,
i.e., when
q(1 + ϕ) < [(1 + ϕ)(pi − p(s)) + b]2 .
Assume that the authority does not incorporate the individual’s payoff into her utility: ϕ = 0.
Then, for a sufficiently low cost q < maxs[pi− p(s) + b]2, the authority coerces the individual for at
least one signal s. Clearly, for any such q and for a sufficiently low level of altruism, the authority
chooses to coerce as well.
Now consider case (ii), in which the induced actions are different, aˆ0 < aˆ1. The authority cannot
be indifferent between the actions aˆ0 and aˆ1 after both signal realizations. Thus, for these actions
to be induced in equilibrium, it must be the case that the authority mixes between messages for no
more than one signal. It implies that aˆs = p(s) + b for at least one signal s. Hence, a non-altruistic
authority who obtained s will choose to impose her preferred action whenever q < b2. Clearly, she
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will still do so for sufficiently low levels of altruism.
Together, cases (i) and (ii) imply that for a sufficiently low coercion cost, q < qC(b), and
altruism level, ϕ < ϕC(q, b), each equilibrium involves coercion with a non-zero probability.
As regards the second part of the Proposition, we argue that for sufficiently low q and ϕ no com-
munication is sustainable in equilibrium. Below we consider two possibilities of how communication
can arise.
First, assume that the authority communicates with positive probability for both signal real-
izations s = 0, 1. If only one action aˆ = pˆ+ b, where pˆ ∈ [p(0), p(1)], is induced in equilibrium, then
a non-altruistic authority would strictly prefer to coerce for at least one signal when
q < q(pˆ, b) = max
s∈{0,1}
[pˆ− p(s) + b]2. (Coercionpr,1 action)
Clearly, q(pˆ, b) > 0 for every pˆ. Because q(pˆ, b) is a continuous function of pˆ, there exists 0 <
q¯(b) = minpˆ∈[p(0),p(1)] q(pˆ, p). The inequality (Coercionpr,1 action) is strict for any q < q¯(b) and
pˆ ∈ [p(0), p(1)]; hence, the authority still prefers to coerce whenever the level of altruism is below
the threshold ϕ(q, pˆ, b) > 0.48 Because ϕ(q, pˆ, b) is continuous in pˆ ∈ [p(0), p(1)], there exists
0 < ϕ(q, b) = min
pˆ∈[p(0),p(1)]
ϕ(q, pˆ, b).
As a result, for q < q¯(b) and ϕ < ϕ(q, b), there exists no equilibrium with non-zero communication
after both signals and only one induced action. Next, if two different actions aˆ0 < aˆ1 are induced
in equilibrium, then the authority strictly prefers inducing one action over the other for at least
one signal, meaning that aˆs = p(s) + b for some s ∈ {0, 1}. Clearly, such an equilibrium cannot
exist for q lower than b2 and sufficiently low ϕ.
Second, suppose that the authority communicates with non-zero probability for one signal and
coerces with certainty for the other signal. For example, assume that the authority sometimes
communicates after s = 1 and always coerces after s = 0. In this case the mere fact that he was
not coerced indicates to the individual that the signal is s = 1. As a result, the induced action
aˆ necessarily equals p(1) + b. Such an equilibrium fails to exist when the authority is better off
48Assuming that the maximum in (Coercionpr,1 action) is achieved at sˆ, the threshold ϕ(q, pˆ, b) > 0 is a closest to 0
root of q(1 + ϕ) = [(1 + ϕ)(pˆ− p(sˆ)) + b]2.
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by imposing the action herself than by inducing aˆ = p(1) + b, i.e., q(1 + ϕ) < b2. The case when
the authority sometimes communicates the low signal s = 0 and always coerces when s = 1 is
analogous. It follows that for every q < b2, communicating after only one signal cannot be an
equilibrium if ϕ is sufficiently low.
Combining the results of the two cases, when the coercion cost q and altruism level ϕ are below
the respective bounds qCC(b0, b1) and ϕCC(q, b0, b1), the unique equilibrium is the one where the
authority always coerces the individual. QED.
Proof of Proposition 15. To prove the first part of the Proposition, we argue that all equilibria
with communication after both signal realizations break down for a sufficiently high level of altruism
ϕ. To show this, we distinguish between (i) communication equilibria where only one action aˆ is
induced, and (ii) communication equilibria where two different actions aˆ0 < aˆ1 are induced.
In case (i), the communicating authority induces the same action for each signal, which nec-
essarily implies uninformative communication, and hence, the individual chooses actions equal to
his prior belief, aˆ = piI . Because the authority’s ideal action choice depends on the signal she ob-
serves, aA(0) 6= aA(1), the individual’s implemented action piI cannot correspond to the authority’s
desired action for both signal realizations. Hence, coercion enables the authority to improve the
action choice after observing at least one signal s. Comparing the expected payoffs, the authority
prefers to coerce after observing signal s if ϕ > q
(aA(s)−piI)2 − 1. Consequently, for a large enough
degree of altruism the authority coerces the individual after at least one signal realization, so such
a communication equilibrium breaks down.
In case (ii), the communicating authority induces the individual to take different actions aˆ0 <
aˆ1. Clearly, rational behavior on the part of the individual ensures that aˆ0, aˆ1 ∈ [pI(0), pI(1)].
Because the authority cannot be indifferent between these actions after both signal realizations
s = 0 and s = 1, it must be the case that the authority mixes between the messages for at most
one signal. Thus, aˆs = pI(s) for at least one s ∈ {0, 1}. Because the authority can improve on
this action choice, she prefers coercion over communication when her concern for the individual is
sufficiently strong, ϕ > q
(pI(s)−pA(s))2 − 1.
Combining the results of the two cases, we obtain that for a sufficiently high level of altruism,
ϕ > ϕC(q, piA, piI) (where the subscript C denotes coercion), the authority cannot communicate
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with probability one in equilibrium.
Regarding the second part of the Proposition, to show that for a sufficiently large ϕ no commu-
nication is sustainable in equilibrium, we consider two manners in which information transmission
can arise: (i) the authority communicates with positive probability after both signal realizations,
and (ii) the authority communicates with non-zero probability after one signal realization and
coerces with certainty after the other.
In case (i), we consider two possibilities: either one action aˆ is induced in equilibrium, or two
different actions aˆ0 < aˆ1 are induced in equilibrium. First, if only one action aˆ is induced, then the
authority would prefer to coerce for at least one signal when
ϕ > ϕ(q, piA, piI , aˆ) =
q
max{(aˆ− pA(1))2, (aˆ− pA(0))2} − 1.
Because ϕ(q, piA, piI , aˆ) is continuous in aˆ ∈ [pI(0), pI(1)], there exists a maximum
0 < ϕ(q, piA, piI) = max
aˆ∈[pI(0),pI(1)]
ϕ(q, piA, piI , aˆ).
As a result, for ϕ > ϕ(q, piA, piI), there exists no equilibrium with non-zero communication for both
signals and only one induced action aˆ. Second, if the induced actions are different, aˆ0 < aˆ1, then
the authority strictly prefers inducing one action over the other for at least one signal, meaning
that aˆs = pI(s) for some s ∈ {0, 1}. This implies that such a communication equilibrium cannot
exist for ϕ > q
(pA(s)−pI(s))2 − 1.
In case (ii), suppose, for example, that the authority coerces for sure after getting the signal
s = 0. In this equilibrium, the authority’s decision to communicate perfectly reveals that she
observed the signal s = 1, so the individual implements aI(1) = pI(1). Clearly, for a high enough
level of altruism, ϕ > q
(pA(1)−pI(1))2 − 1, the authority would choose to improve upon this action;
consequently, such an equilibrium breaks down.
Combining the results of (i) and (ii), for sufficiently high ϕ > ϕCC(q, piA, piI) the unique equi-
librium is the one where the authority always coerces the individual. QED.
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Chapter 4
Strategic communication with guilt
aversion
Uliana Loginova
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Abstract
I study a model of strategic communication between an informed Sender and an uninformed Re-
ceiver, who needs to take an action affecting both players. The Sender has a preference bias and
is guilt averse to letting down the Receiver’s payoff expectations, meaning that the Sender incurs
some cost if the Receiver’s actual payoff is lower than he expected. I show that no separating equi-
librium exists; rather, in case of uniform state of the world and quadratic utilities, I demonstrate
that there exist partition equilibria, in which the Sender effectively reports only the interval where
the state lies. An increase in the guilt aversion intensity has similar equilibrium effects as a decrease
in the preference divergence: holding the number of elements in the partition fixed, greater guilt
aversion intensity results in more balanced intervals, and higher guilt aversion intensity allows for
more intervals in the equilibrium partition. Finally, I show that both, the Sender and the Receiver,
prefer an equilibrium with more elements in the partition, and if players coordinate on the number
of steps in the partition, the Receiver prefers a more guilt averse Sender.
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4.1 Introduction
In many cases, decision makers rely on the experts’ reports about the state of the world. However,
the expert’s preferences over the actions are often different from the preferences of the decision
maker, which gives rise to strategic communication of the expert’s private information. The general
framework of this situation is the following. First, the expert (Sender) obtains private information
about the state of the world (also called the type of the Sender). Second, the Sender communicates
his private information to the decision maker (Receiver). Finally, the Receiver takes an action.
The most popular and fundamental ways of modeling the communication process in this setting are
“verifiable information transmission” and “cheap talk”. Under verifiable information transmission,
introduced by [Grossman, 1981] and [Milgrom, 1981], the Sender may withhold some parts of the
information, but not lie. On the contrary, under cheap talk, pioneered by [Crawford and Sobel,
1982] and [Green and Stokey, 2007], the information is unverifiable and the Sender can misreport
at no cost.
Framing these two approaches in terms of lying, verifiable information transmission means that
the Sender faces infinite costs of lying, while cheap talk implies zero costs of lying for the Sender.
However, a more realistic approach would be to assume that the Sender faces some costs of lying.
Clearly, the nature of the lying costs can be quite different. For example, there may be time and
effort costs of creating a false message and misreporting the numbers. Another example is a possible
punishment or a monetary fine once the falsification is detected. Finally, there might be an intrinsic
aversion to lying, which itself has several reasons. One is that people might have preference to be
honest and not to lie per se. Another reason is that people might not like to feel shame, i.e., to
appear in a situation in which others learn about lying. Finally, people might dislike letting down
others’ expectations, which will be referred to as “guilt aversion”.1
Potential auditing penalties, technological costs of manipulating information, or psychological
costs stemming from the preference not to lie per se, refer to the case of “literal” costs, in which
the lying cost depends only on the state of the world and the message sent. Mathematically, the
cost function, c(t′, t), depends on the actual state t and the reported state t′. This type of costs is
considered in [Kartik, 2009]. He shows that introducing the literal cost of lying in the basic model
1[Tadelis, 2011] studies the difference between shame and guilt aversion.
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of [Crawford and Sobel, 1982] (hereafter CS) results in the incomplete separation with an inflated
language for sufficiently low types and some pooling on the highest messages. [Kartik et al., 2007]
also consider the case of the literal lying cost, but in a setting, in which the state space has an
unbounded support. They find that a fully-separating equilibrium exists even for an arbitrary small
intensity of the lying cost.
In this chapter, I study strategic communication setting of CS with the guilt aversion type of the
psychological cost on part of the Sender, k · c(x, e), where k is the cost intensity parameter. I follow
[Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007] in considering guilt aversion as a disutility from letting down the
Receiver. To be more precise, I say that the Sender lets down the Receiver, if the Receiver’s actual
payoff x after the message m appears to be lower than the Receiver’s expected payoff e (conditional
on the message m). It is straightforward to see, that the psychological cost of lying arising from
guilt aversion is not a specific case of the literal cost approach. Indeed, in the guilt aversion case,
the Sender suffers from the cost when the Receiver gets a lower payoff than the Receiver expected.
Hence, the level of the cost depends on how the Receiver interprets the message and forms his
payoff expectation, and not on the literal difference between the actual and the reported states.
Recall, that the outcome of the classic CS model is a partition equilibrium, in which the Sender
indicates only the interval where the state of the world lies. As already mentioned, introducing
literal cost of lying ([Kartik, 2009]) results in the ability of the lower type senders to separate
themselves through an inflated language. On the contrary, I show that introducing quilt aversion
cost of lying precludes the existence of equilibria with separating intervals of types. Instead, under
the assumptions of uniform state distribution and quadratic payoff functions, there exist partition
equilibria like in CS.
Assume that the Sender has a persistent positive preference bias, i.e., the Sender wants a higher
action than the Receiver, given any state of the world. I demonstrate that as in CS model, in
any partition equilibrium, the higher type senders transmit less information than the lower type
senders: the intervals in the equilibrium partition expand as the Sender’s type increases. Increasing
the level of guilt aversion (or decreasing the preference divergence), while holding the number of
partition elements fixed, does not change this pattern, but makes the intervals more balanced.
Further, an increase in the cost intensity (or a decrease in the preference bias) allows for a greater
number of intervals in the equilibrium partition. Hence, guilt aversion considerations can explain
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the over-communication result documented in [Cai and Wang, 2006]. Finally, I show that both, the
Sender and the Receiver, prefer an equilibrium with more intervals in the partition; and if players
coordinate on the number of steps in the partition, the Receiver prefers a more guilt averse (and
less biased) Sender.
The chapter is organized as follows. The model and the solution concept are presented in
Section 4.2. Section 4.3 provides the general result on the impossibility of separation, and under
the assumptions of uniform state distribution and quadratic payoff functions, characterizes partition
equilibria, and discusses welfare implications. Section 4.4 extends the characterization of partition
equilibria to more general cases. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. Appendix 4.6 contains all the
proofs.
4.1.1 Related literature
The fact that people care about each others’ payoffs and suffer from psychological costs of lying has
a lot of experimental evidence. For example, consider a setting of cheap talk, i.e., lying does not
impose any direct cost on the Sender. A purely self-interested Sender would deceive the Receiver
whenever lying generates a greater payoff for the Sender—even when the gain is marginal and the
loss to the Receiver is significant. However, in experiments people do not behave like that. [Gneezy,
2005] shows that in the cheap talk setting, people care nor only about the gains from lying, but also
about the extent to which lying harms the other party. In particular, if lying is associated with a
marginal gain in the Sender’s payoff and a significant loss to the Receiver, then the average person
prefers not to lie. However, [Hurkens and Kartik, 2009] show that results of [Gneezy, 2005] do not
contradict the simple hypothesis that some people are “extremely fair” and never lie, while others
lie as soon as it is (at least marginally) beneficial to them. [Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009] consider
a fairness hypothesis with the additional assumption that people “like to be perceived as fair”. In
addition, people appear to be sensitive to the size of the lie. [Lundquist et al., 2009] present an
experimental evidence that individuals have an aversion towards lying and this aversion increases
with the size of the lie (as well as with the strength of the promise).
While the existence of psychological costs of lying is quiet well established, the precise nature
of these costs is still under question. That is, whether people do not like lying per se (literal cost
of lying), or they do not like letting down the others’ expectations (guilt aversion), or whether
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they suffer from shame. [Tadelis, 2011] discusses the difference between “guilt” and “shame” and
designs an experiment to distinguish between them. However, in many settings including the one
considered in this chapter, shame and guilt are indistinguishable. Therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I
will utilize only the term of “guilt aversion”. Regarding guilt aversion and the preference to not
to lie per se, the experimental evidence is not sufficient: there are papers slightly favoring one
explanation or the other, but I am not aware of any results that clearly distinguish between the
two. For example, [Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006] and [Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000] present
an evidence that individuals’ behavior can be explained by guilt aversion. Somewhat related is
the case of promise-giving. In this setting, the analogue of the “preference to not to lie per se” is
the individual’s “preference to keep their word per se”; while “guilt aversion” corresponds to the
“disutility of letting down others’ payoff expectations” by not keeping their promise. [Vanberg,
2008] attempts to distinguish between the two reasons for promise keeping, and finds that the
experimental data are better explained by the “preference to keep their word per se”.
Also related to this chapter is the experimental literature studying the extent of communication
in CS setting. [Cai and Wang, 2006] present an over-communication result: messages are more
informative and receivers rely more on the senders’ messages relative to the most informative
equilibrium predicted by CS model. There are several reasons for this outcome including bounded
rationality and existence of “fair” individuals, who have preferences for truth-telling, while others
follow only material incentives ([Sa´nchez Page´s and Vorsatz, 2007]). This chapter gives another
possible explanation to the over-communication result—guilt aversion considerations.
4.2 Model
The model is a modification of CS cheap-talk model. As in CS, there are two players: a Sender (S)
and a Receiver (R). First, the Sender observes his private information about the state of the world
(also referred to as the type of the Sender), t ∈ [0, 1], which is drawn from a distribution F (t) with
density f(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Next, the Sender sends a message m ∈ M to the Receiver. The
set M is assumed to be sufficiently large; no other restrictions on the message interpretation are
imposed. Finally, the Receiver takes an action a ∈ R and the payoffs are realized.
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The payoff of the Receiver is uR (a, t) , where uR1 (a, t) = 0 for some a, u
R
11(a, t) < 0, u
R
12(a, t) > 0.
2
These assumptions ensure that for any state of the world t there exist a unique action aR(t) that






The utility of the Sender is uS(a, t, b)− k · c(x, e), where b represents the preference bias, c(x, e)
is a cost function, k ≥ 0 parameterizes its intensity, x = uR(a, t) is the realized payoff of R, and
e = Eβ(u
R(a, t)) is the expected payoff of R. Assumptions about uS(a, t, b) are the same as in the
case of the Receiver: uS1 (a, t, b) = 0 for some a, u
S
11(a, t, b) < 0, u
S
12(a, t, b) > 0. Thus, there is a
unique action aS(t, b), that maximizes uS(a, t, b) for any given state t, and this action is increasing
in t. I assume that there is a conflict of interests such that aS(t, b) > aR(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. That
is, ignoring the costs, the Sender prefers a higher action than the Receiver.3
Guilt aversion. The cost function, c(x, e), depends on the actual payoff, x = uR(a, t), and the
expected payoff of the Receiver who has belief β about the state, e = Eβ(u
R(a, t)). I make the
following assumptions about the cost function:
(i) For all x ≥ e: c (x, e) = 0.
(ii) For all e > x: c1 (x, e) < 0 < c11 (x, e) and c12 (x, e) < 0.
(iii) For all e: c1 (e, e) = c2 (e, e) = 0.
Such formulation of the cost function posits that given some payoff expectation for R, say e,
the Sender suffers a guilt disutility if and only if S induces an action that yields R a lower payoff
than e (condition (i)). Moreover, the disutility is increasing and convex in how much R is let down
(condition (ii)). The negative cross-partial derivative means that the marginal increase in the cost
from hurting the Receiver by a little bit is higher the more S already lets R down. Finally, condition
(iii) says that small changes in either R’s true payoff of expected payoff starting at a point where
his expectation is fulfilled has negligible effect on S’s guilt.
Solution concept. I study the model using the concept of pure strategies Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE). The Sender’s pure strategy is a function µ : [0, 1]→M , i.e., S of type t sends
2The subscripts denote the corresponding derivatives.
3Note that this setup coincides with CS model when the cost intensity k = 0.
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a message µ(t) to R. The Receiver’s posterior belief about the state after getting a message m is
described by a probability distribution function β(t|m), which will be referred to as β(m) when it
doesn’t cause any confusion. The Receiver’s pure strategy is a function α : M → R, i.e., R takes
the action α(m) after receiving the message m.
Definition. A triple (α, β, µ) is an equilibrium if and only if the following conditions are satisfied
(i) For any m ∈M , R chooses an action α(m) to maximize his expected utility:







(ii) Given the action strategy α(m) and the belief β(m), for any t ∈ [0, 1], S chooses a message
µ(t) to maximize his expected utility:
µ(t) ∈ arg max
m
[
uS(α(m), t, b)− kc (uR(α(m), t), e(m))] , (4.1)





(iii) Belief β(t|m) satisfies Bayes rule whenever possible.
Importantly, R’s payoff expectation given the message m, e(m), is computed using the equilib-
rium belief β(m) and R’s optimal action α(m). In general, e(m) is different for different messages.
Further, when S chooses amongst messages, he cares not only about his direct payoff from the
change in R’s action (captured by α(m) entering the first argument of uS in (4.1)), but he also
takes into account both the different expectation it causes for R (captured by e(m) entering the
second argument of c) and the different level of the actual payoff for R (captured by α(m) entering
indirectly the first argument of c).
4.3 Analysis
In this section, I first demonstrate that in a general setting no equilibrium features separation
of a non-zero interval of types. Instead, under the assumptions of uniform types distribution
and quadratic payoff and cost functions, I show that there exist partition equilibria as in CS.
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Finally, I study welfare implications of changing the number of intervals in the equilibrium partition,
decreasing preference divergence and increasing guilt aversion intensity.
4.3.1 No separation in equilibrium
As in CS framework, there always exists a completely uninformative (babbling) equilibrium. Re-
garding other equilibria, the following result asserts that independently of the cost intensity k there
can be no separating non-zero interval of types. This contrasts [Kartik, 2009] who got separating
intervals (in the bounded state space) and [Kartik et al., 2007] who got full separation (in the
unbounded state space) for any, even arbitrary small lying cost intensity.
Theorem 18. Independently of k > 0, there is no equilibrium, in which some non-zero interval of
types separate themselves.
Proof. See appendix 4.6.
The intuition behind this statement is the following: suppose there is a non-zero interval of
separating types. Then some interior type can deviate and report to be a slightly higher type,
which results in a first-order gain from inducing a higher action and a second-order loss from guilt
aversion of letting down R’s payoff expectation.4
4.3.2 Partition equilibria
From now on, I let the state of the world t be uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and assume quadratic
functional forms for the payoffs. Specifically, R’s payoff is a quadratic-loss utility function that
depends solely on the difference between the actual action a and the state t:
uR(a, t) = −(a− t)2.
Next, S’s utility is uS(a, t, b)− kc(ϕ(a− t), e), where
uS(a, t, b) = −(a− t− b)2, b > 0, and c(x, e) = (max{0, e− x})2.






> 0. For explanation, see the proof of
Theorem 18.
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In this case, the actions that maximize uR(a, t) and uS(a, t, b) are aR(t) = t and aS(t, b) = t +
b, respectively. Condition b > 0 insures that there is a persistent conflict between the players,
aS(t, b) = aR(t) + b for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Given the beliefs of the Receiver, β(m), and his action strategy under these beliefs, I can say
that sending some message m induces a pair (a, e), where a = a(m) and e = Eβ(m)(u
R(a, t)). Thus,
when communicating, the Sender chooses which pair (a, e) to induce, given β(m).
Definition. A PBE with a set of different pairs {(ai, ei)}Ni=1 is called a partition PBE with the
partition 0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tN = 1, if the types in (ti−1, ti) induce the pair (ai, ei), i = 1, ..., N .
In CS model (the guilt aversion intensity k is 0), any equilibrium is essentially equivalent to
some partition PBE, with a finite number of intervals (N) and induced actions a1 < a2 < ... < aN .
Because b > 0, the partition equilibrium features the property that the intervals expand for higher
types t; the precise formula for the interval lengths is: ∆i+1 = ∆i + 4b. Thus, less information is
revealed when the type of the Sender is higher, which implies lower expected payoff for the Receiver:
e1 > e2 > ... > eN .
An interesting question to ask is whether this pattern for actions and expectations can be
reversed, if the guilt aversion intensity k is large enough? The answer is: No, not in a partition
PBE. The following theorem demonstrates this point and provides characterization of partition
equilibria.
Theorem 19. There exists a positive integer N(b, k), such that for any N , 1 ≤ N ≤ N(b, k), there
exists exactly one partition PBE (α, β, µ), in which, effectively, N messages m ∈ {1, . . . , N}, are
used and N pairs (ai, ei), i = 1, . . . , N , are induced. The belief β(t|m) is is uniform on [ti−1, ti] if
m = i, the interval partition 0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tN = 1, is determined from
−(ai − ti − b)2 − k(max{0, ei + (ai − ti)2})2
= −(ai+1 − ti − b)2 − k(max{0, ei+1 + (ai+1 − ti)2})2, i = 1, ..., N − 1. (4.2)
The Sender’s message strategy is
µ(t) = i, if t ∈ (ti−1, ti), and µ(ti) ∈ {i, i+ 1}, (4.3)
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, i = 1, ..., N, (4.4)
and the Receiver’s expected payoffs are
ei = −(ti − ti−1)
2
12
, i = 1, ..., N. (4.5)
Moreover, ti+1 − ti = ∆i+1 > ∆i = ti − ti−1 for every i. Further, there is no partition equilibrium
with the number of intervals greater than N(b, k).
Proof. See appendix 4.6.
As is shown in the proof, the difference in the neighboring intervals when k > 0 is smaller com-
pared to the CS setting (k = 0): ∆i+1 < ∆i + 4b, which possibly explains the over-communication
result of [Cai and Wang, 2006]. The following Lemma asserts that an increase in the intensity
of guilt aversion has similar effects on the equilibrium partition as a decrease in the preference
divergence.
Lemma 20. If the cost intensity k increases (or bias b decreases) then
(i) Holding fixed the number of the intervals in the equilibrium partition, N , the intervals become
more even, i.e., (∆i+1 −∆i) decreases. If k →∞ (or b→ 0) then ∆i+1 → ∆i.
(ii) The maximal number of intervals in equilibrium partition, N(b, k), increases.
Proof. See appendix 4.6.
Illustrative example. To illustrate the effects of the cost intensity k and the preference bias b,
I consider 2-interval partition PBE, which exists if b < 1+k/94 . In this equilibrium, the types [0, t1]
induce one pair, (a1, e1), and the types (t1, 1] induce another pair, (a2, e2).




(which is greater than in the CS model, 14). The greater the guilt aversion intensity k is, the higher
b¯ is; that is, guilt aversion “makes up” for the preference divergence.
Second, Figure 4.1 illustrates that, given the bias b, the threshold type t1 increases in the guilt
aversion intensity k, making the two intervals more even. Finally, holding the cost intensity k
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Figure 4.1: Threshold t1 in 2-interval partition PBE as a function of k.
fixed, higher bias b results in lower value of t1, making the interval less even and the equilibrium
less balanced.
Welfare implications. Similar to CS, I show that both, the Sender and the Receiver, ex-ante
prefer greater information transmission, i.e., equilibrium partitions with more steps.
Theorem 20. Holding the preference bias b and the cost intensity k fixed, R and S ex-ante prefer
equilibrium partitions with more intervals.
Proof. See appendix 4.6.
Remark. It is worth noting, that the greater number of intervals in the equilibrium partition
increases S’s expected utility through two channels: first, by increasing the expectation of the
direct payoff, uS(a, t, b), and second, by decreasing the expected disutility from guilt aversion,
c(x, e).5
CS show that, holding the number of steps in the partition equilibrium fixed, R’s expected utility
increases when agents’ preferences become more similar. This happens, because as b decreases, the
5This point is demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 20.
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intervals in the equilibrium partition become more balanced. As Lemma 20 demonstrated, an
increase in k has similar effects as a decrease in b. Thus, it is natural to expect that R’s expected
utility rises not only when b decreases, but also when S’s cost intensity k increases. The following
theorem formalizes this point.
Theorem 21. Holding the number of intervals N in the partition equilibrium fixed, R would ex-ante
prefer an equilibrium partition associated with lower b and higher k.
Proof. See appendix 4.6.
4.4 Extensions
In this section, I maintain the assumption that the state of the world t is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1], and extend the characterization of partition PBE to a more general case of payoff and
cost functions. In particular, I assume that R’s payoff depends solely on the difference between
the actual action a and the state t in a symmetric way: uR(a, t) = ϕ(a− t), where ϕ(x) = ϕ(−x),
ϕ′′(x) < 0 ∀x ∈ R. These conditions imply that ϕ(x) achieves its maximum at 0 and ϕ′(0) = 0,
i.e., aR(t) = t. Next, S’s payoff is uS(a, t, b) − kc(ϕ(a − t), e), where I maintain the general
assumptions about uS(a, t, b) and continue to assume that the Sender’s preferred action aS(t, b) is
strictly greater than that of the Receiver, aR(t) = t.6 Regarding the cost function, I assume that
it depends only on the difference between the actual and expected utilities of the Receiver. That
is, c(ϕ(a− t), e) = ψ(ϕ(a− t)− e) ≥ 0, where ψ′′(x) > 0 and ψ′(x) < 0 ∀x < 0; ψ(x) = 0 ∀x > 0;
ψ(0) = 0 and ψ′(0) = 0.
As in quadratic case, I find that in any partition equilibrium higher types t induce greater
actions (a1 < ... < aN ) and lower expectations(e1 > ... > eN ), and correspond to greater partition
intervals (∆1 < ... < ∆N ). The following theorem provides characterization of partition equilibria.
7
Theorem 22. Any partition PBE with N intervals satisfies the following conditions. The belief
6Note that, while R’s payoff is assumed to depend only on the difference between the action and the state, S’s
payoff might also depend on the state.
7Here I don’t prove the existence of partition equilibria.
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β(t|m) is uniform on [ti−1, ti], if m = i, the interval partition {ti}, i = 1, . . . , N , solves
uS(ai, ti, b)− kψ(ϕ(ai − ti)− ei) = uS(ai+1, ti, b)− kψ(ϕ(ai+1 − ti)− ei+1), (4.6)
where t0 = 0 and tN = 1. The Sender’s message strategy is
µ(t) = i, if t ∈ (ti−1, ti), µ(ti) ∈ {i, i+ 1}, (4.7)




, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (4.8)












ds, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (4.9)
where ∆i = ti − ti−1 and ∆i < ∆i+1 for all i = 1, ..., N − 1.
Proof. See appendix 4.6.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study a model of strategic communication between an informed Sender and an
uninformed Receiver, who needs to take an action affecting both players. The Sender’s preferences
are upward biased relative to those of the Receiver, and the Sender is assumed to be guilt averse to
letting down the Receiver’s payoff expectations. I show that no separating or partially separating
equilibrium exists for general state distribution and payoff specifications.
Under the assumptions of uniform state distribution and quadratic utilities, I demonstrate that
there exist partition equilibria, in which the Sender effectively reports only the interval where the
state lies. In any equilibrium partition, the intervals expand as the Sender’s type gets higher.
Regarding comparative statics, I show that an increase in the guilt aversion intensity has a sim-
ilar effects to a decrease in the preference bias. Namely, holding the number of elements in the
equilibrium partition fixed, a higher level of guilt aversion leads to more balanced intervals, and
greater guilt aversion intensity allows for more elements in the equilibrium partition. Regarding the
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welfare implications: before the Sender observes the state of the world, both, the Sender and the
Receiver prefer equilibrium with more elements in the partition. In addition, if players coordinate
on the number of steps in the partition, the Receiver prefers a more guilt averse (and a less biased)
Sender.
For future analysis, it would be interesting to study other types of equilibria (apart from par-
tition), or prove that they do not exist. Further, an intuitive extension of the model would be to
incorporate some sort of disappointment aversion on part of the Receiver. Another modification
for potential study would be to consider less smooth guilt aversion costs, and check whether this
allows for separation in equilibrium.
4.6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 18. Suppose the opposite: there is an equilibrium, in which the types in
the interval (t1, t2) perfectly reveal themselves. That means that for any t ∈ (t1, t2) the posterior
β(µ(t)) is a degenerate point-mass distribution on the type t. Therefore, for any t ∈ (t1, t2) the
action is α(µ(t)) = aR(t).
Now consider some type t ∈ (t1, t2). In what follows I show that for sufficiently small ε > 0 this
type t sender would prefer to deviate and send the message µ(t + ε). Indeed, consider ε > 0 such
that t + ε < t2. Upon receiving µ(t + ε), R thinks that the state is t + ε for sure, thus, he picks
the action aR(t+ ε) and expects to receive the payoff of uR
(
aR (t+ ε) , t+ ε
)
. Hence, the expected
utility of the type t sender from deviating to µ(t+ ε) is
uS
(
aR (t+ ε) , t, b
)− kc (uR (aR (t+ ε) , t) , uR (aR (t+ ε) , t+ ε)) .
Differentiating with respect to ε and evaluating at ε = 0,
uS1
(





























aR (t) , t
)


























aR (t) , t, b
)
aR1 (t) > 0,
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where aR1 (t) =
daR




aR (t) , t
)
= 0 (by the definition
of aR), the second equality uses the assumption that c2 (e, e) = 0 for any e, and the last inequality
holds because aS (t, b) > aR (t) and aR1 (t) > 0.




= 0, as is the






> 0, then the derivative
might be negative and the type t sender would prefer to report truthfully. QED.
Proof of Theorem 19. Step 1: Equilibrium conditions. First, I show that the belief β(t|m)
and equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) form equilibrium conditions. If the types in the interval
[ti−1, ti] (and only they) send the same message m = i, then the posterior belief β(t|m) is uniform
on [ti−1, ti], and the optimal action for the Receiver is




















Thus, indeed, (4.4) gives the Receiver’s best response given the belief β(m) and the Sender’s
strategy.
Now I will show that, given the belief β(m) and R’s action strategy presented in (4.4), the best
response of S is described by (4.3). Note that upon sending the message i and inducing (ai, ei),
the types in [ai −
√−ei, ai +
√−ei] ⊂ (ti−1, ti) won’t suffer from guilt aversion, and the types in
(ti−1, ai−
√−ei)∪ (ai+
√−ei, ti) - will. In particular, the types ti−1 and ti always suffer from some
costs when inducing (ai, ei).








12 ), 0 ≤
ti−1 < ti < ti+1 ≤ 1, which are supposed to be induced by the neighboring intervals (in equilib-
rium), (ti−1, ti) and (ti, ti+1), respectively. Type ti is indifferent between the two pairs, (ai, ei) and
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(∆i+1 −∆i − 4b) (∆i+1 + ∆i) = k
36
(∆i −∆i+1)(∆i + ∆i+1)(∆2i + ∆2i+1),





(∆i −∆i+1)(∆2i + ∆2i+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
. (4.10)









(−(∆i+1 −∆i)2 − 2∆2i+1) < 0.
If ∆i+1 = 0, LHS = −∆i − 4b < 0, RHS = k9 ∆3i > 0. If ∆i+1 increases, LHS will eventually
become positive, and RHS will become negative. Thus, there always exists a unique solution for














(∆i+1 −∆i)2 + 2∆2i
)
> 0.
Thus, ∆(∆i, b, k) increases in ∆i.
Note that ∆i+1 can not be smaller than ∆i, because in that case LHS < 0 and RHS ≥ 0,
meaning that type ti would not be indifferent and would strictly prefer inducing the pair (ai+1, ei+1).
Thus, it must be that ∆i+1 > ∆i. In this case, RHS < 0, and for LHS to be negative it must
be that ∆i+1 < ∆i + 4b. I.e., the length of ∆i+1 is smaller than it would be in the standard CS
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framework (k = 0). It can be easily seen that ∆(∆i, b, k) decreases in k and increases in b > 0; and
∆i+1 → ∆i, as k →∞ (or b→ 0).
The condition (4.10) states that the type ti is indifferent between (ai, ei) and (ai+1, ei+1). Now
I will show that the type s 6= ti prefers (ai, ei) to (ai+1, ei+1) if and only if s < ti. The condition
that the pair (ai, ei) is better than (ai+1, ei+1) for the type s is




(max{0, ei + (ai − s)2})2 − (max{0, ei+1 + (ai+1 − s)2})2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS(s)
Because LHS(ti) = RHS(ti), it is sufficient to show that LHS(s) is strictly decreasing in s and
RHS(s) is strictly increasing in s.
LHS(s) can be rewritten as LHS(s) = (ai+1 + ai − 2s− 2b)(ai+1 − ai), hence, LHS is strictly
decreasing in s.
To show that RHS′(s) > 0, I separately consider cases 5 intervals to which [0,1] interval is split
by the points 0 < ai −
√−ei < ai +
√−ei < ai+1 −√−ei+1 < ai+1 +√−ei+1 < 1.
Case 1. s ∈ [ai −
√−ei, ai +
√−ei]. For these types, The cost from inducing the pair (ai, ei)
is 0, hence, RHS′(s) = 4(ei+1 + (ai+1 − s)2)(ai+1 − s) > 0 because ai+1 > ai +
√−ei ≥ s.
Case 2. s ∈ [ai+1 −√−ei+1, ai+1 +√−ei+1]. For these types, the cost from inducing the pair
(ai+1, ei+1) is 0, hence, RHS
′(s) = −4(ei + (ai − s)2)(ai − s) > 0 because ai < ai+1 −√−ei+1 ≤ s.
Case 3. s ∈ (ai +
√−ei, ai+1 −√−ei+1). For these types, the costs from inducing both pairs
are non-zero, hence, RHS′(s) = −4(ei + (ai − s)2)(ai − s) + 4(ei+1 + (ai+1 − s)2)(ai+1 − s) > 0
because ai < s < ai+1.
Case 4. s ∈ [0, ai −
√−ei). For these types, the costs from inducing both pairs are non-
zero, hence, RHS′(s) = −4(ei + (ai − s)2)(ai − s) + 4(ei+1 + (ai+1 − s)2)(ai+1 − s). Note that
ai+1− s > ai− s > 0. To prove that RHS′(s) > 0, it is sufficient to show that ei+1 + (ai+1− s)2 >
ei + (ai − s)2 > 0, i.e.,
(ai+1 − s)2 − (ai − s)2 > ei − ei+1.
The left-hand side can be expressed as (ai+1 − ai)(ai+1 + ai − 2s). Thus, it decreases in s and
(ai+1 − s)2 − (ai − s)2 > (ai+1 − s)2 − (ai − ai +
√−ei)2 = (ai+1 − s)2 + ei > −ei+1 + ei.
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Case 5. s ∈ [ai+1 + √−ei+1, 1). For these types, the costs from inducing both pairs are
non-zero, hence, RHS′(s) = −4(ei + (ai − s)2)(ai − s) + 4(ei+1 + (ai+1 − s)2)(ai+1 − s). Note that
ai−s < ai+1−s < 0. To prove that RHS′(s) > 0, it is sufficient to show that 0 < ei+1+(ai+1−s)2 <
ei + (ai − s)2, i.e.,
(ai+1 − s)2 − (ai − s)2 < ei − ei+1.
The left-hand side can be expressed as (ai+1 − ai)(ai+1 + ai − 2s). Thus, it decreases in s and
(ai+1 − s)2 − (ai − s)2 < (ai+1 − ai+1 +
√−ei+1)2 − (ai − s)2 = −ei+1 − (ai − s)2 < −ei+1 + ei.
This proves that the best response of S takes the form described in Theorem 19.
Step 2: Finiteness of N(b, k) and existence of partition equilibria. To complete the
proof, I will show that the maximum number of intervals in the partition PBE, N(b, k), is finite
and that for any N , 1 ≤ N ≤ N(b, k), there exists exactly one partition {ti} of [0, 1] in N intervals,
satisfying condition (4.10).
Because ∆i+1 = ∆(∆i, b, k) strictly increases with ∆i and the length of ∆i > 0, then ∆(∆i, b, k) ≥
∆(0, b, k) > 0. Hence, the number of intervals in the partition must not exceed (1/(∆(0, b, k)) + 1).
Next, following CS analysis, introduce a function
M(t, b, k) = max{i : there exists a partial partition 0 < t < t2 < . . . < ti ≤ 1 satisfying (4.10)}.
For any t ∈ [0, 1], M(t, b, k) < 1/(∆(0, b, k)) + 1. Thus M(t, b, k) is finite, uniformly bounded
and well-defined as a function of t. That means that there is N(b, k) = sup0≤t≤1M(t, b, k) <
1/(∆(0, b, k)) + 1 < ∞. Now I will argue that for every N , 1 ≤ N ≤ N(b, k) there exists exactly
one partition of [0, 1] into N intervals, satisfying (4.10). Let tM(t,b,k) be the partial partition with
M(t, b, k) points, such that t
M(t,b,k)
1 = t and the corresponding lengths satisfy (4.10). Solutions
to (4.10) vary continuously w.r.t. initial conditions, that is why if the last point in the partial
partition t
M(t,b,k)
M(t,b,k) is less than 1, then M(·, b, k) is continuous and locally constant at t. Because
equation (4.10) determines an increasing function ∆(∆i, b, k) of ∆i, M(t, b, k) is a non-increasing
function w.r.t. t and can change by at most 1 at discontinuity and M(1, b, k) = 1. Thus, M(t, b, k)
takes on all integer values from 1 to N(b, k). If M(t1, b, k) = N and M(t, b, k) is discontinuous at
CHAPTER 4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION WITH GUILT AVERSION 221
t = t1, then the partial partition t
Mt1,b,k is the full partition of [0, 1], i.e., t0 = 0, tN = 1, (4.10) is
satisfied for every i = 1, . . . , N − 1. Because ∆(∆i, b, k) is the unique solution of (4.10) and strictly
increases in ∆i, for every N , 1 ≤ N ≤ N(b, k), there exists exactly one partition {ti} of [0, 1] in N
intervals, satisfying condition (4.10). QED.
Proof of Lemma 20. From the equation (4.10) it can be easily seen that the function ∆i+1 =
∆(∆i, b, k) decreases in k and increases in b. Because ∆(∆i, b, k) increases in ∆i, greater k or
smaller b lead to more even intervals, when holding fixed the number of the intervals in the partition
equilibrium.
Consider b1 < b2. Because ∆(∆i, b, k) increases in b, it is immediate that M(t, b1, k) ≥
M(t, b2, k) for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, N(b1, k) = sup0≤t≤1M(t, b1, k) ≥ sup0≤t≤1M(t, b2, k) =
N(b2, k). Similarly, consider k1 < k2. Because ∆(∆i, b, k) decreases in k, it is immediate that
M(t, b, k1) ≤M(t, b, k2) for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, N(b, k1) ≤ N(b, k2). QED.
Proof of Theorem 20. Call the sequence {t0, . . . , tN} a forward (backward) solution to the
indifference condition (4.2) if the condition holds for all 1 ≤ i < N and t0 < t1 (t0 > t1). Because
the function ∆i+1 = ∆(∆i, b, k) (solution of (4.10)) increases in ∆i, the monotonicity conditions
(M) and (M ′) of CS hold here:
(M) Given b and k, if tˆ and t˜ are two forward solutions of (4.2) with tˆ0 = t˜0 and tˆ1 > t˜1, then
tˆi > t˜i for all i ≥ 2.
(M ′) Given b and k, if tˆ and t˜ are two backward solutions of (4.2) with tˆ0 = t˜0 and tˆ1 > t˜1, then
tˆi > t˜i for all i ≥ 2.
Welfare of the Receiver. First, I prove the welfare statement for R. The proof has the same
structure as the one in Section 5 of [Crawford and Sobel, 1982]. Consider two equilibrium partitions
t(N) = (t0(N), ..., tN (N)) and t(N + 1) = (t0(N + 1), ..., tN+1(N + 1)) with N and N + 1 intervals,
respectively, N < N(b, k). As in CS, I will argue that there exists a continuous deformation of t(N)
into t(N + 1), along which the expected utility of R increases.
Denote by tx = (tx0 , t
x
1 , . . . , t
x
N+1) a partition that satisfies the indifference condition (4.2) for
i = 2, . . . , N with tx0 = 0, t
x
N = x, and t
x
N+1 = 1. If x = tN−1(N), then t
x
1 = 0; if x = tN (N + 1),
then tx = t(N+1). Note that the condition (M ′) implies that tN−1(N) < tN (N+1). Moreover, the
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lengths of the intervals in the partition tx satisfy txi −txi−1 = ∆xi < ∆xi+1 = txi+1−txi for all i = 1, ..., N .





note that tx1 ≤ t1(N + 1) (by the condition (M ′)) and tx2 − tx1 ≥ t2(N + 1)− t1(N + 1) > t1(N + 1)
(because ∆i+1 = ∆(∆i, b, k) increases in ∆i).
I will show that as x changes from tN−1(N) to tN (N + 1), the expected payoff of R increases.



























i )− uR(axi+1, txi )
)
.
By the monotonicity condition (M ′): dt
x
i
dx > 0, i = 1, . . . , N . Next, for each i = 1, . . . , N :
uR(axi , t
x






























Here the last inequality evidently holds because ∆xi+1 > ∆
x
i for i = 1, . . . , N and x ∈ [tN−1(N), tN (N+
1)].
Welfare of the Sender. Second, I prove the welfare statement for S. Consider two equilib-
rium partitions: t(N) = (0 = t0(N), t1(N), ..., tN (N) = 1) and t(N + 1) = (0 = t0(N + 1), t1(N +
1), ..., tN+1(N + 1) = 1). Denote the lengths of the intervals in these partitions as {∆i(N)}Ni=1 and
{∆i(N + 1)}N+1i=1 , respectively. Let {ai(N)}Ni=1, where ai(N) = ti(N)+ti−1(N)2 , be the set of equilib-
rium actions corresponding to t(N), and {ai(N + 1)}N+1i=1 , where ai(N + 1) = ti(N+1)+ti−1(N+1)2 , be
the set of equilibrium actions corresponding to t(N + 1). I will show that S is ex-ante better off
under the partition t(N + 1) than under t(N).
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where EuR(t(N)) is R’s expected payoff in t(N) partition equilibrium. Similarly, the expected
utility of S in t(N + 1) partition equilibrium is





kc(uR(ai(N + 1), t), ei(N + 1))dt.
From the welfare result for the Receiver, I already know that EuR(t(N)) < EuR(t(N + 1)). Thus,










c(uR(ai(N + 1), t), ei(N + 1))dt. (4.11)




12 and that c(u
R(ai(N), t), ei(N)) is 0 for all t ∈
(ai(N)−
√−ei(N), ai(N) +√−ei(N)). Now calculate the expected cost in the interval ∆i:
∫ ti(N)
ti−1(N)






Express t in terms of a new variable s: t = ai(N) +
√−ei(N) + s, where s changes from 0 to
∆i(N)
2 −
√−ei(N) = ∆i(N)√3−12√3 . Thus,
(ei(N)− uR(ai(N), t))2 =
(

























ds = A · (∆i(N))5,









As in the previous step, consider tx = (0 = tx0 , t
x
1 , . . . , t
x
N = x, t
x
N+1 = 1) where the indifference







5; if x = tN (N + 1), then t







i=1 (∆i(N + 1))
5.





















4 − (∆xi+1)4) < 0
because
dtxi




i+1 for all i. Thus, (4.12) holds, i.e., the Sender’s expected cost is
greater in t(N)-partition equilibrium. Hence, S ex-ante prefers a partition equilibrium with more
intervals. QED.
Proof of Theorem 21. The proof has the same logic as argumentation in Section 5 of [Crawford
and Sobel, 1982]. Here I consider the case of an increase in k: k1 < k2 (the case of a decrease in
bias b is proved in the same way). Fix the number of intervals in the equilibrium partition, N .
Denote the equilibrium partition corresponding to ki as t
ki . As before, I will argue that there exists
a continuous deformation of tk1 to tk2 along which the expected utility of R increases.
Denote by tk = (tk0, t
k
1, . . . , t
k
N ) a partition that satisfies the indifference condition (4.2) with
cost intensity k for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, tk0 = 0, and tkN = 1. Note that if k = k1, then tk = tk1 ; if
k = k2, then t
k = tk2 . In what follows, I show that as k changes from k1 to k2, the expected utility
of R increases.
First, I prove the following lemma (an analogue of Lemma 4 of [Crawford and Sobel, 1982]):
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Lemma 21. If tk1 and tk2 are two partial partitions of length n satisfying the indifference condition












i for all i = 1, ..., n− 1.
Proof. The proof is by induction on n. Clearly, the statement holds for n = 1. Consider n = 2.











2 . Now consider n ≥ 4.






n−1. Assume that the statement does not hold for all i, and take
the largest j ∈ {2, ..., N − 2}, such that tk2j ≤ tk1j . Let tx = (0 = tx0 , x = tx1 , ..., txj ) be a partition,
such that (4.10) is satisfied with the cost intensity of k2 for i = 1, ..., j − 1. One can find x ≥ tk21
such that txj = t
k1




i for all i = 1, ..., j− 1. In particular,
txj−1 > t
k1
j−1, and if one continues this partition t
x (satisfying (4.10) with the cost intensity k2) up
to the n’th interval, one would get that txn < t
k1
n (because ∆i+1 = ∆(∆i, b, k) decreases in k). But
this leads to a contradiction that tk1n = t
k2
n initially (because x ≥ tk21 ). This proves the statement
of the lemma.
Lemma 21 immediately implies that tki increases in k for all i = 1, ..., N − 1. The expected































i )− UR(aki+1, tki )
)
.
Because tki increases in k,
dtxi
dx > 0, i = 1, . . . , N . Now consider the expression in brackets for the
term i in the sum:
uR(aki , t
k













because ∆ki+1 > ∆
k
i for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, and k ∈ [k1, k2]. QED.
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Proof of Theorem 22. Step 1: Equilibrium conditions. First, I show that the belief β(t|m)
and equations (4.6), (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9) form equilibrium conditions. If the types in the interval
(ti−1, ti) send the same message m = i, then the preferred action of the Receiver is determined
from maxa∈R
∫ ti
ti−1 ϕ(a− t)dt. The best action ai satisfies the following first-order condition:∫ ti
ti−1
ϕ′(ai − t)dt = 0,
ϕ(ai − ti)− ϕ(ai − ti−1) = 0,
which, by symmetry of ϕ(·), implies that ai = ti−1+ti2 . Thus, (4.8) provides R’s best response, given
























which is exactly (4.9).
Now I will show that given the belief β(m) (uniform on the intervals of the partition (4.6)) and
R’s action strategy presented in (4.8), the best response of S is described by (4.7). Note that if S
sends the message i, then the induced payoff expectation is strictly greater than the actual utility





ϕ(ai − t)dt > 1
ti − ti−1 (ti − ti−1)ϕ(ai − ti−1) = ϕ(ai − ti−1) = ϕ(ai − ti).
This fact, accompanied by the strict concavity of ϕ, means that for any interval (ti−1, ti) there exist
cli and c
r




2 = ai < c
r
i < ti and ψ(ϕ(ai − t) − ei) = 0 for t ∈ (cli, cri ),
and ψ(ϕ(ai − t) − ei) > 0, otherwise. Note that the intervals (cli, cri ) and (clj , crj) do not intersect
for i 6= j.
Consider two pairs (ai, ei) and (ai+1, ei+1) that correspond to the intervals (ti−1, ti) and (ti, ti+1),
respectively. Type ti sender is indifferent between the pairs if and only if
uS(ai, ti, b)− uS(ai+1, ti, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS(ti)
= k [ψ (ϕ(ai − ti)− ei)− ψ (ϕ(ai+1 − ti)− ei+1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS(ti)
.
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Now I will argue that the type s sender prefers the pair (ai, ei) to (ai+1, ei+1) if and only if
s ≤ ti. The condition that the pair (ai, ei) is better for sender s than (ai+1, ei+1) is
uS(ai, s, b)− uS(ai+1, s, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS(s)
> k (ψ(ϕ(ai − s)− ei)− ψ(ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS(s)
.
Because LHS(ti) = RHS(ti), it is sufficient to show that LHS(s) is strictly decreasing in s and
RHS(s) is increasing in s.




uS1 (a, s, b)da.




uS12(a, s, b)da < 0,
because uS12(a, s, b) > 0 for all s. Thus, LHS strictly decreases with s.
Differentiating RHS(s) gives
RHS′(s) = −ψ′(ϕ(ai − s)− ei)ϕ′(ai − s) + ψ′(ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1)ϕ′(ai+1 − s).
To show that RHS′(s) > 0, I separately consider 5 intervals to which [0,1] interval is split by the







Case 1. s ∈ [cli, cri ]. For these types, the cost from inducing pair (ai, ei) is 0, hence
RHS′(s) = ψ′(ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
ϕ′(ai+1 − s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0,
where ψ′(ϕ(ai+1 − s) − ei+1) < 0 because ϕ(ai+1 − s) − ei+1 < 0, and ϕ′(ai+1 − s) < 0 because
ai+1 − s > 0.
Case 2. s ∈ (cri , cli+1). For these types, the costs from inducing both pairs are nonzero,
RHS′(s) = −ψ′(ϕ(ai − s)− ei)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
ϕ′(ai − s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ψ′(ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
ϕ′(ai+1 − s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0,
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where ψ′(ϕ(ai − s) − ei) < 0 because ϕ(ai − s) − ei < 0; ϕ′(ai − s) > 0 because ai − s < 0;
ψ′(ϕ(ai+1−s)−ei+1) < 0 because ϕ(ai+1−s)−ei+1 < 0; and ϕ′(ai+1−s) < 0 because ai+1−s > 0.
Case 3. s ∈ [cli+1, cri+1]. For these types, the cost from inducing pair (ai+1, ei+1) is 0, hence
RHS′(s) = −ψ′(ϕ(ai − s)− ei)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
ϕ′(ai − s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0,
where ψ′(ϕ(ai − s)− ei) < 0 because ϕ(ai − s)− ei < 0, and ϕ′(ai − s) > 0 because ai − s < 0.
Case 4. s ∈ [0, cli). For these types, the cost from inducing any pair is non-zero and
RHS′(s) = −ψ′(ϕ(ai − s)− ei)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
ϕ′(ai − s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ψ′(ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
ϕ′(ai+1 − s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
Note that |ϕ′(ai − s)| < |ϕ′(ai+1 − s)|. To prove that RHS′(s) > 0, it is sufficient to show that
|ψ′(ϕ(ai − s)− ei)| < |ψ′(ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1)|, i.e.,
0 > ϕ(ai − s)− ei > ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1,
ϕ(ai − s)− ϕ(ai+1 − s) > ei − ei+1.
Differentiating the left-hand side yields
−ϕ′(ai − s) + ϕ′(ai+1 − s) < 0,
meaning that it is decreasing in s. Hence,
ϕ(ai − s)− ϕ(ai+1 − s) > ϕ(ai − cli)− ϕ(ai+1 − cli) = ei − ϕ(ai+1 − cli) > ei − ei+1
because ϕ(ai−cli) = ei (by the definition of cli) and ϕ(ai+1−cli) < ei+1. Hence, |ψ′(ϕ(ai−s)−ei)| <
|ψ′(ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1)| and RHS′(s) > 0.
Case 5. s ∈ (cri , 1]. For these types, the cost from inducing any pair is non-zero and
RHS′(s) = −ψ′(ϕ(ai − s)− ei)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
ϕ′(ai − s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ψ′(ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
ϕ′(ai+1 − s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
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Note that |ϕ′(ai − s)| > |ϕ′(ai+1 − s)|. To prove that RHS′(s) > 0, it is sufficient to show that
|ψ′(ϕ(ai − s)− ei)| > |ψ′(ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1)|, i.e.,
0 > ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1 > ϕ(ai − s)− ei,
ϕ(ai − s)− ϕ(ai+1 − s) < ei − ei+1.
Differentiating the left-hand side yields
−ϕ′(ai − s) + ϕ′(ai+1 − s) < 0,
meaning that it is decreasing in s. Hence,
ϕ(ai − s)− ϕ(ai+1 − s) < ϕ(ai − cri+1)− ϕ(ai+1 − cri+1) = ϕ(ai − cri+1)− ei+1 < ei − ei+1.
Hence, |ψ′(ϕ(ai − s)− ei)| > |ψ′(ϕ(ai+1 − s)− ei+1)| and RHS′(s) > 0.
This proves that the best response of S takes the form described in Theorem 22.
Step 2: Monotonicity of ∆i. Now I will argue that ∆i < ∆i+1 for all i = 1, ..., N − 1. Type








































First, I show that ∆i 6= ∆i+1. Suppose the opposite: ∆i = ∆i+1. Then ei = ei+1, which
leads to RHS = 0, while LHS < 0 because uS(·, ti, b) is symmetric in the first argument around
aS(ti, b) > ti. Thus, it cannot be that ∆i = ∆i+1.
Second, suppose ∆i > ∆i+1. Then LHS < 0 by the same symmetry reason. Now I show that
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Here, the first equality is an application of Leibniz’s rule; the second equality follows from the
mean value theorem for integration with s˜ ∈ (0,∆/2). The third equality follows from the mean









. The negative derivative of g
means that if ∆i > ∆i+1, then g(∆i) < g(∆i+1) < 0. This, by convexity of ψ, implies that
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